Tracy Ravizee v. Commissioner of Social Security , 646 F. App'x 747 ( 2016 )

Case: 15-13860 Date Filed: 03/23/2016 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 15-13860
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cv-00412-M
TRACY RAVIZEE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
________________________
(March 23, 2016)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 15-13860 Date Filed: 03/23/2016 Page: 2 of 4
Tracey Ravizee appeals a decision that affirmed the denial of his application
for supplemental security income and disability insurance benefits. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1383(c)(3), 405(g). Ravizee argues that the administrative law judge gave
insufficient weight to the opinion of his examining psychologist that he was
mentally retarded. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.05(C). We affirm.
The administrative law judge was entitled to discount the opinion of Dr.
John Goff in determining whether Ravizee was mentally disabled. Dr. Goff
examined Ravizee regarding his application for disability, see id.
§ 404.1527(c)(2)(i)-(ii) (providing that the length and extent of treatment affects
the weight given a physician’s opinion), and offered an opinion that was internally
inconsistent, see id. § 404.1527(c)(4). Dr. Goff described Ravizee as a “credible
historian,” but the doctor discredited Ravizee’s work history and his description of
his daily activities. Dr. Goff opined that Ravizee was moderately limited in his
abilities to cope with coworkers, to handle customary work pressures, and to carry
out simple instructions, yet the doctor acknowledged that the results of his
personality assessment were “invalid” and that Ravizee could understand and
follow simple instructions. And Dr. Goff’s opinion that Ravizee was incapable of
performing activities of daily life or maintaining concentration, attention, or pace
for two hours was inconsistent with Ravizee’s statements about his extensive work
history and his daily routine. See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1241 (11th
2
Case: 15-13860 Date Filed: 03/23/2016 Page: 3 of 4
Cir. 2004); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (providing that an expert’s opinion is given
“controlling weight” if it is “not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence”).
Substantial evidence supports the finding of the administrative law judge
that Ravizee was not mentally retarded. The administrative law judge considered
Ravizee’s work, medical, and educational records, his testimony, and opinion
evidence and reasonably determined that the presumption of mental retardation
created by Ravizee’s intelligence score of 67 was rebutted by evidence of his
adaptive functioning. See Hodges v. Barnhart, 276 F.3d 1265, 1268–69 (11th Cir.
2001) (stating that a claimant’s low IQ scores create a presumption of mental
retardation that may be rebutted with “evidence of [the claimant’s] daily life”).
Ravizee’s accomplishments and daily activities established that he could function
independently. See Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (“[A]
valid I.Q. score need not be conclusive of mental retardation where the I.Q. score
is inconsistent with other evidence in the record on the claimant’s daily activities
and behavior.”). Ravizee’s work records reflected that he served in the Job Corps
for two years and received certificates for carpentry and maintenance, obtained a
job in construction for nine months, and then worked full-time for 12 years as a
chain offbearer at a lumber company. Ravizee stated in a disability report that he
stopped working because was laid off, not because he was incapacitated by his
ailments. Ravizee also stated that he had never been treated or medicated for a
3
Case: 15-13860 Date Filed: 03/23/2016 Page: 4 of 4
mental condition. And Ravizee testified that he cooked, performed light
housework, shopped for himself, paid bills, opened a savings account, counted his
currency, had a driver’s license, purchased vehicles and insurance, and walked or
drove three to four times a week to stores, to socialize with friends, and to attend
appointments and church services. The administrative law judge was entitled to
consider the opinion of Dr. Sydney Garner, a psychological expert, that Ravizee
had borderline intellectual function because that diagnosis was more consistent
with Ravizee’s communication skills, his work history, and his daily life. See id.;
see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(b), (e)(2)(ii) (explaining that the Commissioner
considers “the medical opinions in your case record together with the rest of the
relevant evidence” to determine whether an applicant is disabled).
We AFFIRM the denial of Ravizee’s application for benefits.
4