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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-12989
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cv-01127-MHT-TFM
ALVIN JAMES JOHNSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF ALABAMA,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
________________________
(June 21, 2018)
Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Alvin Johnson, a formerly pro se Alabama prisoner now proceeding with
counsel, appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus
petition as time-barred. We granted a certificate of appealability (“COA”) on
whether the district court erred in concluding that Johnson was not entitled to
equitable tolling.
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of a § 2254 petition as
untimely. Pugh v. Smith,
465 F.3d 1295, 1298 (11th Cir. 2006). The district
court’s application of equitable tolling to the facts in a § 2254 proceeding is
reviewed de novo. Cadet v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
853 F.3d 1216, 1221 (11th Cir.
2017), cert. denied,
138 S. Ct. 1042 (2018). We review the district court’s
determination of the facts relevant to equitable tolling for clear error. San Martin
v. McNeil,
633 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2011). We must affirm the factual
findings of the district court unless “the record lacks substantial evidence to
support them.”
Id. (quotation marks omitted). We may affirm the judgment of the
district court in a § 2254 case on any ground supported by the record. Trotter v.
Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr.,
535 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2008).
Pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(“AEDPA”), a § 2254 petition is governed by a one-year statute of limitations that
begins to run on the latest of four triggering events, including the date on which the
challenged judgment became final “by the conclusion of direct review or the
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expiration of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
Generally, if a state prisoner appeals to the state’s highest court, his conviction
becomes final when the Supreme Court denies certiorari or issues a decision on the
merits, or when the 90-day period in which to file a certiorari petition expires. See
Nix v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr.,
393 F.3d 1235, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2004). Pro se
litigants “are deemed to know of the one-year statute of limitations” governing §
2254 petitions. Outler v. United States,
485 F.3d 1273, 1282 n.4 (11th Cir. 2007).
Statutory tolling allows state prisoners to toll the limitations period while
properly filed state post-conviction actions are pending. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
We have recognized that a petition for post-conviction relief filed pursuant to Ala.
R. Crim. P. 32, as well as appeals filed in state court from the denial of a Rule 32
petition, toll § 2244’s statute of limitations. See Guenther v. Holt,
173 F.3d 1328,
1331 (11th Cir. 1999). “The time that an application for state postconviction
review is pending includes the period between (1) a lower court’s adverse
determination, and (2) the prisoner’s filing of a notice of appeal, provided that the
filing of the notice of appeal is timely under state law.” Evans v. Chavis,
546 U.S.
189, 191 (2006) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, when an order denying a state
post-conviction petition is not timely appealed, AEDPA’s statute of limitations
begins to run on the date that the state petition was initially denied. See
id. at 192.
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Under Alabama law, a prisoner has 42 days to file a notice of appeal of the
denial of his Rule 32 petition. See Ala. R. App. P. 4(b)(1). The 42-day period
begins to run on the date of the trial court’s denial of the prisoner’s petition.
Barfield v. State,
703 So. 2d 1011, 1012 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997). A motion to alter
or vacate a judgment does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal from the
denial of a Rule 32 petition. Loggins v. State,
910 So. 2d 146, 149 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2005). Alabama has adopted the prison mailbox rule, which presumes that a
pro se prisoner files his Rule 32 petition when he delivers the petition to prison
authorities for mailing. Holland v. State,
621 So. 2d 373, 375 (Ala. Crim. App.
1993).
Equitable tolling allows a state prisoner to toll AEDPA’s statute of
limitations based on “extraordinary circumstances that are both beyond his control
and unavoidable even with diligence.” Sandvik v. United States,
177 F.3d 1269,
1271 (11th Cir. 1999). The prisoner must show both “(1) that he has been pursuing
his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way
and prevented timely filing.” Holland v. Florida,
560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)
(quotation marks omitted). Equitable tolling is “an extraordinary remedy” that “is
typically applied sparingly.” Arthur v. Allen,
452 F.3d 1234, 1252 (11th Cir. 2006)
(quotation marks omitted). The focus of the “extraordinary circumstances” inquiry
“is on the circumstances surrounding the late filing of the habeas petition . . . and
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whether the conduct of others prevented the petitioner from timely filing.”
Id. at
1253 (quotation marks omitted). There must also be a causal connection between
the extraordinary circumstances and the late filing of the petition. San
Martin, 633
F.3d at 1267-68. A prisoner bears the burden of proving that he is entitled to
equitable tolling.
Id. at 1268.
Equitable tolling may be warranted when a government official affirmatively
misleads a prisoner. Spottsville v. Terry,
476 F.3d 1241, 1245 (11th Cir. 2007). In
Spottsville, we held that a state prisoner was entitled to equitable tolling when a
state appellate court told him to file his certificate of probable cause with the
wrong court and the state prisoner followed the state court’s instructions “to the
letter.”
Id. at 1243-46. And in Knight v. Schofield, we held that a state prisoner
was entitled to equitable tolling when he had received assurance from a clerk at a
state court that he would be notified when the court ruled on his post-conviction
motion, the court failed to inform him when it denied his motion, and the
limitations period lapsed while he was waiting.
292 F.3d 709, 710-11 (11th Cir.
2002).
The Supreme Court has held that, even assuming that the prisoner has
satisfied the extraordinary-circumstances prong, his failure to advance “his claims
within a reasonable time of their availability” will defeat the diligence prong where
advancing the claims in state post-conviction proceedings within a reasonable
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period would have eliminated the timeliness problem in federal court. See Pace v.
