Flagship Lake County Development Number 5, LLC v. City of Mascotte, Florida , 559 F. App'x 811 ( 2014 )


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  •             Case: 13-12374   Date Filed: 03/13/2014   Page: 1 of 12
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 13-12374
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 5:12-cv-00188-WTH-PRL
    FLAGSHIP LAKE COUNTY DEVELOPMENT NUMBER 5, LLC,
    a Florida Limited Liability Company,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    CITY OF MASCOTTE, FLORIDA,
    Defendant-Appellee,
    JEFF KRULL, et al.,
    Defendants.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (March 13, 2014)
    Case: 13-12374        Date Filed: 03/13/2014       Page: 2 of 12
    Before HULL, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Plaintiff Flagship Lake County Development Number 5, LLC (“Flagship”)
    appeals the district court’s dismissal of its procedural and substantive due process
    claims, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendant City of Mascotte (“the
    City”). After careful review of the record and the briefs, we affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A.     Flagship’s First Amended Complaint1
    Plaintiff Flagship’s amended complaint arose out of the City’s denial of
    Flagship’s application for approval of the “Second Amendment to Heron’s Glen
    Planned Development Agreement, which was memorialized in Ordinance 2011-09-
    500” (“the Ordinance”). This Ordinance would have re-zoned a 245-acre property
    owned by Flagship, thereby allowing Flagship to construct waste disposal and
    waste management facilities, methane gas recovery facilities, recycling facilities,
    and wetlands habitat preservation areas on the property. Flagship alleged that the
    manner in which the City Council denied the application was arbitrary and
    1
    We present the facts as alleged in Plaintiff Flagship’s first amended complaint. At this
    point in the litigation, we must assume the facts set forth in the complaint as true. Anza v. Ideal
    Steel Supply Corp., 
    547 U.S. 451
    , 453, 
    126 S. Ct. 1991
    , 1994 (2006) (stating that on a motion to
    dismiss, the court must “accept as true the factual allegations in the amended complaint”).
    2
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    capricious and violated both procedural and substantive due process guaranteed
    under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 2
    More specifically, Plaintiff Flagship claimed that the hearing on the
    requested Ordinance “was an extremely emotional, heated, and unwieldy affair.”
    While Flagship presented expert testimony and volumes of documentary evidence
    in support of the Ordinance, the opponents responded only with “a plethora of
    emotional, argumentative, hyperbolic, and unsubstantiated arguments and
    opinions,” including “irrelevant stories about feared, potential odors, animals,
    environmental degradation, and the like.”
    Plaintiff Flagship further explained that “confusion reigned” during the
    hearing; for example, council members at times “could not even figure out what
    they were voting on.” Amidst all this confusion, City Council members
    demonstrated clear bias when they already stated their opposition to the Ordinance
    before ever hearing any evidence. Other council members admitted to having
    conducted their own research before the hearing, which Flagship contended was
    tantamount to relying on ex parte communications. One council member relied on
    an actual ex parte communication with an unidentified person about a landfill
    2
    Flagship also asserted a federal equal protection claim, which the district court
    dismissed. Flagship has not appealed from that ruling. Given the dismissal of Flagship’s federal
    claims, the district court did not address the merits of Flagship’s state law claims but remanded
    them to state court. Flagship has not appealed this aspect of the district court’s order.
    3
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    located in a different community. And, several other council members could not
    explain the reasons behind their votes against the Ordinance.
    What is more, the City Council members then discussed the Ordinance at
    the next Mascotte City Council meeting—without providing notice to Flagship that
    the Ordinance would be discussed at this meeting. Flagship also took issue with
    the purpose of this post-hearing discussion: in an “ill-conceived attempt to cleanse
    the basis for their denial of the [Ordinance],” the City Council members and the
    City attorney “attempted to match the reasons of the Council Members in regard to
    their vote with some of the testimony . . . given at the [prior] hearing.”
