USCA11 Case: 22-10735 Document: 29-1 Date Filed: 02/07/2023 Page: 1 of 11
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-10735
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
JOHN M. TAYLOR,
Relator,
TUNYA TAYLOR,
Relator,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
THE MULTIPLAN NETWORK,
CHUBB COMPANY (AMERICA),
CHUBB COMPANY (INTERNATIONAL),
HLA ENROLLMENT CENTER,
FEDERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, et al.,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10735
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-02169-JLB-CPT
____________________
Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
John and Tunya Taylor, proceeding pro se, appeal the dis-
trict court’s dismissal of their amended complaint against a number
of defendants. The district court dismissed the amended complaint
in part because it was an impermissible shotgun pleading, and gave
the Taylors an opportunity to file a second amended complaint.
But instead of amending their complaint before the deadline ex-
pired, the Taylors appealed the district court’s dismissal order.
We conclude that the Taylors have abandoned their argu-
ment that the district court erred in dismissing their amended com-
plaint because they failed to challenge the reasons for the district
court’s dismissal. We therefore affirm.
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22-10735 Opinion of the Court 3
I
A
This is the Taylors’ second appeal before us. In their first
appeal, the Taylors challenged the district court’s dismissal with
prejudice of their amended complaint, which asserted qui tam
claims under the False Claims Act, as well as 21 other federal and
state-law claims. See Taylor v. Multiplan Network,
817 F. App’x
947 (11th Cir. 2020). Although we noted that the district court cor-
rectly dismissed the Taylors’ qui tam claims because they were
filed by pro se relators, we held that the dismissal should have been
without prejudice. See
id. Thus, we instructed the district court
on remand to “convert the dismissal of the qui tam claims to one
without prejudice.”
Id. We also instructed the district court to
separately analyze the Taylors’ additional 21 federal and state-law
claims. See
id. at 948.
On remand, the district court entered an order reopening
the case. It also converted the dismissal of the Taylors’ qui tam
claims to a “dismissal without prejudice.” D.E. 31 at 2. 1
In its order, the district court also directed the Taylors to
“serve [the amended complaint on] Defendants within sixty days
of the date of th[e] Order, and to file the returns of service within
seventy-five days.”
Id.
1
The Taylors never obtained counsel following remand, so their qui tam
claims remained dismissed.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10735
Before the deadline to serve the defendants expired, the Tay-
lors filed a one-page “Notice of Service of Amended Complaint and
District Court Order.” D.E. 33 at 1. The Taylors’ notice of service
stated, “[t]his is the official notice from the Relators to the court
that all co-defendants in this complaint have been served the
Amended [C]omplaint and the District [C]ourt order filed on
8/20/2020.”
Id. Notably, the Taylors’ notice of service was un-
sworn, signed only by Mr. Taylor, and did not specify the method
of service. The Taylors never requested a summons from the dis-
trict court.
B
Following the Taylors’ notice of service, defendants Multi-
Plan, Inc. (“MultiPlan”), MPH Acquisition Holding LLC (“MPH”),
Polaris Intermediate Corp. (“Polaris”), My Benefits Keeper
(“MBK”), Chubb Company (America) and Chubb Company (Inter-
national) (collectively, “Chubb”), and Federal Insurance Company
(“FIC”), moved to dismiss the amended complaint for insufficient
service of process. See D.E. 40, 44, 53. MPH and Polaris further
argued that dismissal was warranted because the district court
lacked personal jurisdiction over them.
The district court then dismissed the amended complaint as
an impermissible shotgun pleading and gave the Taylors “an op-
portunity to amend their pleading.” D.E. 72 at 7. The district court
explained that the Taylors’ amended complaint, which contained
334 paragraphs, was a shotgun pleading that suffered from numer-
ous deficiencies, including that (1) the defendant against whom the
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22-10735 Opinion of the Court 5
violations or causes of action alleged “[was] not specified”; (2) not
all causes of action were supported by “separately identified factual
allegations”; and (3) the Taylors alleged various “immaterial facts,
standards, and conclusions” throughout the factual background in
the amended complaint.
