Bob H. Belle v. Jo Anne B. Barnhart , 129 F. App'x 558 ( 2005 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 04-16125 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 26, 2005
Non-Argument Calendar
THOMAS K. KAHN
________________________
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 03-00526-CV-G-W
BOB H. BELLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JO ANN B. BARNHART,
Commissioner of Social Security Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(April 26, 2005)
Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Bob H. Belle, a fifty-two year old male with a tenth grade education, filed
an application for disability and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) benefits
alleging that he was disabled due to Type II diabetes and hypertension. His claims
were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Belle requested a hearing before
an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”).
At the hearing, Belle testified that he had been employed as a truck driver
until he was forced to leave his job because he failed a Department of
Transportation physical examination. He stated that he experienced fainting spells
and black outs due to his diabetes, which he treated with insulin. He further stated
that he often experienced swelling of his hands and feet, which made it difficult to
walk, that his blood sugar levels varied despite the insulin, and that he had dizzy
spells and blurred vision. Belle testified, however, that he was able to watch
television, read, mow the lawn, and exercise.
A vocational expert (“VE”) opined that a person with Belle’s limitations
could not return to his past relevant work, but that there were other jobs available,
such as cafeteria attendant, garment sorter, and small products assembly, although
there were no jobs available if the claimant’s self-described limitations were
credible.
Dr. Colie Crutcher, who examined Belle in 2000, diagnosed him with
poorly controlled Type II diabetes, hypertension, and fatigue, but noted that Belle
was generally in good health, with normal lungs, heart, neurological functions and
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vision, that Belle was responding well to insulin, and that the only other
medication Belle used was Advil. Crutcher encouraged dietary management of the
diabetes and exercise.
Dr. Gary Walton, who also treated Belle, noted that Belle took Humulin for
his diabetes, but that the disease was poorly controlled.
Dr. Bobby Hill completed a consultative examination in 2001, finding that
Belle had normal gait without assistance, could walk heels and toes, could squat
and stand, and had no other abnormalities. Hill noted that Belle’s diabetes was not
well controlled, but he concluded that the impairments “imposed questionable
limitations” on Belle’s ability to sit, stand, and walk. Hill confirmed that Belle
could not return to his past relevant work, but opined that Belle could stand or
walk for four hours at a time, for no more than six hours a day, with no limitations
on sitting, could lift or carry five to ten pounds constantly, and ten to fifteen
pounds frequently. Hill further found no limitations on pushing or pulling, but
some limits on climbing and balancing, with additional limitations in temperature,
environment, and driving.
The ALJ concluded that Belle was not disabled because, although he had
severe impairments due to his diabetes and hypertension, these impairments did
not meet or exceed a listing. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ noted that Belle
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did not require medication to treat his hypertension, and that the medical evidence
showed that Belle had normal gait, no joint motion restrictions, and no
neurological deficits. The medical records confirmed that Belle’s diabetes was
uncontrolled, although his condition improved with medication, and he had not
required hospitalization since 1999. The ALJ further noted that Belle had
financial limitations to obtaining treatment. However, the ALJ specifically
discredited Bell’s subjective complaints as inconsistent with the medical records
and not supported by objective medical evidence. As the ALJ explained, “[t]he
record does not contain objective signs and findings that could reasonably be
expected to produce the degree and intensity of limitations alleged. There are no
diagnostic studies to show abnormalities that could be expected to produce such
severe symptoms.” Based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that there
were other jobs available, which required a finding that Belle was not disabled.
After the appeals council denied review, Belle filed a complaint in the
district court, which affirmed the Commissioner’s denial of benefits.
On appeal, Belle argues that the district court erred because the ALJ
improperly applied the pain standard. He contends that there is medical evidence
in his case to show that he has an underlying medical condition, and that medical
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treatises explain that diabetes and hypertension can be expected to produce pain
and motor weakness, dizziness and fatigue.
We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether it is
supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were
applied. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002); Lewis v.
Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion. Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that
substantial evidence is “‘more than a mere scintilla, but less than a
preponderance’”).
In order to establish a disability based on testimony of pain and other
symptoms, the claimant must satisfy two parts of a three-part test showing:
“(1) evidence of an underlying medical condition; and (2) either (a) objective
medical evidence confirming the severity of the alleged pain; or (b) that the
objectively determined medical condition can reasonably be expected to give rise
to the claimed pain.” Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991).
Here, the ALJ found that the medical records did not confirm Belle’s
allegations regarding the severity of his pain, and that finding is supported by
substantial evidence. First, the ALJ properly concluded that there was evidence of
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an underlying medical condition. The records reflect that Belle suffered from
Type II diabetes, which was poorly controlled, but which did improve with
medication.1
Second, the ALJ properly determined that there was no objective medical
evidence confirming the severity of the alleged pain or that the objectively
determined medical condition can reasonably be expected to give rise to the
claimed pain. The medical records demonstrated that all of Belle’s other functions
were normal, and that Belle’s diabetes improved with insulin treatment.
Moreover, Belle was generally in good health, with normal lungs, heart,
neurological functions, and vision, and the only other medication Belle used was
Advil.
Based on this medical evidence, the ALJ’s credibility determination was
supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court.
1
The record further demonstrated, however, that Belle’s financial status sometimes made
it difficult to obtain medication. As this court has held, if one’s disability could be cured by certain
treatment, yet treatment is not financially available, then a condition which is disabling in fact
continues to be disabling in law. Dawkins v. Bowen, 848 F.2d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 1988).
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