    Thereafter, the City Council issued an order containing its findings of fact
    and conclusions of law underlying its denial of the Ordinance. The principal
    reasons for the City Council’s denial were: (1) unpleasant odors, (2) attraction of
    rodents, (3) traffic increase due to garbage trucks, and (4) a “purported requirement
    of two distinct access point/entrance ways.” Flagship contended that these
    findings were “not supported by substantial, competent evidence”; in fact, some of
    the cited reasons were actually undermined by the evidence presented at the
    hearing.
    Based on these allegations, Plaintiff Flagship asserted that the City violated
    Flagship’s procedural and substantive due process rights. In response, the City
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    moved to dismiss these claims under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure.
    B.    The District Court’s Order
    The district court dismissed Flagship’s procedural due process claim. The
    court pointed out that Flagship had not alleged that it had availed itself of the
    remedies available under Florida law, namely the Florida Administrative
    Procedures Act, Fla. Stat. § 120.68, which “provides for judicial review of agency
    actions, including a local government’s zoning decisions.”
    The district court explained that these state remedies were available and
    adequate “to cure any procedural due process defects” that may have occurred
    during the City’s denial of Flagship’s application for the Ordinance. Given that
    Flagship failed to pursue these available and adequate state remedies, the district
    court concluded that Flagship’s procedural due process failed as a matter of law.
    The district court dismissed Flagship’s substantive due process claim for two
    reasons: First, the district court reasoned that the “Due Process Clause . . . only
    provides substantive due process protection against deprivations of fundamental
    rights . . . created by the Constitution,” and state-created property rights are “not
    subject to substantive due process protection.” Instead, “a substantive due process
    claim predicated on an arbitrary and irrational deprivation of a property interest
    should be treated as a procedural due process claim.”
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    Second, the district court concluded that “the City’s alleged actions in this
    case were specifically directed at Flagship” and thus “were executive in nature.”
    The district court explained that “executive deprivations of state-created rights . . .
    cannot support a substantive due process claim.”
    Flagship timely appealed the district court’s dismissal of the procedural and
    substantive due process claims.
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    This Court reviews “the grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for
    failure to state a claim de novo, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true
    and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Belanger v.
    Salvation Army, 
    556 F.3d 1153
    , 1155 (11th Cir. 2009). This Court also “reviews
    questions of constitutional law de novo.” United States v. Duboc, 
    694 F.3d 1223
    ,
    1228 n.5 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 
    133 S. Ct. 1278
    (2013).
    III. DISCUSSION
    A.    Flagship’s Procedural Due Process Claim
    As the district court observed, Flagship has not alleged that adequate state
    remedies were unavailable to remedy any alleged deprivations of procedural due
    process. Flagship could have availed itself of the remedies provided in the Florida
    Administrative Procedure Act, Fla. Stat. §120.68, but did not. This is fatal to
    Flagship’s procedural due process claim, as this Court has held that “‘only when
    6
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    the state refuses to provide a process sufficient to remedy the procedural
    deprivation does a constitutional violation actionable under section 1983 arise.’”
    Cotton v. Jackson, 
    216 F.3d 1328
    , 1330-31 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting McKinney v.
    Pate, 
    20 F.3d 1550
    , 1557 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
    In Cotton, the plaintiff was terminated after his employer, a state university,
    found that the plaintiff had violated the university’s sexual harassment 
    policies. 216 F.3d at 1329
    . The plaintiff asked the university and the Board of Regents to
    hold a hearing regarding his termination, but both entities denied this request. 
    Id. at 1329-30.
    The plaintiff sued the university president and members of the Board
    of Regents in federal court under § 1983, alleging that the defendants’ refusal to
    afford him a hearing was a violation of procedural due process. 
    Id. at 1330.
    This Court held that the plaintiff’s procedural due process claim failed as a
    matter of law because the plaintiff could have pursued a writ of mandamus in state
    court. 
    Id. at 1332-33.
