USCA11 Case: 21-11637 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 02/10/2023 Page: 1 of 13
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-11637
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MAXWELL GARVICE JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cr-00107-CEM-EJK-1
____________________
USCA11 Case: 21-11637 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 02/10/2023 Page: 2 of 13
2 Opinion of the Court 21-11637
Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Maxwell Garvice Johnson appeals his 360-month sentence,
imposed after he pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute or possess
with intent to distribute methamphetamine. He argues that the
district court clearly erred in applying sentencing enhancements
for his leadership role in the conspiracy and for his possession of a
pistol found during the search of his home. We find no error and
affirm the sentence.
I
Mr. Johnson, his girlfriend Gena Walker, and seven others
were indicted for their participation in a narcotics conspiracy. Au-
thorities seized drugs and drug proceeds from searches conducted
of Ms. Walker’s hair salon business and of the home that she and
Mr. Johnson shared. In the master bedroom of their home, author-
ities found a 9-millimeter pistol. It was underneath the mattress
but visible.
Mr. Johnson pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute or pos-
sess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Following his
guilty plea, the United States Probation Office recommended a
four-level enhancement for his leadership role in the conspiracy
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) and a two-level enhancement for
possession of a firearm pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). Mr.
Johnson’s counsel objected to the application of these two
USCA11 Case: 21-11637 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 02/10/2023 Page: 3 of 13
21-11637 Opinion of the Court 3
enhancements, arguing that he was a supplier, not a leader, and
that he did not own or have knowledge of the firearm.
The district court overruled the objections and made a series
of findings to support the application of both enhancements. It
found that, during some recorded phone calls, Mr. Johnson gave
instructions to his co-conspirators, some of whom referred to him
as “boss”; that the amount of cash and contraband attributed to Mr.
Johnson was larger than that attributed to any other defendant ex-
cept for Robert Hamilton; that Mr. Johnson admitted he was the
owner of a stash house at Epic Apartments; and that authorities
found six cellphones within Mr. Johnson’s reach in his bedroom.
As noted earlier, the authorities also found a loaded 9-millimeter
pistol within arm’s reach of where Mr. Johnson and Mr. Walker
had slept.
II
We review a district court’s factual findings at sentencing for
clear error. See United States v. Caraballo,
595 F.3d 1214, 1231
(11th Cir. 2010) (leadership-role enhancement); United States v. Al-
fred,
144 F.3d 1405, 1420 (11th Cir. 1998) (firearm-possession en-
hancement).
III
We first address Mr. Johnson’s argument that the district
court’s application of the leadership enhancement constituted clear
error. Relying on Eleventh Circuit cases, Mr. Johnson argues that
he was merely a seller, and not a leader or organizer of the
USCA11 Case: 21-11637 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 02/10/2023 Page: 4 of 13
4 Opinion of the Court 21-11637
conspiracy. See Initial Br. at 20-21 (citing United States v. Maxwell,
34 F.3d 1006, 1012 (11th Cir. 1994) (application of the leadership
enhancement is inappropriate where “there was no evidence of an-
ything other than a seller/buyer relationship”) and United States v.
Alred,
144 F.3d 1405, 1420-21 (11th Cir. 1998) (same)). His argu-
ment, however, ignores the district court’s many findings of fact
that support its application of the leadership enhancement.
The Sentencing Guidelines call for a four-level enhancement
where the defendant “was an organizer or leader of a criminal ac-
tivity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise ex-
tensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). District courts consider these factors
when determining whether a defendant acted as a leader or organ-
izer:
(1) the exercise of decision making authority, (2) the
nature of participation in the commission of the of-
fense, (3) the recruitment of accomplices, (4) the
claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the
crime, (5) the degree of participation in planning or
organizing the offense, (6) the nature and scope of the
illegal activity, and (7) the degree of control and au-
thority exercised over others.
United States v. Caraballo,
595 F.3d 1214, 1231 (11th Cir. 2010)
(quoting U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n. 4). These factors are merely con-
siderations, and every factor need not apply. See id.