Id. at 6–7. The district court also found
that it lacked personal jurisdiction over MPH and Polaris, two Del-
aware holding companies without any employees or connection to
Florida.
Finally, the district court concluded that the Taylors failed
to properly effect process on all defendants. The district court ex-
plained that defendants presented “unrefuted evidence” that the
Taylors had not attempted to serve either MPH or Polaris, and
their attempt to serve Multiplan, FIC, Chubb, and MBK by provid-
ing a copy of the complaint without a summons via certified mail
did not satisfy, and was inconsistent with, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Id. at 16. Notwithstanding these issues, the district
court concluded that dismissal of the amended complaint on this
basis was “unwarranted” given the procedural posture of the case
and the Taylors’ pro se status. Id. at 18. The district court thus
held that the “appropriate remedy” was to “quash the return of ser-
vice” and require the Taylors to “reattempt service of process con-
sistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” if they decided
to file a second amended complaint. Id.
Although the district court’s order explicitly permitted the
Taylors to “file a second amended complaint” within 18 days, they
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10735
did not do so. Id. at 21. Instead, the Taylors filed the instant appeal
a week after the district court dismissed their amended complaint.2
II
The Taylors’ argument on appeal is nearly indecipherable.
The Taylors seem to appeal the district court’s February 25, 2022,
order dismissing their amended complaint, but they have listed 11
issues to be decided on appeal without raising any arguments sup-
porting the issues they raised. Indeed, the Taylors’ brief includes
an extensive summary of district court proceedings—including a
chaotic description of what occurred before their first appeal—and
citations to inapplicable caselaw, federal rules of civil and appellate
procedure, statutes, and constitutional provisions. The Taylors,
however, do not raise any argument challenging the district court’s
dismissal of their amended complaint as a shotgun pleading or the
dismissal of some of the parties for lack of jurisdiction. In fact, the
Taylors admit that they “do not fully dispute the District Court
02/25/2022 [sic] decision that said complaint may need to be re-
drafted[.]” Appellants’ Br. at 9.
Only one defendant, MBK, filed a response brief. MBK ar-
gues in response that the Taylors failed to effect proper service in
2
Before the Taylors filed their notice of appeal, they filed a motion for leave
to file an interlocutory appeal, which the district court denied. Additionally,
nearly four months after the district court’s deadline for filing a second
amended complaint expired, and after they appealed, the Taylors filed a mo-
tion to amend their complaint.
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22-10735 Opinion of the Court 7
accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Specifically,
MBK argues that the Taylors’ method of service—mailing a copy
of the amended complaint without any summons—was ineffective
under Florida law, which requires that service be made on a corpo-
ration by having an authorized process server serve certain officers
or through limited enumerated methods.
III
A
As an initial matter, we address our jurisdiction. Although
none of the parties raised any jurisdictional argument, we may ad-
dress our jurisdiction sua sponte. See Reaves v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of
Corr.,
717 F.3d 886, 905 (11th Cir. 2013). We write to clarify that
we have jurisdiction to hear this appeal given the unusual proce-
dural history and the fact that the Taylors are appealing the district
court’s dismissal of their amended complaint without prejudice.
When a district court orders the dismissal of a complaint but
provides leave to amend within a specified period of time, the dis-
missal order “becomes final (and therefore appealable) when the
time period allowed for amendment expires.” Garfield v. NDC
Health Corp.,
466 F.3d 1255, 1260 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation
marks omitted). However, “the plaintiff need not wait until the
expiration of the stated time in order to treat the dismissal as final,
but may [instead] appeal prior to the expiration of the stated time
period.” Schuurman v. Motor Vessel Betty K V,
798 F.2d 442, 445
(11th Cir. 1986). By filing an appeal prior to amending their
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10735
complaint, plaintiffs “elect to stand” on their original complaint
and “waive[ ] [their] right to further amendment.” Garfield,
466
F.3d at 1260–61.