    We explained that “[i]t is the state’s failure to provide
    adequate procedures to remedy the otherwise procedurally flawed deprivation of a
    protected interest that gives rise to a federal procedural due process claim.” 
    Id. at 1331.
    This rule “recognizes that the state must have the opportunity to remedy the
    procedural failings of its subdivisions and agencies in the appropriate fora—
    agencies, review boards, and state courts before being subjected to a claim alleging
    a procedural due process violation.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted). Thus,
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    “[i]f adequate state remedies were available but the plaintiff failed to take
    advantage of them, the plaintiff cannot rely on that failure to claim that the state
    deprived him of procedural due process.” 
    Id. We therefore
    concluded in Cotton
    that “because adequate state remedies were available to provide Plaintiff with the
    opportunity for a . . . hearing, he has failed to state a procedural due process
    claim.” 
    Id. at 1330.
    Again and again, this Court has repeated the basic rule that a procedural due
    process claim can exist only if no adequate state remedies are available. See
    Reams v. Irvin, 
    561 F.3d 1258
    , 1266-67 (11th Cir. 2009) (“Because we conclude
    that available state remedies were adequate to cure any erroneous deprivation of
    [the plaintiff’s] protected interest in her equines, [the plaintiff] has failed to
    establish that her procedural due process rights were violated”); Foxy Lady, Inc. v.
    City of Atlanta, 
    347 F.3d 1232
    , 1238 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[E]ven if a procedural
    deprivation exists . . ., such a claim will not be cognizable under § 1983 if the state
    provides a means by which to remedy the alleged deprivation”); Horton v. Bd. of
    Cnty. Comm’rs of Flagler Cnty., 
    202 F.3d 1297
    , 1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (no federal
    procedural due process violation if state courts “generally would provide an
    adequate remedy for the procedural deprivation the federal court plaintiff claims to
    have suffered”); Bell v. City of Demopolis, 
    86 F.3d 191
    , 192 (11th Cir. 1996)
    (affirming district court’s dismissal of procedural due process in employment
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    discrimination context because “Alabama has available a satisfactory means by
    which [the plaintiff] can seek redress for any procedural due process deprivation”);
    Narey v. Dean, 
    32 F.3d 1521
    , 1528 (11th Cir. 1994) (concluding that because the
    plaintiff “did not take advantage of the opportunity for state court review, [the
    plaintiff] cannot now claim that the state deprived him of procedural due process”).
    Flagship’s complaint failed to allege that adequate state remedies were
    unavailable to cure the procedural deprivations allegedly committed by the City.
    Nor did the complaint allege that Flagship attempted to avail itself of the remedies
    provided in the Florida Administrative Procedure Act. Our binding precedent
    therefore bars Flagship’s procedural due process claim as a matter of law.
    Flagship, instead, relies on cases holding “that there is no requirement that a
    plaintiff exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit under § 1983.”
    Beaulieu v. City of Alabaster, 
    454 F.3d 1219
    , 1226-27 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing
    Patsy v. Board of Regents, 
    457 U.S. 496
    , 516, 
    102 S. Ct. 2557
    , 2568 (1982)). That
    concept is true; but it is also inapposite here. As this Court explained in Cotton,
    the rule that a section 1983 claim is not stated unless inadequate state procedures
    exist to remedy an alleged procedural deprivation “is not an exhaustion
    
    requirement.” 216 F.3d at 1331
    & n.2. Instead, it is “a recognition that procedural
    due process violations do not even exist unless no adequate state remedies are
    available.” 
    Id. at 1331
    n.2. In other words, the unavailability of adequate remedies
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    is an element of a procedural due process claim—as opposed to an exhaustion
    requirement.
    B.    Substantive Due Process
    Flagship’s substantive due process claim is also barred by this Court’s
    precedent. “The substantive component of the Due Process Clause protects those
    rights that are ‘fundamental’ that is, rights that are ‘implicit in the concept of
    ordered liberty.’” 
    McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1556
    (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 
    302 U.S. 319
    , 325, 
    58 S. Ct. 149
    , 152 (1937)). However, “areas in which substantive
    rights are created only by state law . . . are not subject to substantive due process
    protection under the Due Process Clause because ‘substantive due process rights
    are created only by the Constitution.’” 
    Id. (quoting Regents
    of Univ. of Mich. v.
    Ewing, 
    474 U.S. 214
    , 229, 
    106 S. Ct. 507
    , 515 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring)).
    “The list of state-created rights . . . include[s] land-use rights like the zoning
    restrictions at issue here,” Lewis v. Brown, 
    409 F.3d 1271
    , 1273 (11th Cir. 2005),
    because these rights “are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules
    or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law,”
    Greenbriar Village, L.L.C. v. Mountain Brook, City, 
    345 F.3d 1258
    , 1262 (11th
    Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Flagship predicates its
    claim on the denial of its state-granted-and-defined land-use rights, “no substantive
    due process claim is viable.” Id.; 
    Lewis, 409 F.3d at 1272-74
    (holding that a claim
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    based on the denial of a request for re-zoning is not viable as a substantive due
    process claim).
    The rights Flagship advances here are indistinguishable from those asserted
    by the plaintiffs in Lewis. There, the plaintiffs also alleged a substantive due
    process violation after a local government entity denied the plaintiffs’ request to
    re-zone their property. 
    Lewis, 409 F.3d at 1272
    . The plaintiffs contended that this
    denial was arbitrary and capricious. 
    Id. This Court
    explained in Lewis that such a land-use claim falls under the
    general rule that “areas in which substantive rights are created only by state law are
    not subject to substantive due process protection.” 
    Id. at 1272-73
    (internal
    quotation marks omitted). An exception to the general rule applies when “an
    individual’s state-created rights are infringed by legislative act.” 
    Id. at 1273.
    In
    that scenario, “the substantive component of the Due Process Clause generally
    protects [the individual] from arbitrary and irrational action by the government.”
    
    Id. By contrast,
    “[n]on-legislative, or executive, deprivations of state-created
    rights, which would include land-use rights, cannot support a substantive due
    process claim, not even if the plaintiff alleges that the government acted arbitrarily
    and irrationally.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted).
    The question in Lewis was therefore whether the government decision “was
    a legislative act or an executive act.” 
    Id. This Court
    squarely held that the local
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    government’s denial of a request to re-zone the plaintiffs’ property was “a textbook
    ‘executive act’” because this decision affected only a limited number of people,
    namely the plaintiffs. 
    Id. As a
    result, the denial of the request for re-zoning was
    an executive act that could not form the basis of a substantive due process claim.
    
    Id. So too
    here. Flagship has not distinguished itself from the plaintiffs in
    Lewis. Flagship asserts a state-created property right; more specifically, it claims
    that the City’s arbitrary and capricious denial of the request to re-zone Flagship’s
    property impinges on the company’s land-use rights. The City’s decision was a
    “textbook executive act” because it affected only Flagship. Thus, Flagship’s claim
    is subject to this Court’s general rule that no substantive due process claim exists
    for executive acts affecting state-created land-use rights. See id.; Greenbriar
    Village, 
    L.L.C., 345 F.3d at 1262
    .3
    IV. CONCLUSION
    For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
    Flagship’s procedural and substantive due process claims.
    AFFIRMED.
    3
    We reject Flagship’s argument that the Supreme Court’s decision in Lingle v. Chevron
    U.S.A, Inc., 
    544 U.S. 528
    , 
    125 S. Ct. 2074
    (2005) provides a basis for Flagship’s claim. Lingle
    addressed a Fifth Amendment takings claim arising from a rent-control statute, see 
    id. at 532-34,
    125 S. Ct. 2078-79
    , not a substantive due process claim arising out of a zoning decision.
    12