United States v. Clovis A. Reeves , 318 F. App'x 807 ( 2009 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
MAR 6, 2009
No. 08-14399 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 07-00286-CR-1-CC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CLOVIS A. REEVES,
a.k.a. Clovis Reeves,
a.k.a. C,
a.k.a. Clovis Reed,
a.k.a. KJ,
a.k.a. Keith Johnson,
a.k.a. T,
a.k.a. K,
a.k.a. Alaray Reed,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_________________________
(March 6, 2009)
Before BIRCH, BARKETT and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Clovis A. Reeves appeals his convictions on one count of conspiracy to
make false statements in an application for the purchase of firearms, 18 U.S.C.
§ 371, seven counts of making false statements in an application for the purchase
of firearms, 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(a)(1)(A), 2, and four counts of being a convicted
felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g), 924(a)(2). The sole issue on
appeal is whether the district court committed reversible error when it denied
Reeves’s motion in limine to exclude the testimony of 14 New Jersey police
officers as to their recovery of firearms from crime scenes near his residences.
We review a district court’s evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1202 (11th Cir. 2005). “An abuse of
discretion arises when the district court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous
finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to
fact.” Id.“Relevant evidence” is broadly defined. United States v. Glasser, 773 F.2d
1553, 1559 n.4 (11th Cir. 1985). To be relevant, “(1) [t]he evidence must be
probative of the proposition it is offered to prove, and (2) the proposition to be
proved must be one that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” Id.2
In general, “evidence introduced in a criminal trial should relate only to the
specific offense charged in the indictment.” United States v. Audsley, 486 F.2d
289, 290 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam). “Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
Fed.R.Evid. 403.
District courts have broad discretion to admit probative evidence, but their
discretion to exclude evidence under Rule 403 is limited. United States v.
Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1117 (11th Cir. 1990). “[T]he application of
Rule 403 must be cautious and sparing. Its major function is limited to excluding
matter of scant or cumulative probative force, dragged in by the heels for the sake
of its prejudicial effect.” United States v. Mills, 704 F.2d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir.
1983).
Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
discern no reversible error. Evidence that some of the firearms in question were
recovered at crime scenes in New Jersey shortly after their purchase in Georgia
was probative of Reeves’s possession of the firearms and his participation in the
conspiracy to acquire and transport them. The evidence also was not so
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prejudicial, misleading, or duplicative as to warrant its exclusion under Rule 403.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Reeves’s motion in limine.
AFFIRMED.
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