United States v. Harry Cancel-Velez , 614 F. App'x 994 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 14-11843
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:13-cr-00259-ACC-KRS-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HARRY CANCEL-VELEZ,
a.k.a. Harry,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(June 15, 2015)
Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Harry Cancel-Velez pled guilty to conspiracy to commit access-
device fraud. In exchange for his plea, the government agreed to recommend a
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three-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under the United
States Sentencing Guidelines and a sentence within the calculated sentencing
guideline range. The government also agreed to consider whether Cancel-Velez’s
cooperation qualified as “substantial assistance” warranting a downward departure
from the applicable guideline range. In this regard, the plea agreement states,
[T]he defendant understands that the determination as to
whether “substantial assistance” has been provided or
what type of motion related thereto will be filed, in any,
rests solely with the United States Attorney for the
Middle District of Florida, and the defendant agrees that
the defendant cannot and will not challenge that
determination, whether by appeal, collateral attack, or
otherwise.
The plea agreement also contains a limited waiver of appeal, which provides
as follows:
6. Defendant’s Waiver of Right to Appeal the Sentence
The defendant agrees that this Court has jurisdiction
and authority to impose any sentence up to the statutory
maximum and expressly waives the right to appeal
defendant’s sentence on any ground, including the
ground that the Court erred in determining the applicable
guidelines range pursuant to the United States Sentencing
Guidelines, except (a) the ground that the sentence
exceeds the defendant’s applicable guidelines range as
determined by the Court pursuant to the United States
Sentencing Guidelines; (b) the ground that the sentence
exceeds the statutory maximum penalty; or (c) the
ground that the sentence violates the Eighth Amendment
to the Constitution; provided, however, that if the
government exercises its right to appeal the sentence
imposed, as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b), then the
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defendant is released from his waiver and may appeal the
sentence as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
In the plea agreement, Cancel-Velez acknowledged that he was entering into
the agreement freely and voluntarily, that he understood the nature of the offense
to which he was pleading guilty and its penalties, and that he was satisfied with his
attorney’s representation. Cancel-Velez and his attorney also certified that they
had read the plea agreement in its entirety and that Cancel-Velez fully understood
its terms.
During the Rule 11, Fed. R. Crim. P., plea colloquy, the district-court judge
reviewed pertinent provisions of the plea agreement with Cancel-Velez, including,
notably, his decision to waive his right to appeal his sentence except in limited
circumstances. Cancel-Velez, who had a copy of the plea agreement in front of
him, confirmed that he had discussed the appeal waiver provision with his attorney
and that he understood that he was “waiving [his] right to appeal [his] sentence.”
The judge did not specifically describe the exceptions in the appeal waiver
provision, but explained that “by this waiver you give up your right to appeal or
contest your sentence on any ground except for those that are specifically
mentioned here [in the provision].” Cancel-Velez stated that he did not have any
questions about the waiver and that he made the waiver knowingly and voluntarily.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court judge accepted Cancel-Velez’s
guilty plea and found that it was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made.
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At Cancel-Velez’s sentencing, the district court determined that his
guideline range was 37 to 46 months’ imprisonment. The government moved for a
two-level downward departure based on Cancel-Velez’s substantial assistance.
Cancel-Velez’s attorney requested that the court “stretch [the substantial assistance
departure] a little” due to Cancel-Velez’s “significant” cooperation. Cancel-
Velez’s attorney highlighted that Cancel-Velez provided valuable information to
the Secret Service, testified before a grand jury, and testified for the government in
the sentencing hearings of other defendants. Based on the extent of his
cooperation, Cancel-Velez was “hoping for a couple more levels.” The court
granted the two-level downward departure and Cancel-Velez’s guideline range
became 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment. After considering the sentencing factors
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the court imposed a sentence of imprisonment of 12
months and one day.
On appeal, Cancel-Velez argues, with respect to the appeal waiver, that due
process requires that he be released from the waiver and that he fits within an
exception to the waiver. On the merits, Cancel-Velez contends that the
government did not fulfill its obligations under the plea agreement because it
should have moved for a greater departure based on Cancel-Velez’s substantial
assistance.
