Edward R. Lane v. Central Alabama Community College , 772 F.3d 1349 ( 2014 )

Case: 12-16192 Date Filed: 11/24/2014 Page: 1 of 7
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
___________________________
No. 12-16192
Non-Argument Calendar
___________________________
Docket No. 4:11-cv-00883-KOB
EDWARD R. LANE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CENTRAL ALABAMA COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
STEVE FRANKS, in His Individual Capacity, and
SUSAN BURROW, in Her Official Capacity as Acting
President of Central Alabama Community College,
Defendants-Appellees.
______________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_______________________________
(November 24, 2014)
ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Case: 12-16192 Date Filed: 11/24/2014 Page: 2 of 7
Before MARTIN, FAY, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The Court hereby vacates its prior opinion, issued on 8 October 2014, and
substitutes this corrected opinion.
In Lane v. Cent. Ala. Cmty. Coll., 523 Fed. Appx. 709 (11th Cir. 2013) (per
curiam), we affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Steve Franks, former president of Central Alabama Community College
(“CACC”), in Lane’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil action alleging retaliation in violation
of the First Amendment. We concluded -- based on existing Eleventh Circuit
precedent -- that Lane’s subpoenaed testimony at a federal criminal trial about acts
that he performed as part of his official duties as a CACC employee was not
speech made “primarily in [Lane’s] role as a citizen” and, thus, was not protected
by the First Amendment. Id. at 712. We also said that, even if a First Amendment
violation had occurred, Franks would be entitled to qualified immunity from the
claim against him individually because Lane’s First Amendment right was not
clearly established under then-existing law. Id. at 711 n.2. Because we determined
that no First Amendment violation occurred, we had no need to decide whether
2
Case: 12-16192 Date Filed: 11/24/2014 Page: 3 of 7
Franks was entitled to sovereign immunity from Lane’s claim against him in his
official capacity. 1 Id. at 711.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in Lane v. Franks,
134 S.Ct. 2369 (2014), affirmed in part and reversed in part our decision and
remanded the case for further proceedings. The Supreme Court concluded that
Lane’s subpoenaed trial testimony was protected by the First Amendment. The
Supreme Court said that “[t]ruthful testimony under oath by a public employee
outside the scope of his ordinary job duties is speech as a citizen for First
Amendment purposes . . . even when the testimony relates to his public
employment or concerns information learned during that employment.” Id. at
2378. Because Lane testified about a matter of public concern, and because CCAC
offered no justification for treating Lane differently from other members of the
general public, Lane’s testimony was protected under the First Amendment. Id. at
2380-81.
Although the Supreme Court ruled that Lane’s speech was protected by the
First Amendment, the Court determined that the constitutional question had not
been “beyond debate” when Franks terminated Lane’s employment. Id. at 2383.
As a result, Franks was entitled to qualified immunity from the claim made against
1
Lane’s claim against Franks in his official capacity is now a claim against Susan Burrow, in her
official capacity as CACC’s acting President.
3
Case: 12-16192 Date Filed: 11/24/2014 Page: 4 of 7
him in his individual capacity. Id. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the dismissal
of Lane’s claim against Franks individually. Id.Because we had declined to decide -- and the parties had failed to argue on
certiorari review -- whether Franks (now Burrow) was entitled to sovereign
immunity from Lane’s official capacity claim seeking equitable relief, 2 the
Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings. Id. We now address
the sovereign immunity issue.
The district court concluded that Lane’s official-capacity claim against
Franks for equitable relief was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. We review the
district court’s ruling de novo. See Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d
1326, 1334 (11th Cir. 1999).
Generally speaking, the Eleventh Amendment bars civil actions against state
officials in their official capacity “when the state is the real, substantial party in
interest.” Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 104 S.Ct. 900, 908 (1984).
Pursuant to the exception established in Ex parte Young, 28 S.Ct. 441 (1908),
official-capacity suits against state officials are permissible, however, under the
Eleventh Amendment when the plaintiff seeks “prospective equitable relief to end
continuing violations of federal law.” See Summit Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1336
(emphasis in original).
2
Lane has abandoned expressly his claim for money damages against Franks in his official
capacity. See Lane, 523 Fed. Appx. at 710 n.1.
4
Case: 12-16192 Date Filed: 11/24/2014 Page: 5 of 7
Here, Lane seeks equitable relief in the form of reinstatement of his
employment. We have determined previously that requests for reinstatement
constitute prospective injunctive relief that fall within the scope of the Ex parte
Young exception and, thus, are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Cross
v. Ala. State Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 49 F.3d 1490, 1503
(1995); Lassiter v. Ala. A & M Univ., Bd. of Trs., 3 F.3d 1482, 1485 (11th Cir.
1993), vacated on other grounds, 28 F.3d 1146 (11th Cir. 1994).
And given our precedents, nothing demonstrates to us that Lane’s requested
reinstatement is considerably different, implicating Alabama’s sovereignty
interests and funds so significantly that the Ex parte Young exception would be
inapplicable. In Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 117 S.Ct. 2028 (1997), the
Supreme Court concluded that a state was entitled to Eleventh Amendment
protection from a suit asserting ownership in certain submerged land and navigable
waterways within the state. The Supreme Court noted that the relief sought was
“functional[ly] equivalent” to a quiet title action barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Id. at 2040. Moreover, the requested relief would “diminish, even
extinguish, the State’s control [not just state ownership but the power to regulate or
affect in any way] over a vast reach of land and waters long deemed by the State to
be an integral part of its territory.” Id. Under the “particular and special
circumstances” of the case -- where the state’s sovereign interests “would be
5
Case: 12-16192 Date Filed: 11/24/2014 Page: 6 of 7
affected in a degree fully as intrusive as almost any conceivable retroactive levy
upon funds in its Treasury” -- the state was entitled to Eleventh Amendment
protection. Id. at 2043.
This case is not like Coeur d’Alene. Here, the special sovereignty interest is
lacking: this case does not involve land; Lane’s requested reinstatement is not the
“functional equivalent” of a form of relief otherwise barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Cf. Summit Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1340-41 (distinguishing Coeur
d’Alene).
That Lane’s reinstatement would require the State to pay Lane’s salary does
not trigger Eleventh Amendment protection. The Supreme Court has recognized
that compliance with the terms of prospective injunctive relief will often
necessitate the expenditure of state funds. See Edelman v. Jordan, 94 S.Ct. 1347,
1358 (1974). And “[s]uch an ancillary effect on the state treasury is a permissible
and often an inevitable consequence of the principle announced in Ex parte
Young.” Id.In the light of our reinstatement precedents, we conclude that the district
court erred in dismissing Lane’s official-capacity claim against Franks as barred by
the Eleventh Amendment.
6
Case: 12-16192 Date Filed: 11/24/2014 Page: 7 of 7
We affirm in part and vacate in part; and we remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion and with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Lane v. Franks, 134 S.Ct. 2369 (2014). 3
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
3
We acknowledge that the C.I.T.Y. Program for which Lane served as Director is no longer in
existence. We are unconvinced that this fact, in and of itself, renders Lane’s request for
reinstatement moot, particularly where Lane has alleged that the program was merely
reorganized and renamed. But, should the district court determine that a constitutional violation
occurred, we suggest that it might be necessary for the district court to engage in additional
factfinding on this issue to determine what form of equitable relief is available to Lane.
7