Mikhail Abam Watson v. U.S. Attorney General ( 2019 )


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  •            Case: 18-10546   Date Filed: 03/08/2019   Page: 1 of 7
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 18-10546
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    Agency No. A060-126-661
    MIKHAIL ABAM WATSON,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ________________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    ________________________
    (March 8, 2019)
    Before MARCUS, ROSENBAUM and HULL, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 18-10546     Date Filed: 03/08/2019   Page: 2 of 7
    Mikhail Watson, an alien previously convicted of drug and firearm offenses,
    seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) final order of removal
    affirming the Immigration Judge’s denial of Watson’s application for asylum and
    withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and
    for protection under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
    After review, we dismiss Watson’s petition for review for lack of jurisdiction.
    I. BACKGROUND FACTS
    Watson is a native and citizen of Jamaica who was living in the United
    States as a lawful permanent resident. In 2015, Watson was convicted in Florida
    state court of carrying a concealed firearm and of conspiring to traffic, and
    delivering, methylenedioxymethamphetamine (“MDMA”), for which he received
    two concurrent 18-month prison sentences.
    In his removal proceedings, Watson was represented by counsel and
    conceded his removability under (1) INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(2)(B)(i), for having been convicted of an offense relating to a controlled
    substance after admission (his Florida MDMA convictions); and (2) INA
    § 237(a)(2)(C), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(2)(C), for having been convicted of a firearms
    offense after admission (his Florida firearm conviction). Watson also conceded
    that his Florida convictions were aggravated felonies that were also “particularly
    serious crimes,” rendering him ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal
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    under INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i), and
    INA§ 241(b)(3)(B)(ii), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1231
    (b)(3)(b)(ii), and that, as such, he was
    seeking only CAT relief.
    With respect to his CAT claim, Watson maintained that he is bisexual and
    that if he were returned to Jamaica, he would be tortured or killed because of his
    sexual orientation. Watson submitted country conditions evidence that Jamaica
    criminalizes homosexual sex and that the Jamaican LGBTQ community faces
    homophobia, discrimination and violence. At his hearing, Watson presented
    testimony from himself, his parents, and the mother of his two U.S.-born children.
    Watson testified that while living in Jamaica, he was forced by an angry mob to
    flee his hometown and live with his grandmother after neighbors learned he was in
    a romantic relationship with another man named Kemar and that Kemar was killed
    by these neighbors shortly thereafter because of his sexual orientation.
    In their rulings, both the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and the BIA noted
    Watson’s concessions and confirmed that Watson sought only CAT relief. The IJ
    determined, and the BIA agreed, that: (1) Watson was not credible; and (2) even if
    Watson was credible, he had not shown that it was more likely than not that he
    would be tortured in Jamaica because he is bisexual.
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    II. DISCUSSION
    Watson’s pro se petition for review argues that he presented sufficient
    evidence to meet his burden of proof for CAT relief. Watson also contends—for
    the first time—that the IJ violated his due process rights by erroneously concluding
    that his Florida convictions were categorically aggravated felonies under the INA.
    The government responds, and we agree, that we lack jurisdiction to review either
    argument. 1
    INA § 242(a)(2)(C), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(C), commonly known as the
    “criminal alien bar,” deprives us of jurisdiction to review Watson’s first argument.
    Under the criminal alien bar, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review any final
    removal order against an alien who, like Watson, “is removable by reason of
    having committed” a controlled substance offense covered in 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(2)(B) or a firearm offense covered in § 1227(a)(2)(C). INA
    § 242(a)(2)(C), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(C) (cross-referencing INA § 237(a)(2)(B),
    (C), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(2)(B), (C)). Notwithstanding this jurisdictional bar, we
    retain jurisdiction to review colorable constitutional claims and questions of law
    raised in the petition for review. INA § 242(a)(2)(D), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a)(2)(D);
    Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    482 F.3d 1281
    , 1283-84 & n.2 (11th Cir. 2007).
    1
    We review de novo our own subject matter jurisdiction. Gonzalez-Oropeza v. U.S.
    Att’y Gen., 
    321 F.3d 1331
    , 1332 (11th Cir. 2003).
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    When a criminal alien like Watson “petitions for review of a removal order
    denying his CAT claim, we may not review the administrative fact findings of the
    IJ or the BIA as to the sufficiency of the alien’s evidence and the likelihood that
    the alien will be tortured if returned to the country in question.” Singh v. U.S.
    Att’y Gen., 
    561 F.3d 1275
    , 1280 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Malu v. U.S. Att’y
    Gen., 
    764 F.3d 1282
    , 1289-90 (11th Cir. 2014). We retain jurisdiction, however,
    over whether a set of undisputed facts amounts to torture, which is a legal question.
    Singh, 
    561 F.3d at 1280
    .
    Here, Watson’s petition challenges only the IJ’s fact findings. An IJ’s
    credibility determination is a fact finding. See Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    440 F.3d 1247
    , 1254-55 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that factual determinations such as
    credibility findings are reviewed under the substantial evidence test). Thus, to the
    extent Watson challenges the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, we lack jurisdiction
    to review that claim.
    Watson also argues that the testimony he presented at his hearing—from
    himself, his parents, and the mother of his two children—along with the country
    conditions evidence was sufficient to show that it was more likely than not that he
    would be tortured or killed in Jamaica because of his sexual orientation. We also
    do not have jurisdiction to review this claim as to the sufficiency of the evidence.
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    We also lack jurisdiction to review Watson’s second argument, but for a
    different reason. Watson argues that the IJ erred in concluding that his prior
    Florida convictions were categorically aggravated felonies, which amounted to a
    violation of Watson’s due process rights. This issue raises both a legal question
    and a constitutional claim that, if colorable, we would ordinarily retain jurisdiction
    to review despite the criminal alien bar. In Watson’s case, however, we lack
    jurisdiction to review Watson’s second argument because he failed to
    administratively exhaust it before the BIA.
    Under INA § 242(d)(1), 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (d)(1), we lack jurisdiction to
    review a claim if the petitioner has failed to exhaust it administratively by raising it
    in his notice of appeal or appeal brief to the BIA. Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S.
    Att’y Gen., 
    463 F.3d 1247
    , 1250-51 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that this Court
    lacked jurisdiction to consider an alien’s due process claim raised for the first time
    in his petition for review). This jurisdictional requirement extends to due process
    claims that are within the BIA’s purview to provide a remedy. 
    Id. at 1251
    ; Sundar
    v. INS, 
    328 F.3d 1320
    , 1325 (11th Cir. 2003). To properly exhaust a claim before
    the BIA, the petitioner must do more than merely identify an issue to that body: a
    petitioner has not exhausted a claim unless he “both raised the core issue before the
    BIA . . . and also set forth any discrete arguments he relied on in support of his
    claim.” Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    810 F.3d 792
    , 800 (11th Cir. 2016).
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    Watson’s counseled notice of appeal and brief filed with the BIA argued
    only that the IJ erred in concluding he had not met his burden of showing he was
    entitled to CAT protection. More importantly, Watson did not raise any due
    process issues or challenge the IJ’s determination that his Florida convictions were
    aggravated felonies and particularly serious crimes. In fact, consistent with his
    statements before the IJ, Watson again conceded to the BIA that his convictions
    qualified as such. Watson also noted that the only form of relief he sought was
    CAT protection. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review this unexhausted
    claim as well.
    PETITION DISMISSED.
    7