USCA11 Case: 21-11296 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 02/09/2023 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-11296
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
DUANE E. ARMSTRONG,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
Respondents-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-00775-WFJ-SPF
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2 Opinion of the Court 21-11296
____________________
Before JORDAN, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Duane E. Armstrong, a Florida prisoner serving a 20-year
sentence for burglary of an unoccupied dwelling, dealing in stolen
property, and providing false information on a pawn broker form
(over $300), appeals the district court’s denial of his
28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 petition. We granted a certificate of appealability on the is-
sue of “[w]hether Armstrong had shown that trial counsel was in-
effective for failing to object to the forensic print analyst’s testi-
mony that a second analyst had verified her comparison of Arm-
strong’s fingerprints with the latent print found in the burglarized
home.” Armstrong asserts he was prejudiced by counsel’s error, as
the hearsay testimony from Nicole Jarvis, the forensic print analyst,
bolstered the only state witness testimony that directly connected
him to the burglary offense and the jury showed interest in
whether there had been any cases where a fingerprint expert had
been proven unreliable. After review, 1 we affirm the district court.
1 We review de novo a district court’s decision about whether a state court
acted contrary to or unreasonably applied clearly established federal law.
Reed v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr.,
593 F.3d 1217, 1239 (11th Cir. 2010). Thus,
we review the district court’s grant or denial of a § 2254 petition de novo but
owe deference to the state court’s judgment. Id.
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21-11296 Opinion of the Court 3
A federal court cannot grant habeas relief on a claim that was
“adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the
state court’s decision was (1) “contrary to, or involved an unrea-
sonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as deter-
mined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or (2) “based on
an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “De-
ciding whether a state court’s decision involved an unreasonable
application of federal law requires the federal habeas court to train
its attention on the particular reasons—both legal and factual—
why state courts rejected a state prisoner’s federal claims, and to
give appropriate deference to that decision.” Meders v. Warden,
Ga. Diagnostic Prison,
911 F.3d 1335, 1349 (11th Cir. 2019) (quota-
tion marks and ellipsis omitted).
Under Strickland v. Washington, to succeed on an ineffec-
tive-assistance-of-counsel claim, a petitioner must show that (1) his
counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient perfor-
mance prejudiced his defense.
466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). If the mo-
vant fails to establish either prong, we need not address the other
prong.
Id. at 697.
To prove the prejudice prong, the defendant must show a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient perfor-
mance, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Id.
at 694. A reasonable probability is one sufficient to undermine con-
fidence in the outcome of trial.
Id. It is not enough for the defend-
ant to show that the error had some conceivable effect on the
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4 Opinion of the Court 21-11296
outcome of the proceeding.
Id. at 693. Rather, counsel’s errors
must be “so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable.” Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 104
(2011) (quotation marks omitted). Thus,
a court hearing an ineffectiveness claim must con-
sider the totality of the evidence before the judge or
jury. Some of the factual findings will have been un-
affected by the errors, and factual findings that were
affected will have been affected in different ways.
Some errors will have had a pervasive effect on the
inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering
the entire evidentiary picture, and some will have had
an isolated, trivial effect. Moreover, a verdict or con-
clusion only weakly supported by the record is more
likely to have been affected by errors than one with
overwhelming record support. Taking the unaffected
findings as a given, and taking due account of the ef-
fect of the errors on the remaining findings, a court
making the prejudice inquiry must ask if the defend-
ant has met the burden of showing that the decision
reached would reasonably likely have been different
absent the errors.
Strickland,
466 U.S. at 695-96.
The district court did not err in denying Armstrong’s § 2254
petition because the state court reasonably applied Strickland in de-
termining Armstrong had not shown prejudice from counsel’s al-
leged deficient failure to object to Jarvis’s hearsay testimony that a
second analyst had verified her determination the fingerprint found
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21-11296 Opinion of the Court 5
on the victim’s dresser was a match to Armstrong. See 28
U.S.C.§ 2254(d). Two pieces of evidence strongly supported the
jury’s verdict: (1) the fingerprint on the dresser Jarvis concluded
was a match to both the print she took from Armstrong and to the
print from the pawn ticket that Armstrong admitted was his, and
(2) Armstrong’s sale of the stolen jewelry to the pawn shop on the
morning of the burglary. Notably, the state described the finger-
print evidence in closing as the “most important evidence” in the
case. And the jury asked questions about the accuracy of finger-
print results before returning its verdict, reflecting the jury under-
stood the significance of that evidence.
As the postconviction court reasoned in denying relief to
Armstrong, even if counsel had objected to Jarvis’s statement that
her results were verified by a second analyst and the court had ex-
cluded that testimony, the jury still would have heard her testi-
mony the fingerprint on the victim’s dresser matched Armstrong.
Armstrong concedes this point, but argues the statements at issue
improperly bolstered the only state witness testimony that directly
connected him to the burglary. Even assuming Armstrong is cor-
rect, the effect of the bolstering was trivial, as the jury’s verdict was
supported by the unaffected evidence (1) that a credentialed analyst
found the print on the dresser matched the prints she had taken
from Armstrong and his print on the pawn form and (2) his posses-
sion and sale of the stolen jewelry soon after the burglary. See
Strickland,
466 U.S. at 695-96.
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6 Opinion of the Court 21-11296
As to Armstrong’s possession and pawning of stolen jewelry,
the state postconviction court reasoned the jury would still have
heard these facts regardless of counsel’s alleged deficient perfor-
mance. Additionally, the jury must not have believed Armstrong’s
testimony that he bought the jewelry on the street for $30 and had
never been inside the victim’s home because it convicted him of
stealing the jewelry and burglarizing the home. That evidence
standing alone would have been sufficient to support his burglary
conviction, as the jury was instructed that proof of possession by
an accused of property recently stolen by means of a burglary, un-
less satisfactorily explained, may justify a conviction for burglary.
While Armstrong contends he satisfactorily explained his posses-
sion of the stolen jewelry, a fair-minded jurist could agree with the
state court that, if he had satisfactorily explained it, the jury would
not have found him guilty, even in light of the assertedly improper
bolstering of the fingerprint expert’s testimony. See Strickland,
466
U.S. at 694; Harrington,
562 U.S. at 104.
The totality of the evidence presented at trial supports the
state court’s decision that counsel’s performance, if deficient, was
not prejudicial. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694-96. The jury heard tes-
timony that jewelry was stolen during a burglary, Armstrong
pawned the jewelry on the morning it was stolen, investigators
found a fingerprint on the dresser where the jewelry had been kept
that matched Armstrong’s in the print database, and a fingerprint
expert took Armstrong’s fingerprint, compared it with a fingerprint
on the pawn transaction form that Armstrong admitted was his,
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21-11296 Opinion of the Court 7
compared both fingerprints to the fingerprint found on the victim’s
dresser, and concluded that all three fingerprints were the same
and belonged to Armstrong. Considering the strength of this evi-
dence, the fingerprint examiner’s statement that a second analyst
had verified her findings did not alter the evidentiary picture such
as to undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict. See Strickland,
3466 U.S. at 695-96. Because Armstrong has failed to show the state
court unreasonably applied Strickland in concluding Armstrong
had failed to show prejudice, it is unnecessary for us to analyze
whether Armstrong has shown counsel was deficient. See id. at
697.
AFFIRMED.
