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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 18-13058
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-00081-RH-CAS
RONALD DAVID JONES,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
GADSDEN COUNTY SCHOOLS,
WEST GADSDEN MIDDLE SCHOOL,
Defendants - Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(March 4, 2019)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Substitute teacher Ronald Jones appeals the dismissal of his pro se civil
rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in which he alleged that the school
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district retaliatorily refused to hire him as a permanent teacher. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm the dismissal of his suit.
We construe Jones’s pro se pleadings and brief liberally, and we accept his
factual allegations as true for the purposes of our review. See Trawinski v. United
Techs.,
313 F.3d 1295, 1297 (11th Cir. 2002). Jones, a substitute teacher for
Gadsden County Schools, alleged in his complaint that the school district refused
to hire him as a permanent teacher in 2017 and 2018 “in retaliation for exposing
their inappropriate sexual behavior.” Jones later amended his complaint to add
various other allegations dating from 2007 to 2013, including claims of misuse of
public position and violation of his free exercise of religion, but the magistrate
judge found that the new claims were time-barred.1
With respect to the retaliation claim, the magistrate judge found that Jones
failed to state a prima facie case of retaliation because he had not shown that he
engaged in any protected activity. Finding that any remaining allegations were
“disjointed, conclusory, and contradictory” and did not state a claim, the magistrate
judge recommended that the complaint be summarily dismissed. Jones filed
objections and moved for appointment of counsel. The district court adopted the
report and recommendations of the magistrate judge and sua sponte dismissed the
1
A § 1983 claim is governed by the forum state’s residual personal injury statute of limitations,
which in Florida is four years. Burton v. City of Belle Glade,
178 F.3d 1175, 1188 (11th Cir.
1999); see Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(p).
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entire complaint for failure to state a claim. Denying Jones’s request for appointed
counsel as moot, the district court also noted that, given Jones’s 31 cases filed in
that court, “[n]o purpose would be served by granting leave to amend further.”
Jones now appeals the dismissal of his amended complaint.
We review de novo the sua sponte dismissal of a complaint for failure to
state a claim. Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez,
480 F.3d 1043, 1056–57 (11th
Cir. 2007). Jones argues on appeal that his complaint did state a claim of retaliation
when he alleged that the school district refused to hire him, in retaliation for his
filing of this suit, another federal lawsuit, and two state administrative actions.
We conclude that Jones has not pleaded “factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). He has not
provided a factual basis that would allow us, even reading liberally, to infer all
three elements of the prima facie retaliation case. The amended complaint does not
suggest how “exposing their inappropriate sexual behavior” was protected activity,
nor does it tell us how that exposure was causally connected to the school district’s
failure to hire Jones as a permanent teacher. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal
of the retaliation claim.
Jones also argues on appeal that the school district violated Fla. Stat.
§ 112.313(6), which prohibits a public officer from “corruptly” using his or her
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position “to secure a special privilege, benefit, or exemption for himself, herself, or
others.” But his amended complaint does not name any public officers as
defendants. Furthermore, as Jones correctly acknowledges, respondeat superior
liability is not available under § 1983. See Polk Cty. v. Dodson,
454 U.S. 312, 325
(1981). This allegation therefore fails to state a claim under § 1983.
Finally, Jones does not argue on appeal that the district court erred in
dismissing his case without first granting him leave to amend his complaint or in
dismissing most of his claims as time-barred. He purports to appeal the denial of
his motion for appointed counsel, but he does not explain why he is entitled to
counsel. These issues are thus waived. Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc.,
680 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2012) (“A passing reference to an issue in a brief is
not enough, and the failure to make arguments and cite authorities in support of an
issue waives it.”); Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co.,
385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th
Cir. 2004).
The dismissal of Jones’s complaint is AFFIRMED.
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