Pernell Ford v. Michael W. Haley , 195 F.3d 603 ( 1999 )

[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 99-10895 07/07/99
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 95-B-3020-S
PERNELL FORD,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
MICHAEL W. HALEY, Commissioner,
Alabama Department of Corrections,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(July 7, 1999)
Before ANDERSON, Chief Judge, DUBINA and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This appeal involves Ford’s first § 2254 habeas petition in his capital case.
LaJuana Davis (“Davis”), acting as counsel for Pernell Ford (“Ford”), has filed in
Ford’s name a Motion for a Stay of Ford’s execution. Ford’s execution is
scheduled for 12:01 a.m. on Friday, July 9, 1999. The district court dismissed with
prejudice Ford’s § 2254 habeas petition, finding Ford was mentally competent to
dismiss his counsel and dismiss that petition. On July 6, 1999, the district court
issued a certificate of probable cause for Ford to appeal its dismissal of his § 2254
habeas petition.1 Therefore, this Court grants Ford’s Motion for a Stay of
Execution pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 22-3, which we attach as an appendix
to this opinion.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant Ford was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death. The
evidence is summarized in the opinions of the Alabama appellate courts affirming
Ford’s conviction and sentence. Ford v. State, 515 So.2d 34 (Ala. Crim. App.
1986), aff’d, 515 So.2d 48 (Ala. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1079 (1988); Ford v.
State, 630 So.2d 111 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991) (affirming the denial of Ford’s state
habeas petitions), aff’d, 630 So.2d 113 (Ala. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1078(1994).
On November 21, 1995, Ford filed a § 2254 habeas petition in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. On May 30, 1997, Ford
filed a motion to dismiss his habeas petition. Before allowing the petition to be
1
Because Ford’s § 2254 habeas petition was filed in 1995, Davis properly sought a
certificate of probable cause to appeal, as opposed to a certificate of appealability under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (1996).
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dismissed, the Magistrate Judge selected Dr. Rollins, from the names submitted by
Ford’s attorney, to examine Ford. After examining Ford, Dr. Rollins submitted his
psychiatric evaluation giving his opinion that Ford was competent to dismiss his
attorney and his § 2254 habeas petition. On June 10, 1998, an evidentiary hearing
was held wherein both Ford and Dr. Rollins were questioned by the Magistrate
Judge, and Ford’s attorney. Subsequently, Dr. Rollins re-examined Ford and the
Magistrate Judge held a telephone conference with all parties and questioned Ford
again. Davis subsequently submitted another mental evaluation of Ford by Dr.
Pincus. In his report, Dr. Pincus gave his opinion that Ford was not competent to
dismiss his attorney and his § 2254 habeas petition.
Thereafter, the Magistrate Judge issued a detailed Report recommending that
Ford be found mentally competent to dismiss his attorney and to dismiss, with
prejudice, his § 2254 habeas petition. The Magistrate Judge found, inter alia, that
Dr. Rollins’s report was more persuasive than Dr. Pincus’s. On March 31, 1999,
the federal district court in Alabama issued a detailed order finding Ford mentally
competent, granting Ford’s request to dismiss his attorney, granting his motion to
dismiss his habeas petition, and dismissing with prejudice Ford’s § 2254 habeas
petition.
3
On April 14, 1999, Davis, signing as Ford’s attorney, filed, in Ford’s name,
a Motion to Alter and Amend the Judgment, a Notice of Appeal of the district
court’s order dated March 31 dismissing with prejudice Ford’s § 2254 habeas
petition, and a Motion for Stay of Execution in the district court. On July 1, 1999,
the district court denied the Motion to Alter and Amend and the Motion for Stay of
Execution.
On July 6, 1999, Davis, signing as Ford’s attorney, filed a Notice of Appeal
of the district court’s July 1 order denying the Motion to Alter and Amend and the
Motion for a Stay of Execution.2 On July 6, Davis also filed a Motion for
Certificate of Probable Cause to Authorize Appeal, which the district court
granted. In its July 6, 1999 order, the district court stated as follows:
[T]he court has considered the fact that this is a capital case involving
issues that are “debatable among jurists of reason” and that “a court
could resolve the issues in a different manner.” While this court has
resolved the issues against Petitioner, and is confident of the
correctness of its decision, the foregoing findings by the court are
sufficient to authorize the issuance of a certificate of probable cause
under Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983), thus allowing
Petitioner’s counsel to appeal this court’s grant of Petitioner’s request
to waive his appeals, to dismiss counsel and the dismissal of a writ of
habeas corpus in this death penalty case. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the certificate of probable cause is hereby issued.
2
Davis’s first Notice of Appeal, filed April 28, 1999, may have been premature but
remains effective. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i). The Motion to Alter or Amend tolled the time
for appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). Together, the two Notices of Appeal are sufficient to appeal
both the district court’s March 31 and July 1, 1999 orders. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(B)(i),(ii).
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II. DAVIS’S STANDING
The Appellee contends that the Notices of Appeal and Motion for Stay of
Execution, filed by Davis in Ford’s name, should be dismissed because the district
court found Ford was mentally competent, and thus Davis lacks standing to pursue
this appeal as Ford’s attorney. If we conclude that the district court’s finding that
Ford is mentally competent is not clearly erroneous, then the district court correctly
honored Ford’s wishes to dismiss his attorney and his § 2254 habeas petition. See
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990); Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012(1976); Lonchar v. Zant, 978 F.2d 637 (11th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, Davis, no
longer Ford’s attorney, would lack standing to pursue Ford’s case further.