USCA11 Case: 21-11637 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 02/10/2023 Page: 5 of 13
21-11637 Opinion of the Court 5
Here, the district court found that (1) Ms. Johnson “was
clearly giving out instructions per surreptitiously recorded phone
calls[,]” and during those calls he was referred to as “boss”; (2) Mr.
Johnson was “associated with” a “large amount of cash” which was
disproportionate compared to the other co-conspirators except for
Mr. Hamilton; (3) Mr. Johnson owned a stash house and only he
and Mr. Hamilton owned stash houses and (4) Mr. Johnson admit-
ted to being peers with Mr. Hamilton, who had already been found
to be a leader or organizer under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). We consider
each finding in turn.
A
Mr. Johnson argues that the district court clearly erred in
finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was directing
others. We disagree.
In making this finding of fact, the district court relied on
transcripts of specific phone calls in which Mr. Johnson instructed
others regarding how much product to supply. During one of
these phone calls, a co-conspirator who was confused about the
quantity of drugs that he should have supplied stated “[T]hat’s all
you told me to give him boss. I was following instructions.” In
another phone call, Mr. Johnson counseled a co-conspirator about
how to better predict the quantity of drugs that a repeat customer
would need. Mr. Johnson said, “But I am still sending you. You
know she’s going to call and if she calls one time she’s call four to
five times that day. That’s guaranteed locked in.”
USCA11 Case: 21-11637 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 02/10/2023 Page: 6 of 13
6 Opinion of the Court 21-11637
Based on these and other phone calls, the district court
found that Mr. Johnson gave out instructions to co-conspirators.
The district court did not clearly err in making this finding. See
United States v. Almedina,
686 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012)
(“[W]e will not disturb a district court’s findings unless we are left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been com-
mitted.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Mr. Johnson also argues that district court erroneously re-
lied on his nickname—“boss”—which he says was not used to indi-
cate leadership, but just to show respect. According to Mr. John-
son, his characterization as “boss” does not control whether the
leadership enhancement applies because the commentary to
§ 3B1.1 says so.
The Sentencing Guideline note cited by Mr. Johnson states
that the use of a nickname like “boss” is not controlling “in distin-
guishing a leadership and organizational role from one of mere
management or supervision.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt., n. 4. In other
words, the use of such a nickname does not control whether a de-
fendant qualifies for a four-level role enhancement as “an organizer
or leader” or a three-level enhancement as “a manager or supervi-
sor.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), (b). But this does not mean that the use
of the nickname “boss” is completely irrelevant to the application
of a role enhancement under § 3B1.1. Although we agree that call-
ing a conspirator “boss” alone does not control, the district court
did not base its application of the leadership enhancement on this
one fact. See United States v. Dixon,
901 F.3d 1322, 1348 (11th Cir.
USCA11 Case: 21-11637 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 02/10/2023 Page: 7 of 13
21-11637 Opinion of the Court 7
2018) (affirming the leadership enhancement’s application because
it was based on specific findings of fact and acknowledging that be-
ing called “boss” is not controlling).
B
The district court also found that Mr. Johnson profited more
than his co-conspirators except for Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Johnson
does not challenge this finding as clearly erroneous, and indeed
seemingly agrees that he made more than his fellow dealers. In-
stead, he argues that this finding only proves that he was a whole-
saler who sold a greater volume of narcotics than the others, argu-
ing that it is “entirely conceivable” that he acted as a wholesaler.
The ability to conceive of a different explanation for Mr.
Johnson’s disproportionate profit does not render this finding irrel-
evant to the district court’s ultimate determination that Mr. John-
son was a leader. See United States v. Almedina,
686 F.3d 1312,
1315 (11th Cir. 2012) (explaining that where the facts “give[ ] rise
to two reasonable and different constructions, the factfinder’s
choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous”). And courts
may consider evidence that a defendant profited more than any
other person convicted in a criminal scheme in imposing leadership
enhancements. See United States v. Crabtree,
878 F.3d 1274, 1290
(11th Cir. 2018) (affirming imposition of leadership enhancement
based in part on the fact that he profited more than all but one of
his co-conspirators). Cf. United States v. Martinez,
584 F.3d 1022,
1028 (11th Cir. 2009) (reversing the district court’s leadership en-
hancement in part because the defendant did not claim a larger
USCA11 Case: 21-11637 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 02/10/2023 Page: 8 of 13
8 Opinion of the Court 21-11637
share of the fruits of the crime). The evidence seized and photo-
graphed at Mr. Johnson’s home shows that he had approximately
$50,000 as well as a Maserati, which was much more than the
amounts found at his co-conspirators’ homes.
