Henry Lee Moody, Jr. v. Physicians Mutual Insurance Company ( 2019 )


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  •            Case: 18-13027   Date Filed: 10/11/2019   Page: 1 of 11
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 18-13027
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-00168-KD-B
    HENRY LEE MOODY, JR.,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    PHYSICIANS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Alabama
    ________________________
    (October 11, 2019)
    Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JILL PRYOR and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 18-13027          Date Filed: 10/11/2019     Page: 2 of 11
    Henry Moody, Jr. appeals the district court’s grant of Physicians Mutual
    Insurance Company’s (“Physicians Mutual”) motions for summary judgment on
    the claims arising from two lawsuits consolidated in this action. The claims arose
    when Physicians Mutual denied payment for the face value of a life insurance
    policy following the death of Moody’s wife. On appeal, Moody argues that the
    district court failed to consider all evidence before it and that he is entitled to
    payment of the face value of the death benefits insurance policy. After careful
    review, we affirm the district court’s grants of summary judgment.
    I.      BACKGROUND
    A.     Factual Background1
    In April 2011, Physicians Mutual issued a life insurance policy (the
    “Policy”) to Moody’s wife; Moody was listed as the beneficiary. The Policy
    delineated its benefits by the policy year. In the first and second policy years,
    Moody was entitled to the face value of the Policy if his wife suffered an
    accidental death. If his wife’s death was not accidental, however, Moody was
    entitled to 110% of the premiums paid. After the third policy year, Moody would
    receive the face value of the Policy following his wife’s death, whether accidental
    1
    On review of an order granting a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, we view
    the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Lee v. Ferraro, 
    284 F.3d 1188
    , 1190 (11th
    Cir. 2002). In recounting the facts here, we will note where facts are disputed and at this stage
    resolve the disputes in Moody’s favor.
    2
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    or not. The Policy defined an accidental death as a death that (1) “results from an
    accidental bodily injury occurring while the policy is in force,” (2) “occurs within
    180 days of the injury,” and (3) “is independent of disease, suicide, and all other
    causes.” Doc. 25-6 at 4.2
    Less than one year after the issuance of the Policy, Moody’s wife, who had
    amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (“ALS”), also known as Lou Gehrig’s disease, fell in
    her bedroom. Moody’s daughter testified that her mother struggled to breathe and
    required the suctioning of blood and mucus from her tracheostomy tube. She died
    shortly thereafter. A doctor certified her cause of death as a “natural cause”—
    respiratory failure “due to (or a consequence of)” her disease. Doc. 25-4 at 6.
    After his wife’s death, Moody, through his attorney, attempted to claim
    death benefits from Physicians Mutual. Physicians Mutual responded, informing
    Moody that he was entitled to 110% of premiums paid because his wife’s death
    certificate listed her cause of death as “natural cause” and no autopsy was
    performed to contradict this cause of death. And on August 13, 2012, Physicians
    Mutual sent a letter to Moody’s lawyer, explaining that Moody’s claim for the face
    value of the Policy was denied because his wife’s death was not accidental
    2
    “Doc. #” refers to the numbered entry on the district court’s docket.
    3
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    Physicians Mutual issued Moody a check for 110% of the paid premiums.
    Moody never cashed the check, and nearly four years after the issuance of the
    check, he received a Notice of Unclaimed Funds from Physicians Mutual.
    B.    Procedural History
    In March 2017, Moody filed a complaint against Physicians Mutual in the
    Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama, alleging breach of contract and fraud
    and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Physicians Mutual removed the
    action to Southern District of Alabama.
    After some discovery and motions practice—including Physician Mutual’s
    successful motion to exclude Moody’s experts’ testimony—Physicians Mutual
    filed a motion for summary judgment on Moody’s breach of contract and fraud
    claims. Instead of responding to this motion, Moody filed a motion to dismiss the
    case without prejudice. On the same day, he filed a second complaint in the
    Circuit Court of Mobile County, Alabama against Physicians Mutual, adding
    Physicians Life Insurance Company (“Physicians Life”) as a defendant and a
    breach of fiduciary duty claim. The district court denied Moody’s motion to
    dismiss and granted Physician Mutual’s motion for summary judgment,
    determining that (1) Physicians Mutual did not breach the Policy’s terms because
    no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Moody’s wife suffered from
    an accidental death and (2) Moody’s fraud claim was time-barred.
    4
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    Physicians Mutual removed the second case to the Southern District of
    Alabama, where it was consolidated with the first. Physicians Mutual then filed a
    second motion for summary judgment. It argued that (1) Moody was barred by res
    judicata from bringing the breach of contract and fraud claims and (2) Moody’s
    breach of fiduciary duty claim failed as a matter of law because Alabama law does
    not recognize a fiduciary relationship between insurers and insureds of life
    insurance policies. The district court agreed and granted the motion. This appeal
    followed.
