United States v. David Menejia Manso ( 2019 )


Menu:
  •              Case: 18-12426    Date Filed: 03/29/2019   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 18-12426
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 4:17-cr-10013-JEM-1
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    DAVID MENEJIA MANSO,
    a.k.a. David Menegia Manso,
    a.k.a. David Meneiga Manzo,
    a.k.a. David Menega Manso,
    a.k.a. David Menejia-Manzo,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (March 29, 2019)
    Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    David Manso appeals his 57-month sentence for convictions stemming from
    his involvement in smuggling noncitizens into the United States. Manso argues the
    Case: 18-12426    Date Filed: 03/29/2019   Page: 2 of 6
    district court erred in applying the special-skill enhancement. See United States
    Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.3. After careful consideration, we deem this
    argument to be without merit, and we affirm.
    I.
    A grand jury indicted Manso on twenty-two counts related to his alleged
    involvement in a conspiracy to bring noncitizens into the United States in violation
    of federal law. Manso pled guilty to three of these charges.
    The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) set forth Manso’s offense
    conduct. Relevant here, the PSR stated that an unknown person solicited a
    confidential source (“CS”) to smuggle narcotics from the Bahamas to the United
    States using a go-fast vessel. The unknown person introduced the CS to Manso
    and told the CS that Manso would accompany him to the Bahamas to retrieve
    contraband and bring it back to the United States. After some discussion, the three
    decided the CS and Manso would drive a go-fast vessel from South Florida to
    Bimini, Bahamas, where they would pick up a group of noncitizens and smuggle
    them to South Florida on the go-fast vessel.
    The CS and Manso left South Florida at nighttime in a go-fast vessel
    destined for Bimini. When they arrived, Manso docked the boat. Over the next
    few days, Manso and the CS negotiated with a Bahamian national about the terms
    of the smuggling plan. They ultimately agreed that Manso and the CS would
    2
    Case: 18-12426     Date Filed: 03/29/2019    Page: 3 of 6
    transport ten noncitizens at a rate of $4,000 per person. After receiving payment,
    Manso, the CS, and the ten agreed-upon noncitizens boarded the go-fast vessel.
    They departed from Bimini late in the evening. Manso and the CS took turns
    driving the vessel towards Key Largo. Early the next morning, the United States
    Coast Guard interdicted the vessel five miles off the coast of Key Largo and found
    Manso, the CS, and ten noncitizens on board.
    The PSR recommended that Manso’s offense level be increased by two
    points because he “navigated the go-fast vessel to and from Bimini” and thus used
    a special skill in a manner that significantly aided the commission of his offenses.
    See USSG § 3B1.3. Manso objected to this recommendation. Manso argued that
    the evidence in the PSR did not support the enhancement, because “the application
    of this enhancement requires more than simply acting as captain of a small,
    recreational fishing vessel.” Manso did not object to the PSR’s allegations that he:
    navigated the go-fast vessel to Bimini at night and docked it upon arrival; made the
    return trip with the CS in the late evening; navigated the go-fast vessel during the
    return trip; and took turns driving the vessel with the CS during the return trip.
    At sentencing, Manso again objected to the application of the special skill
    enhancement. He conceded that “navigating the boat requires a special skill.” But
    he argued that the enhancement requires “a little bit more than just a blanket
    assertion that they took turns driving the boat” and that the PSR “does not give the
    3
    Case: 18-12426      Date Filed: 03/29/2019     Page: 4 of 6
    Court sufficient facts to [find] that he . . . had that special skill other than just
    momentarily taking control at the helm.” The district court disagreed with
    Manso’s characterization of the PSR’s allegations, finding the allegation that
    Manso and the CS took turns driving did not simply “mean [Manso] monetarily
    took [the helm].” The court overruled Manso’s objection and ultimately sentenced
    him to concurrent terms of 57 months in prison on each of the three counts.
    II.
    The special skill enhancement may apply if, in the commission of his
    offense, a defendant used “a skill not possessed by members of the general public
    and usually requiring substantial education, training, or licensing.” USSG § 3B1.3
    & cmt. n.4; United States v. De La Cruz Suarez, 
    601 F.3d 1202
    , 1219 (11th Cir.
    2010). This Court reviews de novo a district court’s legal interpretation of the term
    “special skill,” but reviews for clear error a district court’s finding that a defendant
    possessed a special skill. 
    Id. A factual
    finding is clearly erroneous if we are “left
    with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” 
    Id. (quotation marks
    omitted). A sentencing court may base its factual findings on
    “undisputed statements in the presentence report.” United States v. Wilson, 
    884 F.2d 1355
    , 1356 (11th Cir. 1989).
    Manso argues the evidence was insufficient to support the special-skill
    enhancement. However, the undisputed facts show that Manso navigated a go-fast
    4
    Case: 18-12426     Date Filed: 03/29/2019   Page: 5 of 6
    vessel to Bimini at night, docked the vessel there, and navigated the vessel back to
    South Florida at night with ten additional people aboard. The skills required to
    perform these tasks “are not . . . possessed by the general public,” even if he and
    the CS took turns driving. De La Cruz 
    Suarez, 601 F.3d at 1219
    (holding that
    “navigat[ing] a boat at night in the Florida Keys with no lights” is not a “skill[]
    possessed by the general public”); see also United States v. Calderon, 
    127 F.3d 1314
    , 1339 (11th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e are convinced that captaining a vessel on the
    high seas is the type of activity that requires skills not possessed by members of the
    general public, and, therefore, requires ‘special skills’ within the meaning of
    section 3B1.3.”). The First Circuit cases Manso cites do not help his cause. See
    United States v. Hilario-Hilario, 
    529 F.3d 65
    , 78 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that
    “steering a simple sailing vessel along a course, as directed by another, does not
    appear to be a special skill”); United States v. Montero-Montero, 
    370 F.3d 121
    ,
    124 (1st Cir. 2004) (remanding because “the record now lacks evidence that [the
    defendant] was in fact navigating the boat,” but merely “reflects that [he] was a
    member of a two-man crew” and “does not show whether [he] was piloting the
    boat or otherwise employing special skills in connection with its navigation”).
    This record shows Manso did more to navigate the boat than the actions of the
    defendants described in the First Circuit cases. The district court did not clearly err
    in finding that Manso employed a special skill.
    5
    Case: 18-12426   Date Filed: 03/29/2019   Page: 6 of 6
    AFFIRMED.
    6