United States v. David Silva , 566 F. App'x 804 ( 2014 )


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  •            Case: 13-12464   Date Filed: 05/15/2014   Page: 1 of 9
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 13-12464
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cr-20452-KMM-9
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    DAVID SILVA,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (May 15, 2014)
    Before CARNES, Chief Judge, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 13-12464     Date Filed: 05/15/2014   Page: 2 of 9
    David Silva appeals his 120-month sentence for conspiring to possess with
    intent to distribute marijuana, contending for the first time on appeal that the
    district court: (1) improperly deferred to the government’s assertions about his
    truthfulness and candor when denying him safety-valve relief; and (2) violated
    Alleyne v. United States, 
    133 S.Ct. 2151
     (2013), by making findings reserved for a
    jury.
    I.
    Silva was indicted on one count of conspiring to possess with intent to
    distribute marijuana, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    . He pleaded guilty under a
    written plea agreement, in which he acknowledged his role in a drug trafficking
    ring and stipulated that the conspiracy involved 1,000 or more marijuana plants.
    Silva’s plea agreement noted that he was subject to a statutory minimum of ten
    years imprisonment.
    Silva’s presentence investigation report (PSR) calculated a base offense
    level of 26 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(5) and (c)(7), with a 2-level increase under
    § 2D1.1(b)(12) for maintaining a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or
    distributing a controlled substance. After a 3-level reduction under § 3E1.1 for
    acceptance of responsibility, the PSR assigned Silva a total offense level of 25.
    Together with his criminal history category of I, that gave him an initial guidelines
    range of 57 to 71 months imprisonment. But because Silva was subject to a
    2
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    mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years under 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A)(vii), the
    PSR set his final guidelines range at 120 months, in accordance with U.S.S.G.
    § 5G1.1.
    Silva objected to the PSR on the ground that it failed to grant him safety-
    valve relief under § 5C1.2(a), which would have made the 120-month minimum
    sentence no longer mandatory and would have reduced his total offense level to
    23.1 See U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a). The government filed a response asserting that
    Silva was not eligible for safety-valve relief because he had not given a safety-
    valve debriefing. It indicated that he could still give a debriefing but warned that
    he would be expected to talk about a corrupt police officer who had aided the drug
    conspiracy, an officer the government believed that Silva had introduced to his co-
    conspirators. Though the government did not give the officer’s name in its filed
    response, the record reveals that it was referring to Silva’s brother, Roderick Silva,
    who worked for the Miami-Dade Police Department at the time. Silva requested
    that he be given the opportunity for a safety-valve debriefing, and the parties met
    for that purpose shortly before the sentence hearing.
    At that hearing a few days later, Silva renewed his request for safety-valve
    relief, noting that he had finally spoken with the government. The government
    1
    Silva made other objections to the PSR, which are not at issue in this appeal. With a
    total offense level of 23 and criminal history category of I, Silva’s guidelines range would have
    been 46 to 57 months.
    3
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    again objected, stating that when the parties met Silva had not been candid and
    truthful, which is required for safety-valve relief. The government noted that Silva
    talked only grudgingly during his debriefing. And to the extent he did talk, it was
    to assert that he knew nothing about his brother Roderick’s involvement in the
    conspiracy, despite evidence from multiple sources, including Roderick himself,
    showing that the officer had taken bribes from and had given help to Silva’s co-
    conspirators. Knowing that Silva was a full-fledged partner in the drug trafficking
    network, the government argued that it was not believable that he had no idea his
    brother was involved.
    At the conclusion of the sentence hearing, the district court determined that
    Silva did not qualify for safety-valve relief because he had been neither candid nor
    truthful when talking to the government. The court noted that Silva’s position in
    the conspiracy and the independent evidence of his brother’s involvement both
    suggested that Silva lied and withheld information about Roderick’s role. The
    court indicated that circumstantial factors also cast doubt on Silva’s candor and
    honesty, such as his delay in seeking a debriefing, his refusal to speak openly with
    the government when the debriefing finally took place, and his failure to present
    any evidence supporting the truth of his statements other than the unsubstantiated
    arguments of his attorney. The district court sentenced Silva to the mandatory
    minimum of 120-months imprisonment.
    4
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    II.
    Silva first challenges the district court’s factual finding that he did not
    satisfy the criteria for safety-valve relief under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (f) and U.S.S.G.
    § 5C1.2(a). A district court’s assessment of the candor and completeness of a
    defendant’s safety-valve disclosure is a factual determination normally reviewed
    for clear error. United States v. Johnson, 
    375 F.3d 1300
    , 1301 (11th Cir. 2004).
    Because Silva has raised this issue for the first time on appeal, however, we review
    it only for plain error.2 United States v. De La Garza, 
    516 F.3d 1266
    , 1269 (11th
    Cir. 2008). As a result, Silva bears the burden of showing that there is “(1) an
    error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects [his] substantial rights, and (4) that seriously
    affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” 
    Id.
    The “safety valve” at issue here is a statutory creature. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (f). It allows defendants who meet certain requirements to avoid the
    statutory minimum sentences that would otherwise apply to their crimes. United
    States v. Brehm, 
    442 F.3d 1291
    , 1299 (11th Cir. 2006). Defendants seeking
    safety-valve relief must satisfy the five criteria found in U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a), only
    the fifth of which is at issue here:
    2
    Silva did object to the denial of safety-valve relief at the time of his sentencing, but he
    did so on grounds different from those he now raises on appeal.
    5
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    (5) not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has
    truthfully provided to the Government all information and evidence
    the defendant has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of
    the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan, but the
    fact that the defendant has no relevant or useful other information to
    provide or that the Government is already aware of the information
    shall not preclude a determination by the court that the defendant has
    complied with this requirement.
    U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(5). This “tell all” provision requires defendants to truthfully
    tell everything they know about the crimes and conspiracies in which they were
    involved. United States v. Yate, 
    176 F.3d 1309
    , 1310 (11th Cir. 1999). As with all
    of the other safety-valve criteria, defendants bear the burden of proving that they
    have truthfully told all there is to tell. See United States v. Milkintas, 
    470 F.3d 1339
    , 1345 (11th Cir. 2006).
    Silva asserts that the district court improperly deferred to the government’s
    conclusion that he was lying, a proposition for which his sole support is our
    decision in United States v. Espinosa, 
    172 F.3d 795
     (11th Cir. 1999). In Espinosa,
    we concluded that the district court erred by blindly accepting the government’s
    assertion about the quantity of drugs involved in the crime without first assessing
    the credibility of the defendant’s contrary position. See Espinosa, 
    172 F.3d at 797
    .
    Given what occurred in this case, however, Espinosa is far off point. The record
    here shows that the district court did not simply adopt the government’s
    assessment of Silva’s candor. Instead, the court fulfilled its duty as a factfinder,
    considered both parties’ positions, and concluded based on the arguments and the
    6
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    record before it that Silva had not been candid enough to earn safety-valve relief.
    The district court did not improperly defer to the government’s assessment of
    Silva’s honesty, and we conclude that it did not err, much less plainly err, in
    finding that Silva was not eligible for safety-valve relief. 3
    III.
    Silva next challenges the denial of safety-valve relief on the ground that the
    district court’s factfindings violated his Sixth Amendment rights under Alleyne,
    