The district court did not clearly err in finding that Mr. John-
son profited more than most of his co-conspirators. Nor did it err
in considering the disproportionate distribution of cash in making
a leadership determination.
C
The district court found that Mr. Johnson owned one of the
two stash houses used in the conspiracy. Again, Mr. Johnson does
not challenge this finding as clearly erroneous and instead argues
that the district court erred in considering this fact because stash
house ownership is not articulated in the Sentencing Guidelines as
a factor for determining whether to apply the leadership enhance-
ment. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. 4. See also Dixon,
901 F.3d 1322.
This argument is not persuasive.
Mr. Johnson’s ownership of the two stash houses is relevant
to the second factor—the nature of his participation in the commis-
sion of the offense—and the district court did not err in considering
evidence pertaining to Mr. Johnson’s overall role and conduct. We
agree that a leadership enhancement cannot be based solely on
ownership of a stash house because § 3B1.1 “requires the exercise
of some authority in the organization, the exertion of some degree
of control, influence, or leadership.” United States v. Martinez, 584
USCA11 Case: 21-11637 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 02/10/2023 Page: 9 of 13
21-11637 Opinion of the Court
9
F.3d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 2009). But here the district court did not
apply the leadership enhancement solely based on this finding. In-
stead, the district court considered Mr. Johnson’s ownership and
control of the stash house, together with its findings that Mr. John-
son gave instructions to his co-conspirators who referred to him as
boss, that he had profited more than most of his co-conspirators,
and that Mr. Hamilton was his peer.
D
Mr. Johnson argues that Mr. Hamilton’s role as a leader
should have no bearing on Mr. Johnson’s sentence, even though
Mr. Johnson admitted he was Mr. Hamilton’s “peer” and that they
were “on the same level.” The district court reasoned that because
it had previously applied a leadership enhancement to Mr. Hamil-
ton’s sentence, it should also apply the leadership enhancement to
his peer.
The district court did not err in considering the relative par-
ticipation of all co-conspirators to determine which, if any, quali-
fied for a leadership role enhancement. As we have explained,
there can be more than one leader of a conspiracy. See United
States v. Revel,
971 F.2d 656, 660 (11th Cir. 1992) (“In order to be
considered an organizer or leader within the meaning of the Guide-
lines, the defendant need not be the sole leader or a kingpin of the
conspiracy . . . Evidence at trial indicated that Revel and Pullman
both exercised decision-making authority and control over the op-
eration”).
USCA11 Case: 21-11637 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 02/10/2023 Page: 10 of 13
10 Opinion of the Court 21-11637
IV
Next, we consider Mr. Johnson’s argument that the district
court clearly erred in applying the two-level enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of a firearm because he was
not the owner of the firearm, made no use of it, and did not have
knowledge of it. Again, we disagree.
The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level enhance-
ment when, in connection with the drug offense charged, a defend-
ant possesses a dangerous weapon. To apply the firearms enhance-
ment, “[t]he government bears the initial burden of showing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that a firearm was ‘present’ at the
site of the charged conduct or that the defendant possessed it dur-
ing conduct associated with the offense of conviction.” United
States v. George,
872 F.3d 1197, 1204 (11th Cir. 2017). Once the
government meets this initial burden, the burden shifts to the de-
fendant to demonstrate that the connection between the weapon
and the charged offense was “clearly improbable.” United States v.
