United States v. Craig Frazier , 823 F.3d 1329 ( 2016 )


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  •             Case: 15-14640   Date Filed: 05/24/2016   Page: 1 of 7
    [PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 15-14640
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 0:98-cr-06155-KMM-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    CRAIG FRAZIER,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (May 24, 2016)
    Before TJOFLAT, WILSON and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    WILSON, Circuit Judge:
    Case: 15-14640     Date Filed: 05/24/2016    Page: 2 of 7
    Craig Frazier appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to reduce his
    sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), based on Amendment 782 to the
    Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines). On appeal, he argues that the district court
    abused its discretion in deciding against a sentence reduction after considering the
    factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), even though Frazier was eligible for a reduction
    based on the amendment. He also requests that we reassign the case to a different
    district court judge on remand. After review of the parties’ briefs and the record,
    we affirm.
    I
    This appeal concerns Frazier’s third § 3582(c)(2) motion for sentence
    reduction and is his third sentencing appeal before this court. Since 2008, the
    Sentencing Commission has passed a number of retroactive amendments directed
    at reducing the disparity in sentencing between crack cocaine and powder cocaine.
    Such efforts culminated in Congress’s passing of the Fair Sentencing Act in 2010,
    which prompted the Sentencing Commission to pass several sweeping amendments
    to reduce crack cocaine sentences. In 2008 and 2011, Frazier filed his first two
    § 3582(c)(2) motions under Amendments 706 and 750, respectively. On appeal of
    Frazier’s second motion, this Court vacated the denial of a sentence reduction and
    remanded for the district court to detail its analysis of the § 3553(a) factors, since
    the court’s denial provided only a conclusory statement that they had been
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    considered. See United States v. Frazier, 502 F. App’x 863, 866–67 (11th Cir.
    2012) (per curiam). At a hearing on remand, the district court acknowledged that
    Frazier would have received a lower guideline range if he had been sentenced after
    Amendment 750, but concluded that Frazier’s history and characteristics did not
    support a sentence reduction because he had not shown respect for the law. It
    denied his § 3582(c)(2) motion, and this Court affirmed on appeal. See United
    States v. Frazier, 554 F. App’x 842, 846 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam).
    Frazier now appeals the denial of his third § 3582(c)(2) motion, this time
    based on Amendment 782. 1 In a short, one-page order, the district court concluded
    that “[a]lthough [Frazier] is eligible for a reduced sentence, his career offender
    status, post-sentence conduct in prison, additional state court conviction for
    murder, and his leadership role in a large-scale drug trafficking organization[]
    counsel against this Court exercising its discretion to reduce [Frazier’s] sentence.”
    II
    We review the district court’s decision of whether to grant a sentence
    reduction under § 3582(c)(2) for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Smith,
    
    568 F.3d 923
    , 926 (11th Cir. 2009). “The district court abuses its discretion if it
    fails to apply the proper legal standard or to follow proper procedures in making its
    1
    Though Amendment 782 reduces Frazier’s offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c) to
    33, Frazier acknowledges that his offense level actually would be 34 because of his career-
    offender status. Even so, he contends that Amendment 782 reduces his guideline range to 262 to
    327 months’ imprisonment, which is lower than his current range.
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    determination.” United States v. Jules, 
    595 F.3d 1239
    , 1241–42 (11th Cir. 2010)
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    A district court may modify a defendant’s term of imprisonment if the
    defendant was sentenced based on a sentencing range that subsequently has been
    lowered by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). When the
    district court considers a § 3582(c)(2) motion, it must engage in a two-part
    analysis: (i) recalculate the defendant’s guideline range under the amended
    guidelines, then (ii) “decide whether, in its discretion, it will elect to impose the
    newly calculated sentence under the amended guidelines or retain the original
    sentence.” See United States v. Bravo, 
    203 F.3d 778
    , 780–81 (11th Cir. 2000).
    Any reduction, however, must be “consistent with applicable policy statements
    issued by the Sentencing Commission.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district
    court must consider the § 3553(a) factors and the nature and severity of the danger
    to any person or the community posed by a sentence reduction. See 
    Smith, 568 F.3d at 927
    . It also may consider the defendant’s post-sentencing conduct. See
    U.S.S.G. §1B1.10 cmt. 1(B)(iii).
    Section 3553(a) sets forth the factors to be considered when imposing a
    sentence, including: (1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense”; (2) “the
    history and characteristics of the defendant”; (3) “the need for the sentence
    imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the
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    law, and to provide just punishment”; (4) the need for “adequate deterrence”; (5)
    the need “to protect the public from further crimes”; (6) the guideline range; and
    (7) “any pertinent policy statement . . . issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18
    U.S.C. § 3553(a). A district court can demonstrate that it has considered the
    § 3553(a) factors by stating which pertinent factors weigh against granting a
    sentence reduction, even if it does not present particular findings for each
    individual factor. See United States v. Brown, 
    104 F.3d 1254
    , 1255–56 (11th Cir.
    1997) (per curiam) (affirming the denial of a sentence reduction where the district
    court mentioned the defendant’s significant involvement in a large crack cocaine
    conspiracy and his lack of remorse or acceptance of responsibility). The district
    court has discretion to determine how much weight to grant to a specific § 3553(a)
    factor. See United States v. Alvarado, 
    808 F.3d 474
    , 496 (11th Cir. 2015).
    III
    The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Frazier’s
    § 3582(c)(2) motion. It complied with the two-part procedure for analyzing
    Frazier’s § 3582(c)(2) motion by determining that he was eligible for a sentence
    reduction, but the reduction was not warranted based on its analysis of the §
    3553(a) factors. See 
    Bravo, 203 F.3d at 780
    –81. In reaching such a conclusion,
    the district court referenced several facts relating to the § 3553(a) factors that
    weighed against a sentence reduction, including the severe nature of Frazier’s
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    offense and his history of violent crime. The court also asserted that Frazier’s
    post-sentencing conduct, which included several disciplinary infractions, weighed
    against a sentence reduction. Such an analysis is all that is required to survive our
    level of scrutiny. See 
    Smith, 568 F.3d at 927
    –28 (A court “commits no reversible
    error by failing to articulate specifically the applicability—if any—of each of the
    section 3553(a) factors, as long as the record demonstrates that the pertinent factors
    were taken into account by the district court.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
    The district court also did not abuse its discretion by failing to address
    explicitly the effect of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 or Frazier’s positive efforts
    to improve his character because the record shows that it otherwise considered the
    § 3553(a) factors. See 
    Brown, 104 F.3d at 1255
    –56. Therefore, the district court
    did not abuse its discretion in declining to amend Frazier’s sentence. See 
    Smith, 568 F.3d at 927
    –28.
    IV
    We have the supervisory authority to reassign a criminal case to a different
    district court judge, but reassignment “is an extraordinary order.” United States v.
    Gupta, 
    572 F.3d 878
    , 891 (11th Cir. 2009). “Where there is no indication of actual
    bias, we consider at least three factors to determine whether to reassign a case: (1)
    whether the original judge would have difficulty putting his previous views and
    findings aside; (2) whether assignment is appropriate to preserve the appearance of
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    justice; (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of
    proportion to gains realized from reassignment.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks
    omitted).
    We decline to reassign Frazier’s case to a different district court judge
    because there is no need for a remand and “reassignment is unnecessary to
    preserve the appearance of justice and would require undue duplication of effort.”
    See United States v. Shaygan, 
    652 F.3d 1297
    , 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2011).
    Accordingly, the denial of Frazier’s § 3582(c)(2) motion is
    AFFIRMED.
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