United States v. Damon Eugene Oden ( 2019 )


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  •             Case: 18-14604    Date Filed: 09/18/2019   Page: 1 of 5
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 18-14604
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cr-00549-RDP-JHE-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    DAMON EUGENE ODEN,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Alabama
    ________________________
    (September 18, 2019)
    Before TJOFLAT, MARTIN and FAY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 18-14604      Date Filed: 09/18/2019    Page: 2 of 5
    A jury found Damon Eugene Oden guilty of being a felon in possession of a
    firearm, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g), and of possession with intent to
    distribute five grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    . He appeals his convictions, arguing that the district court erred in denying his
    motion to suppress because the officers subjected him to a Fourth Amendment
    seizure without reasonable suspicion of any criminal activity. We conclude that
    Oden’s initial encounter with law enforcement was consensual and did not
    implicate the Fourth Amendment and therefore affirm his convictions. We do so
    without addressing whether the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion of
    criminal activity so as to justify his seizure.
    We review the denial of a motion to suppress as a mixed question of law and
    fact; the district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error while its
    application of the law is reviewed de novo. United States v. Gibbs, 
    917 F.3d 1289
    ,
    1294 (11th Cir. 2019). All facts are construed in the light most favorable to the
    prevailing party below. 
    Id.
     In deciding whether to affirm the district court’s denial
    of a motion to suppress, we may consider evidence introduced at the hearing on the
    motion and evidence presented at trial. United States v. Villabona-Garnica, 
    63 F.3d 1051
    , 1056 (11th Cir. 1995).
    The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the people to be secure
    in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
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    Case: 18-14604     Date Filed: 09/18/2019    Page: 3 of 5
    seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The general rule is that
    warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable. United States v.
    Bradley, 
    644 F.3d 1213
    , 1262 (11th Cir. 2011). We have identified “three broad
    categories of police-citizen encounters for purposes of . . . Fourth Amendment
    analysis: (1) police-citizen exchanges involving no coercion or detention; (2) brief
    seizures or investigatory detentions; and (3) full-scale arrests.” United States v.
    Perez, 
    443 F.3d 772
    , 777 (11th Cir. 2006). The first category encompasses
    consensual encounters and does not implicate Fourth Amendment scrutiny. 
    Id.
    Officers must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to briefly detain a
    person for an investigatory detention. United States v. Williams, 
    876 F.2d 1521
    ,
    1523 (11th Cir. 1989).
    “Law enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment’s
    prohibition of unreasonable seizures merely by approaching individuals on the
    street or in other public places and putting questions to them if they are willing to
    listen.” United States v. Drayton, 
    536 U.S. 194
    , 200 (2002). To determine if an
    encounter is consensual, the “crucial test is whether, taking into account all of the
    circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct would have
    communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police
    presence and go about his business.” Florida v. Bostick, 
    501 U.S. 429
    , 437 (1991).
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    Case: 18-14604      Date Filed: 09/18/2019     Page: 4 of 5
    This test presupposes an innocent person. 
    Id. at 438
    . Officers may ask questions
    of an individual even when they do not suspect criminal activity. 
    Id.
     at 434–35.
    In order for there to be a sufficient restraint on liberty to elevate an
    interaction between law enforcement and an individual to constitutional
    dimensions that trigger Fourth Amendment protection, the police must
    exert a show of authority that communicates to the individual that his
    liberty is restrained, meaning he is not free to leave.
    United States v. Baker, 
    290 F.3d 1276
    , 1278 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, a seizure
    occurs when, by means of physical force or a show of authority by law
    enforcement, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
    leave. United States v. Mendenhall, 
    446 U.S. 544
    , 553–54 (1980).
    We consider a non-exhaustive list of factors in determining whether police
    questioning constituted a seizure:
    [W]hether a citizen’s path is blocked or impeded; whether
    identification is retained; the suspect’s age, education and intelligence;
    the length of the suspect’s detention and questioning; the number of
    police officers present; the display of weapons; any physical touching
    of the suspect, and the language and tone of voice of the police.
    Perez, 
    443 F.3d at 778
     (quotation marks omitted). Officers’ subjective intent is
    irrelevant unless conveyed to the defendant. Mendenhall, 
    446 U.S. at
    554 n.6.
    “The societal pressure to stop and speak with law enforcement is not a sufficient
    restraint of liberty to raise the interaction to a level that requires constitutional
    protection.” Baker, 
    290 F.3d at 1278
    .
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    Case: 18-14604     Date Filed: 09/18/2019   Page: 5 of 5
    Oden’s encounter with law enforcement was consensual and did not
    implicate the Fourth Amendment. Examining the Perez factors under the facts
    most favorable to the prevailing party, the exchange here has substantial indicia of
    permissible, consensual police questioning. Oden’s path as he exited the wooded
    area was not blocked or impeded, Oden’s identification was not taken, he was of
    suitable age, education, and intelligence, the exchange lasted for two to three
    minutes, and the officers did not display their weapons, touch Oden, or use
    coercive language or tone of voice. It is also important to note that Oden was
    voluntarily approaching the officers. While there were three officers to the one
    suspect, that factor alone did not transform this consensual encounter into a Fourth
    Amendment seizure. To the extent that Oden relies on testimony indicating the
    officers formed a semi-circle around him, other testimony indicates that he had
    several routes by which to avoid the officers, and a reasonable innocent person
    would have felt free to leave.
    AFFIRMED.
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