However, if the district court’s finding is clearly erroneous and Ford is mentally
incompetent, then the dismissals of Davis and the petition were in error, and Davis
may be entitled, as Ford’s attorney, to pursue Ford’s § 2254 habeas petition.
In other words, Davis’s standing in this appeal ultimately may depend on the
limited issue of whether the district court’s factual finding that Ford is mentally
competent is clearly erroneous. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990);
Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 989 (1976), stay vacated, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976). Thus,
at this juncture, Davis appears to retain standing to the limited extent necessary to
file this appeal and to challenge the district court’s findings that Ford is mentally
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competent to dismiss Davis as his counsel and his § 2254 habeas petition with
prejudice. Otherwise, a district court would be able to find a defendant mentally
competent in a capital case to dismiss his counsel and dismiss with prejudice his
first § 2254 habeas petition in a federal court and there never would be any appeal
or review of that contested mental competency ruling.
Likewise, at this juncture Davis appears to retain standing to seek a stay of
execution to the limited extent necessary to prosecute this appeal of the district
court’s mental competency rulings in Ford’s first habeas petition. The district
court issued a certificate of probable cause based on its finding that Ford’s mental
competency to dismiss his capital appeals involves “issues that are ‘debatable
among jurists of reason’ and that ‘a court could resolve the issues in a different
manner.’” When non-frivolous issues are presented on appeal in a capital case, the
Supreme Court has made it clear that a stay of execution should be issued, even if
only temporarily, when a stay is needed for the court to address such issues before
the appeal becomes moot. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893-94 (1983).
Thus, since Davis appears to have limited standing to pursue the district court’s
mental competency rulings, Davis necessarily also has limited standing to move for
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a stay of Ford’s execution while this Court hears that appeal in order to prevent the
appeal from becoming mooted by Ford’s execution.3
III. STAY OF EXECUTION
This brings us to whether the Motion for a Stay of Execution should be
granted under the circumstances of this first § 2254 habeas petition in a capital
case. We attach Eleventh Circuit Rule 22-3 because it provides the answer to this
question. Under this Circuit’s Rule 22-3(a)(7), “[i]f a certificate of appealability is
granted by the district court or by this Court, the panel shall grant a temporary stay
pending consideration of the merits of the appeal if necessary to prevent mooting
the appeal. . . .” 11th Cir. R. 22-3(a)(7) (emphasis added). Certificates of probable
cause are the prior equivalent of certificates of appealability. Hardwick v.
Singletary, 126 F.3d 1312, 1313 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Notwithstanding a marginal
variance in the language identifying the necessary showing with respect to
certificates of probable cause and appealability, we conclude that the standard
governing certificates of probable cause and certificates of appealability is
materially identical.”).
3
The standing issue here is arguably akin to a court’s having limited jurisdiction to
determine its own jurisdiction. While we find Davis has made a sufficient showing of standing
to be able to pursue this appeal at this juncture, questions do arise regarding Davis’s status, as
she is no longer Ford’s attorney and is not filing this appeal as his next friend, and the effect, if
any, on her standing. We carry those jurisdictional issues with the appeal.
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The district court has granted a certificate of probable cause and a temporary
stay of the July 9 execution is clearly necessary to prevent the mooting of this
appeal filed July 6. Therefore, Eleventh Circuit Rule 22-3(a)(7) directs that we
shall grant a temporary stay of the July 9 execution until further order of this
Court. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
We recognize that subsections (i) and (ii) of our Circuit Rule 22-3(a)(7)
permit exceptions to this grant of a stay after a certificate has been issued by the
district court; however, neither exception applies under the particular factual
circumstances revealed in the record in this case. First, we do not find that the
district court abused its discretion in finding the appeal was non-frivolous and in
issuing the certificate of probable cause. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880,
893-94 (1983). In fact, the Appellee has not cross-appealed the district court’s
grant of that certificate as of this juncture. Also, this appeal does not involve a
successive habeas petition.
IV. APPEAL SCHEDULE
Finally, pursuant to the last paragraph in our Circuit Rule 22-3(a), we
conclude that at this late date the merits of this appeal, filed on July 6, 1999, cannot
be appropriately addressed and decided concurrently with a decision on the motion
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to stay. However, we do find that good cause clearly exists for an advanced
briefing schedule and oral argument.
This appeal involves only the limited issue of whether the district court was
clearly erroneous in its factual finding that Ford is mentally competent to dismiss
his counsel and dismiss his § 2254 petition. Ford has been requesting dismissal of
his § 2254 habeas petition since May 1997. In fact, in a letter dated May 9, 1999,
Ford again expressed his desire that his execution date be set and that his execution
be carried out. Thus, for good cause shown, the Court advances the briefing
schedule and oral argument in this appeal. Appellant’s brief shall be due on July
22, 1999; Appellee’s brief shall be due on August 5, 1999; Appellant’s reply brief
shall be due on August 12, 1999; and, oral argument is scheduled for August 18,
1999 at 2:00 p.m. in Atlanta, Georgia. The Clerk immediately shall issue oral
argument and briefing notices to all parties.
V. STAY
The Court grants the Motion to Stay Execution and temporarily stays the
execution of Pernell Ford pending further order of this Court.
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