Brenda J. Burch v. Atlanta City Court ( 2018 )


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  •            Case: 17-13208   Date Filed: 06/28/2018     Page: 1 of 3
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 17-13208
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-00516-TCB
    BRENDA J. BURCH,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    ATLANTA CITY COURT,
    FULTON COUNTY,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (June 28, 2018)
    Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 17-13208        Date Filed: 06/28/2018       Page: 2 of 3
    Brenda J. Burch appeals the district court’s dismissal of her pro se complaint
    seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As required by 28 U.S.C.
    § 1915(e)(2)(B), the district court reviewed her complaint to determine whether it
    alleged facts sufficient to state a claim. Concluding it did not, the district court
    gave Burch an opportunity to amend her complaint to correct its deficiencies.
    Burch supplemented her complaint, but the district court determined the complaint
    still failed to state a plausible federal claim. In addition, the district court
    determined Burch sought damages against defendants who were immune from
    such claims under the Eleventh Amendment. It therefore dismissed Burch’s
    complaint, and Burch timely appealed. After careful review, 1 we affirm. 2
    1
    We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28
    U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de novo, viewing all allegations in the complaint as true. Hughes v.
    Lott, 
    350 F.3d 1157
    , 1159–60 (11th Cir. 2003). Pro se pleadings are construed liberally, and we
    hold them “to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys.” 
    Id. at 1160
    (quotation omitted). Issues of immunity under the Eleventh Amendment are also reviewed de
    novo. United States v. Ala. Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 
    673 F.3d 1320
    , 1324
    (11th Cir. 2012).
    2
    We affirm on the basis that Burch failed to state a plausible federal claim. Because this
    action was dismissed by the district court sua sponte, Defendants have not appeared in the case.
    Thus, neither Atlanta City Court nor Fulton County has asserted a sovereign-immunity defense
    to Burch’s claims. We are therefore free to resolve the merits of Burch’s claims before
    addressing whether her claims would otherwise be barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See
    McLendon v. Ga. Dep’t of Comty. Health, 
    261 F.3d 1252
    , 1257–59 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that
    the merits of a plaintiff’s claims may sometimes be reached before addressing the issue of
    immunity under the Eleventh Amendment); see also U.S. ex rel. Burlbaw. v. Orenduff, 
    548 F.3d 931
    , 942 (10th Cir. 2008) (“This is not a case in which the State defendant (or those purportedly
    covered by the State’s immunity) has directly asserted Eleventh Amendment immunity. If a
    State defendant had asserted it, addressing the threshold jurisdictional matter would be
    obligatory. Without such an assertion, we are not obligated to resolve the Eleventh Amendment
    issue.” (footnote omitted)). This approach is particularly appropriate here, where the merits are
    straightforward and there is no adversarial process to assist the Court in determining the more
    2
    Case: 17-13208       Date Filed: 06/28/2018       Page: 3 of 3
    Burch failed to state a claim because she did not allege facts sufficient to
    demonstrate her injuries were caused by a custom or policy that was deliberately
    indifferent to her civil rights. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
    436 U.S. 658
    ,
    690–91 (1978); McDowell v. Brown, 
    392 F.3d 1283
    , 1289 (11th Cir. 2004).
    Although Burch alleged facts suggesting Defendants failed to properly maintain
    their records of her traffic violations and court appearances, which led to her
    erroneous arrest, she merely speculates as to the reason why those records were not
    updated properly—unlawful discrimination. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 555–56 (2007) (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
    relief above the speculative level.”).
    At a minimum, Burch needed to plead facts demonstrating Defendants’
    failure to update their records went beyond mere negligence. See Cannon v.
    Macon Cty., 
    1 F.3d 1558
    , 1563 (11th Cir. 1993) (“[N]egligent conduct does not
    give rise to § 1983 liability for resulting unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty,
    or property.”). Even construed liberally, Burch failed to allege such facts. We
    therefore conclude the district court did not err by dismissing her complaint.
    AFFIRMED.
    complicated issue of whether a Georgia municipal court is an “arm of the State” for purposes of
    the Eleventh Amendment. See Tennessee v. Lane, 
    541 U.S. 509
    , 527 n.16 (2004) (citing
    favorably cases where federal appellate courts concluded municipal courts in certain states are
    entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); Tuveson v. Fla. Governor’s Council on Indian
    Affairs, Inc., 
    734 F.2d 730
    , 732 (11th Cir. 1984) (providing four-factor test for determining
    whether a particular entity is entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment).
    3