The district court here expressly permitted the Taylors to
file a second amended complaint consistent with the district court’s
order on or before March 14, 2022. Instead of filing a second
amended complaint, as permitted by the district court, the Taylors
decided to appeal. By doing so, the Taylors waived their right to
amend their complaint and caused the district court’s dismissal or-
der to become a final and appealable order. See Garfield,
466 F.3d
at 1260–61. We therefore have jurisdiction given that the Taylors
are appealing a final order. See
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
B
We next turn to the merits of the Taylors’ appeal. We re-
view a district court’s dismissal of a complaint on “shotgun” plead-
ing grounds for abuse of discretion. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty.
Sheriff’s Off.,
792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). Additionally, we
liberally construe the filings of pro se parties. Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Although their brief is difficult to comprehend, the Taylors
state that they are appealing the district court’s order dismissing
their amended complaint. The Taylors, however, have abandoned
any argument that the district court erred in dismissing their
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22-10735 Opinion of the Court 9
amended complaint because they fail to attack on appeal the dis-
trict court’s reasons for dismissing that complaint. 3
To reverse a district court judgment that was based on mul-
tiple, independent grounds, the appellant “must convince us that
every stated ground for the judgment against him is incorrect.”
Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co.,
739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir.
2014). If the appellant fails to properly challenge one of the
grounds on which the judgment was based, “he is deemed to have
abandoned any challenge of that ground, and it follows that the
judgment is due to be affirmed.”
Id. An appellant also abandons a
claim when he (a) makes only passing references to it; (b) raises it
in a perfunctory manner without supporting arguments and au-
thority; (c) refers to it only in the “statement of the case” or “sum-
mary of the argument”; or (d) discusses the issue as mere back-
ground to his main arguments or buries the issue within those ar-
guments. See
id. at 681.
Even reading their pro se brief liberally, the Taylors make
no argument attacking the actual reasons for which the district
court dismissed their amended complaint. Here, the district court
dismissed the amended complaint because it was an impermissible
shotgun pleading, and because it lacked jurisdiction over MPH and
3
The Taylors also state in their notice of appeal that they are appealing the
district court’s order reopening the case after remand from their first appeal,
but they do not raise any argument regarding that order. As such, their
grounds for appealing that order are entirely unclear and equally abandoned.
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-10735
Polaris. The Taylors, however, raise absolutely no argument that
their amended complaint was not a shotgun pleading or that the
district court had jurisdiction over MPH and Polaris. On the con-
trary, the Taylors acknowledge that they “do not fully dispute the
District Court 02/25/2022 decision that said the complaint may
need to be redrafted[.]” Appellants’ Br. at 9.
The Taylors’ argument on appeal, at least what can be deci-
phered from their brief, seems to focus in part on the injustice of
allowing corporations to “remain silent.” Appellants’ Br. at 34, 56,
67. The Taylors believe that they “legally” served the defendants
because the defendants were served via electronic court service. Id.
at 22. But this argument misses the mark entirely because the dis-
trict court expressly found that dismissal of the amended complaint
due to the Taylors’ noncompliance with the service of process rules
was “unwarranted.” D.E. 72 at 18. As such, even the Taylors’ ar-
gument regarding alleged injustices related to the service of process
does not address the district court’s reasons for actually dismissing
their amended complaint.
Given the Taylors’ lack of argument challenging the district
court’s dismissal of their amended complaint and their concession
that they do not fully dispute the district court’s ruling, we con-
clude that the Taylors have abandoned their argument that the dis-
trict court erred in dismissing their amended complaint. See
Sapuppo,
739 F.3d at 680.
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22-10735 Opinion of the Court 11
IV
We therefore affirm the district court’s order dismissing the
Taylors’ amended complaint.
AFFIRMED.