    133 S.Ct. at 2151
    . Because he raises this issue for the first time on appeal, we
    review it only for plain error. De La Garza, 
    516 F.3d at 1269
    .
    Under Alleyne, facts that result in a higher mandatory minimum sentence
    are treated as additional elements of an offense that must be submitted to a jury and
    found beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne, 
    133 S.Ct. at
    2162–63. Silva contends
    that because the district court’s factfindings about his truthfulness during his
    safety-valve debriefing resulted in a guidelines range increase from 46-to-57
    3
    Silva also argues that the district court violated his Sixth Amendment rights under
    Crawford v. Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
    , 
    124 S.Ct. 1354
     (2004), by relying on testimony from
    codefendants whom he was not allowed to cross-examine. The problem with this argument is
    that Crawford applies only to hearsay evidence presented during the trial of a case, not during
    non-capital sentencing. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Crawford, 
    541 U.S. at 42
    , 
    124 S.Ct. at 1359
    ;
    United States v. Cantellano, 
    430 F.3d 1142
    , 1146 (11th Cir. 2005); cf. Proffitt v. Wainwright,
    
    685 F.2d 1227
    , 1254–55 (11th Cir. 1982) (recognizing a defendant’s right to cross-examine
    witnesses during capital sentencing). And because Crawford does not apply to Silva’s
    sentencing, the direct court did not err, much less plainly err, by relying on testimony from
    Silva’s codefendants. Silva makes additional arguments about the district court’s safety-valve
    factfindings, but none of them merit discussion.
    7
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    months to 120 months, those findings should have been made by a jury, not a
    judge. 4
    That argument is meritless. While Alleyne requires a jury to find facts that
    increase a defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence, Silva’s mandatory minimum
    sentence never increased here. See id. at 2163. Before the district court found that
    Silva was not truthful in his safety-valve debriefing, his mandatory minimum
    sentence was 120 months. After the district found that he was not truthful in his
    debriefing, his mandatory minimum sentence was 120 months. All that changed as
    a result of the court’s finding was that Silva was not eligible for a sentence below
    that mandatory minimum. As a result, the district court’s safety-valve findings did
    not increase his mandatory minimum sentence as prohibited by Alleyne.
    The First Circuit has reached the same conclusion under similar
    circumstances. In United States v. Harakaly, a defendant argued that the district
    court erred in finding him ineligible for safety-valve relief on the ground that he
    occupied a managerial role in the conspiracy because, under Alleyne, such a
    finding was reserved for the jury. 
    734 F.3d 88
    , 97 (1st Cir. 2013). The Harakaly
    panel rejected that argument, reasoning that where a jury verdict or guilty plea
    results in a mandatory minimum sentence, “[j]udicial fact-finding that precludes
    4
    As we have already mentioned, had the district court granted him safety-valve relief,
    Silva’s total offense level would have been 23, which, together with his criminal history category
    of I, would have resulted in a guidelines range of 46 to 57 months. Because the district court
    found that Silva was not eligible for safety-valve relief, the court sentenced him to the statutory
    minimum of 120-months imprisonment.
    8
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    safety-valve relief is permissible because it does not increase that baseline
    minimum sentence.” 
    Id. at 99
    . To find otherwise, the panel noted, would
    “stretch[] Alleyne well beyond its actual holding.” 
    Id. at 98
    . We find that
    reasoning persuasive.
    Because the district court committed no error, much less plain error, in
    making the factual and legal determinations underlying its denial of Silva’s request
    for safety-valve relief, we affirm the sentence in this case.
    AFFIRMED.
    9