    II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment,
    construing the facts and drawing all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor
    of the nonmoving party. Urquilla-Diaz v. Kaplan Univ., 
    780 F.3d 1039
    , 1050
    (11th Cir. 2015). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is “no genuine
    dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Conclusory allegations and speculation are
    insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Cordoba v. Dillard's
    Inc., 
    419 F.3d 1169
    , 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Speculation does not create a genuine
    issue of fact; instead, it creates a false issue, the demolition of which is a primary
    goal of summary judgment.”).
    5
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    We review de novo the district court’s application of the res judicata
    doctrine. Griswold v. Cty. of Hillsborough, 
    598 F.3d 1289
    , 1292 (11th Cir. 2010).
    III.    DISCUSSION
    A.     The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment on Moody’s
    Breach of Contract Claim.
    To succeed on his breach of contract claim, Moody needed to demonstrate
    “(1) the existence of a valid and binding contract; (2) breach of the contract by the
    defendant; and (3) money damages suffered by the plaintiff.” Guinn v. Wilkerson,
    
    963 So. 2d 555
    , 558 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006). 3 An insurance policy is a contract
    between the insurer and the insured and if clear and unambiguous will be enforced
    according to its terms. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters
    Ins. Co., 
    797 So. 2d 981
    , 985 (Miss. 2001). Because Moody cannot show that
    Physicians Mutual breached the terms of the Policy, the district court did not err in
    granting summary judgment in Physicians Mutual’s favor.
    Again, the Policy provided that, for the first two years of the Policy, Moody
    was entitled to 110% of the paid premiums unless his wife’s death was accidental.
    Only in the third year was Moody entitled to the face value of the Policy regardless
    of his wife’s cause of death.
    3
    Because the parties agree that Mississippi law applies here, we assume that it does. See
    Bahamas Sales Assoc., LLC v. Byers, 
    701 F.3d 1335
    , 1342 (11th Cir. 2012) (“If the parties
    litigate the case under the assumption that a certain law applies, we will assume that that law
    applies.”).
    6
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    Relying on Moody’s wife’s death certificate, Physicians Mutual contends
    that because her cause of death was certified as respiratory failure “due to (or as a
    consequence of)” her ALS, it did not breach the terms of the Policy. Physicians
    Mutual is correct. A death certificate is “prima facie evidence . . . of the facts
    therein stated.” Miss. Code Ann. § 41-57-9. Therefore, Moody’s wife’s death was
    not accidental, and Moody was entitled to only 110% of the paid premiums.
    Moody argues that his wife’s death was accidental, as evidenced by the
    testimony of his daughter concerning the sound she heard, the discovery of her
    mother on the floor, and the care she provided to her mother after the fall. But a
    layperson cannot provide evidence as to cause of death. See Fed. R. Evid. 701,
    702; Webster v. Offshore Food Serv., 
    434 F.2d 1191
    , 1193 (5th Cir. 1970)
    (granting summary judgment due to “the unequivocal, uncontradicted and
    unimpeached testimony of an expert witness [whose] testimony bears on technical
    questions of medical causation beyond the competence of lay determination”);4 see
    also Sowers v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 3:09 C 11829, 
    2015 WL 12839775
    , at
    *5 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 23, 2015) (“[O]pinions regarding medical causation . . . are not
    admissible when offered by lay witnesses”). Accordingly, Moody’s daughter
    cannot provide competent testimonial evidence regarding her mother’s ultimate
    4
    In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 
    661 F.2d 1206
    , 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), the
    Eleventh Circuit adopted the case law of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close of
    business on September 30, 1981, as its governing body of precedent.
    7
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    cause of death. 5 And Moody failed to present any other competent evidence that
    contradicted Physician Mutual’s showing that Moody’s wife’s death was not
    accidental.6 Accordingly, Physicians Mutual did not breach the Policy’s terms,
    and Physicians Mutual was entitled to summary judgment on Moody’s breach of
    contract claim.
    B.     The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment on Moody’s
    Fraud Claim.
    Physicians Mutual claimed that a two-year statute of limitations bars
    Moody’s fraud claim, and the district court agreed. Moody argued that Alabama
    Code § 6-2-3 applies and that Physicians Mutual’s and Physician Life’s alleged
    misrepresentations about which entity issued the Policy tolled the statute of
    limitations until 2016. 7 But Moody’s claim does not fall under this code section’s
    umbrella of protection.