DiGuglielmo,
544 U.S. 408, 418-19 (2005). Specifically in Pace, the prisoner
failed to assert his claims more than a year after they became available to him and
waited five months after his state proceedings had ended before seeking relief in
federal court. See
id.
The Supreme Court held in Martinez v. Ryan that the ineffective assistance
of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings could serve as cause to excuse the
procedural default of an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim that was not
properly exhausted in state court. See
566 U.S. 1, 18 (2012). We have
consistently rejected the argument, however, that Martinez provides a basis for
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. See Chavez v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr.,
742 F.3d 940, 946 (11th Cir. 2014). We have also rejected the argument that we
should broaden the equitable reasoning behind Martinez because it would ignore
the Supreme Court’s statement that Martinez created only a narrow exception to
the procedural default doctrine. Arthur v. Thomas,
739 F.3d 611, 631 (11th Cir.
2014).
Here, the district court did not err in determining that Johnson was not
entitled to equitable tolling. Johnson did present evidence that he attempted to
diligently pursue his rights by filing a timely notice of appeal, as he attached a
certificate of service and a purported prison mailbox log that showed that he
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attempted to properly and timely serve the clerk of the trial court with his notice of
appeal of the denial of his Rule 32 petition, and an unspecified “clerk’s record”
that purported to show that Johnson filed two notices of appeal. See San
Martin,
633 F.3d at 1268. And, if Johnson is correct and his state appeal had been properly
filed, he would have been entitled to the additional statutory tolling while his
appeal was pending and his § 2254 petition would have been timely, which would
demonstrate the causal connection between the state’s error and his untimeliness.
See
Chavis, 546 U.S. at 191-92;
Holt, 173 F.3d at 1331; San
Martin, 633 F.3d at
1267-68.
However, this evidence does not demonstrate the extraordinary
circumstances required for equitable tolling due to a government official’s
purported error. See
Spottsville, 476 F.3d at 1245;
Holland, 560 U.S. at 649. The
evidence was not irrefutable proof that Johnson timely filed his notice of appeal
and thus does not render clearly erroneous the district court’s determination that he
did not show extraordinary circumstances. See San
Martin, 633 F.3d at 1265.
Notably, Johnson failed to raise this alleged error before the state appellate court
during his Rule 32 proceedings, casting doubt on his version of events. The clerk
of the trial court also stated that it did not have his notice of appeal and the
appellate court stated that it did, further indicating that Johnson’s own mistake
caused his appeal to be untimely. Unlike the prisoners in Knight and Spottsville,
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who clearly demonstrated that the courts’ mistakes had caused them to file their §
2254 petitions out of time, Johnson did not clearly show that the state court
misplaced his notice of appeal and caused him to lose statutory tolling, as there
was evidence indicating that the mistake was his own fault. See
Spottsville, 476
F.3d at 1243-46;
Knight, 292 F.3d at 710-11; see also San
Martin, 633 F.3d at
1268.
Furthermore, Johnson did not demonstrate that he exercised reasonable
diligence in pursing his rights once the state’s alleged error was pointed out to him.
See San
Martin, 633 F.3d at 1267. Johnson waited until June 11, 2014, to remedy
the issue with his notice of appeal, despite being informed of it on May 30.
Johnson also failed to pursue available avenues to correct this problem during the
state proceedings, as he did not request an out-of-time appeal once he was
informed that the trial court did not have his notice of appeal after the 42 days had
expired, and he did not file a protective § 2254 petition with the district court when
it became clear that the time for filing a notice of appeal had expired and his
federal rights could be prejudiced. See San
Martin, 633 F.3d at 1267; see also
Outler, 485 F.3d at 1282 n.4.
Moreover, even if Johnson had diligently pursued his rights during his Rule
32 proceedings, he provides no explanation as to why he waited 264 days after his
conviction was final to file his Rule 32 petition in the first place. See Nix,
393 F.3d
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at 1236-37; see also
Trotter, 535 F.3d at 1291. Further, and separately, Johnson
still had four days to file a timely § 2254 petition even following the final
resolution of his Rule 32 proceedings. See
Chavis, 546 U.S. at 191-92;
Holland,
621 So. 2d at 375. Yet he waited 46 days to file it. Though, unlike the situation in
Pace, Johnson did not wait an entire year after his claims originally became
available or five months to file his § 2254 petition after his state proceedings had
ended, Johnson did not make any showing that he diligently pursued his rights
outside of his actual Rule 32 proceedings. See
Pace, 544 U.S. at 418-19.
Finally, Johnson is not entitled to relief under Martinez. This Court has held
that Martinez does not apply to equitable tolling and has expressly declined to
broaden Martinez’s reasoning to pro se litigants outside of the narrow exception it
provides in the procedural-default context. See
Chavez, 742 F.3d at 946;
Thomas,
739 F.3d at 631. Further, Johnson’s former pro se status does not entitle him to
equitable tolling, as pro se litigants are responsible for knowing and complying
with the statute of limitations. See
Outler, 485 F.3d at 1282 n.4. Accordingly,
Johnson has not demonstrated that he is entitled to the “extraordinary remedy” of
equitable tolling. See
Arthur, 452 F.3d at 1252.
* * *
The district court did not err when it determined that Johnson was not
entitled to equitable tolling because its finding that Johnson did not timely file a
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notice of appeal of the denial of his state post-conviction motion was not clearly
erroneous based on the evidence that Johnson presented. Additionally, Johnson
did not demonstrate reasonable diligence because he did not attempt to protect his
rights when it became clear that his state post-conviction appeal would likely be
dismissed as untimely and he waited 264 days after his conviction became final to
begin his state post-conviction proceedings.
AFFIRMED.
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