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We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de novo and will
continue to enforce the waiver if it was made knowingly and voluntarily. United
States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. Bushert,
997 F.2d 1343, 1350-51 (11th Cir. 1993). To establish that the waiver was made
knowingly and voluntarily, the government must show either that (1) the district
court specifically questioned the defendant about the waiver during the plea
colloquy, or (2) the record makes clear that the defendant otherwise understood the
full significance of the waiver. Johnson, 541 F.3d at 1066; Bushert, 997 F.2d at
1351. This Court has noted that “[i]n extreme circumstances—for instance, if the
district court had sentenced [the defendant] to a public flogging—due process may
require that an appeal be heard despite a previous waiver.” United States v. Howle,
166 F.3d 1166, 1169 n.5 (11th Cir. 1999).
Here, we find that the appeal waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made.
The district-court judge specifically questioned Cancel-Velez about the appeal
waiver. Although the judge did not list each exception, Cancel-Velez had a copy
of the plea agreement in front of him at the time, and the judge referred to the
provision and the limited grounds for appeal listed there. Cancel-Velez clearly
confirmed that he understood the appeal waiver, had discussed it with his attorney,
and did not have any questions about the provision. The representations Cancel-
Velez made in the plea agreement itself further show that Cancel-Velez understood
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the full significance of the waiver. In sum, the circumstances show that Cancel-
Velez was specifically questioned about the waiver and understood its full
significance. See Bushert, 997 F.2d at 1351. There is no “extreme circumstance”
here requiring that the appeal be heard despite the waiver. See Howle, 166 F.3d at
1169 n.5. Indeed, the district court sentenced Cancel-Velez well below the
guideline range. Consequently, the waiver is enforceable.
Moreover, it is not entirely clear what challenge Cancel-Velez presents on
the merits of his appeal. While he contends that an exception to the waiver permits
him to appeal his sentence, he identifies no error committed by the district court in
sentencing him. Rather, his arguments relate only to the government’s obligations
under the plea agreement, to which the district court was not a party, but he does
not state what relief he seeks from this Court—such as vacating his guilty plea or
his sentence. In any case, assuming that Cancel-Velez attempts to challenge the
district court’s sentence or the extent of the reduction granted by the court, no
exception to the waiver applies to permit his appeal. We therefore dismiss this
portion of his appeal.
To the extent that Cancel-Velez contends that the government breached the
plea agreement at sentencing, his challenge is cognizable despite the sentence
appeal waiver. United States v. Copeland, 381 F.3d 1101, 1105-06 (11th Cir.
2004) (reviewing whether the government breached a plea agreement
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notwithstanding a sentence appeal waiver). But cognizable does not equal
meritorious.
“The government is bound by any material promises it makes to a defendant
as part of a plea agreement that induces the defendant to plead guilty.” United
States v. Taylor, 77 F.3d 368, 370 (11th Cir. 1996). Under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, the
district court may depart from the guidelines “[u]pon motion of the government
stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.” U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.
Here, the plea agreement expressly reserves to the government “the
determination as to whether ‘substantial assistance’ has been provided or what type
of motion related thereto will be filed, if any.” See generally United States v.
Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1500-03 & n.5 (11th Cir. 1993) (explaining the limited
circumstances in which a defendant can challenge a prosecutor’s discretion with
respect to filing a § 5K1.1 motion); see also United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825,
831 (11th Cir. 2000). Cancel-Velez further agreed that he could not and would not
“challenge that determination, whether by appeal, collateral attack, or otherwise.”
Because Cancel-Velez has not alleged any unconstitutional motive on the part of
the government, we could not review his challenge even if the government had
refused to move for a sentence reduction altogether. See Forney, 9 F.3d at 1502
n.5. The government’s decision as to the extent of the reduction sought is similarly
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discretionary under the plea agreement. Consequently, the government did not
violate the plea agreement, and we affirm as to this issue.
DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART.
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