    5
    Moody’s daughter’s testimony also precludes full recovery of the Policy’s full value
    because her testimony cannot establish that the death was “independent of disease, suicide, and
    all other causes.” See Doc. 25-6 at 4.
    6
    The district court struck Moody’s purported expert reports concerning his wife’s cause
    of death because (1) his expert disclosures were deficient pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 26 and (2) Moody did not respond to the motion to exclude his expert witnesses based
    on this deficiency. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in doing so.
    See Griffith v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
    303 F.3d 1276
    , 1282–83 (11th Cir. 2002) (reviewing district
    court’s decision concerning Rule 26 disclosures for abuse of discretion).
    7
    Because the parties agree that Alabama law applies to this claim, we assume that it
    does. See Bahamas Sales Assoc., LLC v. Byers, 
    701 F.3d 1335
    , 1342 (11th Cir. 2012) (“If the
    parties litigate the case under the assumption that a certain law applies, we will assume that that
    law applies.”).
    8
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    Alabama law considers a claim that is based in fraud, including the
    fraudulent concealment claim Moody articulates, accrued when “the aggrieved
    party [discovers] the fact constituting the fraud.” Ala. Code § 6-2-3. Moody
    argued that the letters from Physicians Mutual between April 2011 and August
    2016 “precluded Moody from discovering the fraud” because the letters contained
    material misrepresentations about the coverage offered in the Policy. Doc. No. 37
    at 17. Moody failed to demonstrate how this correspondence concealed the alleged
    fraud.
    In August 2012, Physicians Mutual sent him a check and a letter explaining
    why it was denying him the full value of the Policy. Accordingly, Moody became
    aware of Physician Mutual’s denial in August 2012, and he did not submit any
    evidence suggesting otherwise. These letters were sent nearly five years before
    Moody brought his claim. The statute of limitations for his claim, therefore, began
    to run when he discovered the denial.8
    Moody also argued that misrepresentations about whether Physicians Mutual
    or Physicians Life issued the Policy tolled the statute of limitations for his fraud
    claim. Because Alabama law only allows tolling “until the discovery . . . of the
    fact constituting the fraud,” which Moody contends is Physician Mutual’s denial of
    8
    Because we conclude that Moody’s breach of contract and fraud claims fail as a matter
    of law, we do not address whether the district court properly applied the res judicata doctrine to
    those same claims in Moody’s second complaint.
    9
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    the full value of the Policy, confusion regarding the correct identity of the issuer
    cannot toll the statute of limitations. Ala. Code § 6-2-3. Accordingly, the statute
    of limitations bars Moody’s fraud claim.
    C.     The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment on Moody’s
    Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim.
    Moody alleges that Physicians Mutual and Physicians Life breached their
    fiduciary duty when they refused to pay the face value of the Policy. To succeed
    on a breach of fiduciary duty claim, Moody must establish (1) existence of a
    fiduciary relationship between the parties that creates a duty; (2) a breach of that
    fiduciary duty, and (3) damages caused by the breach. Regions Bank v. Lowrey,
    
    101 So. 3d 210
    , 219 (Ala. 2012).9 Moody cannot demonstrate the first element.
    Alabama courts have expressly declined to find a fiduciary relationship
    “between insurance companies . . . and their customers in the context of the
    purchase of casualty, health, or life insurance and attempts to collect under those
    policies.” Sayer v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., No. 7:05-CV-1423-RDP, 
    2006 WL 6253201
    , at *6 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 12, 2006) (collecting Alabama cases); see also Fed.
    Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n v. GNM II, LLC, 2:13-CV-700-WC, 
    2014 WL 1572584
    , at *4
    (M.D. Ala. Apr. 17, 2014) (granting summary judgment when a customer could
    9
    Because the parties agree that Alabama law applies to this claim, we assume that it
    does. See Bahamas Sales Assoc., LLC v. Byers, 
    701 F.3d 1335
    , 1342 (11th Cir. 2012) (“If the
    parties litigate the case under the assumption that a certain law applies, we will assume that that
    law applies.”).
    10
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    not establish a fiduciary relationship between itself and its insurer because the case
    was “an attempt to collect under the insurance policy.”). Moody’s breach of
    fiduciary duties claim is an attempt to collect under an insurance policy. He,
    therefore, cannot demonstrate a fiduciary relationship between himself and
    Physicians Mutual. The district court did not err in dismissing Moody’s breach of
    fiduciary duty claim; Physicians Mutual was entitled to summary judgment on the
    claim.
    IV.    CONCLUSION
    For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s grants of
    summary judgment.
    AFFIRMED.
    11