Willie L. Pegues v. State of Tennessee ( 2019 )


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  •                                                                                          03/19/2019
    IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
    AT JACKSON
    Assigned on Briefs December 4, 2018
    WILLIE L. PEGUES v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
    Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
    No. 91-01420 Mark Ward, Judge
    No. W2018-00830-CCA-R3-PC
    The Petitioner, Willie L. Pegues, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s
    dismissal of his petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act. The post-
    conviction court denied relief on the basis that, although the Petitioner requested various
    forms of scientific analysis, his claim was not cognizable because he had not requested
    DNA analysis. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the court erred in dismissing his
    petition because the scope of the forensic testing authorized by the statute is not limited
    to DNA analysis. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.
    Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
    ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT
    W. WEDEMEYER and ROBERT L. HOLLOWAY, JR., JJ., joined.
    Willie L. Pegues, Hartsville, Tennessee, Pro Se.
    Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Jonathan H. Wardle, Assistant
    Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney General; Tracye Jones, Assistant
    District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
    OPINION
    The Petitioner is serving a life sentence for a 1990 first degree felony murder. See
    State v. Willie L. Pegues, No. 02C01-9202-CR-00040, 
    1994 WL 68375
    , at *1 (Tenn.
    Crim. App. Mar. 9, 1994), perm. app. denied (Tenn. July 5, 1994). In 2018, he filed a
    petition pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001 (the Act), Tennessee
    Code Annotated sections 40-30-301 to -313, seeking lumber analysis, luminol test
    analysis, blood spatter analysis, forensic autopsy analysis, crime scene reconstruction
    analysis, and false confession analysis. He did not seek DNA analysis. The post-
    conviction court did not conduct a hearing on the petition and instead filed a written order
    summarily dismissing the petition because it failed to state a cognizable claim under the
    Act.
    The Act provides that persons convicted of first degree murder, among other
    offenses,
    may at any time, file a petition requesting the forensic DNA analysis of any
    evidence that is in the possession or control of the prosecution, law
    enforcement, laboratory, or court, and that is related to the investigation or
    prosecution that resulted in the judgment of conviction and that may
    contain biological evidence.
    T.C.A. § 40-30-303 (2018).
    Despite the language of the Act, the Petitioner contends that the testing he has
    requested is available pursuant to the Act. He acknowledges that this court has said that
    the Act contemplates only DNA testing but not other forms of scientific analysis. See
    Bondurant v. State, 
    208 S.W.3d 424
    , 431 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2006) (“The plain, clear, and
    unambiguous language of the statutes at issue in this case allow for DNA analysis, but
    not additional serological testing.”); Earl David Crawford v. State, No. E2002-02334-
    CCA-R3-PC, 
    2003 WL 21782328
    , at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 4, 2003) (“The statute
    does not authorize the trial court to order the victim to submit new DNA samples years
    after the offense nor does the statute open the door to any other comparisons the
    petitioner may envision.”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Dec. 22, 2003). He argues that
    Powers v. State, 
    343 S.W.3d 36
    , 49-50 (Tenn. 2011), abrogated this court’s decisions in
    Bondurant and Earl David Crawford and that, as a result, the post-conviction court erred
    in dismissing his claim as not cognizable under the Act.
    The petitioner in Powers sought DNA testing of evidence from his 1980 offenses
    and comparison of the results to a DNA database on the basis that he could establish his
    innocence if the DNA results matched another DNA profile in the database. Powers, 
    343 S.W.3d at 39
    . The post-conviction court denied relief, and this court held “that DNA
    analysis was limited to a comparison between the petitioner’s DNA and that collected as
    a part of the evidence in the case.” 
    Id.
     The supreme court held that access to the DNA
    database was permitted pursuant to the Act “if a positive match between the crime scene
    DNA and a profile contained within the database would create a reasonable probability
    that a petitioner would not have been prosecuted or convicted if exculpatory results had
    been obtained or would have rendered a more favorable verdict or sentence if the results
    had been previously available.” 
    Id.
     In reaching its conclusion, the Powers court
    abrogated the Earl David Crawford holding that the only DNA analysis permitted by the
    -2-
    Act was that “‘which compares the petitioner’s DNA samples to DNA samples taken
    from biological specimens gathered at the time of the offense if all four statutory criteria
    [of the Act] are met.’” See id. at *49 (quoting Earl David Crawford, 
    2003 WL 21782328
    , at *3). Although the Powers court took a more expansive view of the scope of
    the Act regarding DNA testing than this court had previously, the Powers court did not
    address an interpretation of the Act that would permit non-DNA scientific testing. The
    Petitioner contends that Powers abrogated Bondurant, as well. However, Powers did not
    specifically address Bondurant. See 
    id.
    Therefore, we reject the Petitioner’s argument that Powers stands for the
    proposition that the Act should be construed beyond its explicit language permitting
    testing of DNA evidence in certain circumstances. The Act does not authorize non-DNA
    scientific testing. Because none of the forms of scientific testing the Petitioner sought
    involved DNA analysis, the post-conviction court did not err in dismissing his petition.
    The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this basis.
    In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of the
    post-conviction court is affirmed.
    _____________________________________
    ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: W2018-00830-CCA-R3-PC

Judges: Judge Robert H. Montgomery

Filed Date: 3/19/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/19/2019