Audain,
254 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 2001). See also U.S.S.G. §
2D1.1, cmt. n.11 (“The enhancement should be applied if the
weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the
weapon was connected with the offense.”). “In effect, the govern-
ment benefits from a rebuttable presumption that a firearm, if pre-
sent—just present, not present in proximity to drugs—is connected
with the offense.” United States v. Carillo-Ayala,
713 F.3d 82, 90
(11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
USCA11 Case: 21-11637 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 02/10/2023 Page: 11 of 13
21-11637 Opinion of the Court 11
Mr. Johnson made no effort to rebut that presumption and
provided no evidence that the connection between the weapon and
the charged offense was “clearly improbable.” He argued instead
that, since the government had not met its initial burden, he was
not required to provide evidence that the connection was clearly
improbable.
The government produced evidence that, when officers ex-
ecuted a search warrant at the home of Mr. Johnson and Ms.
Walker, they found a fully loaded 9-millimeter firearm with a mag-
azine that contained 11 rounds of ammunition within arm’s reach
of where Mr. Johnson slept. The officers also found two boxes of
additional ammunition, six cell phones, two digital scales, and ap-
proximately $50,000 in cash.
Proximity between guns and drug-related items is enough
to meet the government’s initial burden. See United States v. Hall,
46 F.3d 62, 63-64 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding firearm enhancement
when the gun was found in a dresser drawer in the same room as
several drug-related objects such as scales, a bag containing cocaine
residue, and a large amount of cash); United States v. Delgado,
981
F.3d 889, 902-03 (11th Cir. 2020) (upholding firearm enhancement
where the gun was found with scales and powders and the defend-
ant’s home was the intended destination for drugs); United States
v. Carillo-Ayala,
713 F.3d at 92 (“A firearm found in close proximity
to drugs or drug-related items simply ‘has’ —without any require-
ment for additional evidence—the potential to facilitate the drug
offense.”). On this record, the district court did not clearly err in
USCA11 Case: 21-11637 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 02/10/2023 Page: 12 of 13
12 Opinion of the Court 21-11637
finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the firearm was
present at the site of the charged conduct, and Mr. Johnson does
not challenge this finding as clearly erroneous.
Mr. Johnson argues that he did not possess, or even know
about, the gun that was stored inches from where he slept, with its
brightly colored handle visibly protruding from his mattress. This
purported lack of knowledge—which the district court was not re-
quired to credit—is not sufficient to show that Mr. Johnson did not
constructively possess the gun. See United States v. Villarreal,
613
F.3d 1344, 1459 (11th Cir. 2010) (constructive possession, which
means “ownership, dominion, or control over an object itself or
control over the premises in which the object is concealed,” is suf-
ficient for a firearm enhancement). In any event, there is no dis-
pute that Mr. Johnson’s conspirator, Ms. Walker, possessed the
weapon. Mr. Johnson’s argument therefore fails. See United States
v. Westry,
524 F.3d 1198, 1221 (11th Cir. 2008).
Under § 2D1.1(b)(1) to apply the weapon enhancement to
members of a conspiracy the government must prove by prepon-
derance of the evidence that “(1) the possessor of the firearm was a
co-conspirator, (2) the possession was in furtherance of the conspir-
acy, (3) the defendant was a member of the conspiracy at the time
of possession, and (4) the co-conspirator possession was reasonably
foreseeable by the defendant.” United States v. Gallo,
195 F.3d
1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999). Mr. Johnson concedes that the govern-
ment has established that he and Ms. Walker were members of the
conspiracy at the time of the firearm possession. As to the
USCA11 Case: 21-11637 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 02/10/2023 Page: 13 of 13
21-11637 Opinion of the Court 13
foreseeability—it is reasonably foreseeable for a co-conspirator to
possess a firearm in a lucrative illegal drug conspiracy. See United
States v. Pham,
463 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2006). Mr. Johnson
and Ms. Walker not only lived together but they also were in a re-
lationship since 2013 and have a child together. Their close famili-
arity weighs in favor of Mr. Johnson’s ability to foresee Ms.
Walker’s actions. See United States v. Fields,
408 F.3d 1356, 1359
(11th Cir. 2005) (noting that because the defendant and the co-con-
spirator were cousins and grew up together their close relationship
increased the possibility that the defendant would be able to fore-
see the co-conspirator’s actions, including the gun possession).
V
We AFFIRM Mr. Johnson’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.
