Ronnie Lee Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security , 677 F. App'x 529 ( 2017 )


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  •            Case: 16-11556   Date Filed: 01/25/2017   Page: 1 of 6
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 16-11556
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 6:14-cv-02051-CEM-TBS
    RONNIE LEE BROWN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (January 25, 2017)
    Before ED CARNES, Chief Judge, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 16-11556      Date Filed: 01/25/2017   Page: 2 of 6
    Ronnie Lee Brown appeals the district court’s order affirming the
    Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s denial of his applications
    for social security income and disability insurance benefits. He contends that the
    administrative law judge erred by failing to consider his need for supplemental
    oxygen in determining his residual functional capacity, and that the ALJ failed to
    develop a full and fair record.
    When an ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review of that
    decision, we review the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final decision.
    Doughty v. Apfel, 
    245 F.3d 1274
    , 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). We review de novo the
    Commissioner’s legal conclusions, and we consider the Commissioner’s factual
    findings conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Lewis v. Barnhart, 
    285 F.3d 1329
    , 1330 (11th Cir. 2002). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla
    and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to
    support a conclusion.” Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 
    631 F.3d 1176
    , 1178
    (11th Cir. 2011).
    To be eligible for social security income and disability insurance benefits, a
    claimant must have a disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1)(E), 1382(a). An ALJ
    must follow the Commissioner’s five-step sequential evaluation to determine
    whether a claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
    During the last two steps of the process, an ALJ considers the claimant’s residual
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    functional capacity, see 
    id., which is
    “the most [a claimant] can still do despite
    [his] limitations,” 
    id. § 404.1545(a)(1).
    The ALJ considers medical evidence and
    other relevant evidence in the record in making that assessment. 
    Id. § 404.1545(a)(3).
    Brown argues that the ALJ “failed to account” for his need for supplemental
    oxygen in determining his residual functional capacity. Based on the record and
    the ALJ’s written decision, it is clear that the ALJ considered his need for oxygen
    yet concluded that continuous use of supplemental oxygen was not medically
    necessary for Brown. She made that determination based on his medical records
    and her finding that Brown’s testimony as to his need for continuous oxygen was
    not entirely credible. As a result, it appears that Brown actually takes issue with
    the ALJ’s determinations as to his credibility and about his need for supplemental
    oxygen.
    The record contains adequate evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion that
    Brown did not need to continuously use supplemental oxygen. The ALJ
    considered, among other things, his history of noncompliance with recommended
    medical care; his treatment records, which indicated stable conditions when he
    complied with recommended medical care; the activities he claimed to have
    performed while allegedly needing oxygen, such as cutting the grass; and evidence
    of his ability to conduct his daily activities that was contrary to what he had
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    generally reported. Although Brown was discharged from the hospital on two
    occasions with instructions to use home oxygen, those instructions did not indicate
    how much home oxygen he needed, and none of his other hospital discharges
    included an instruction to use home oxygen. Based on all of the evidence, the ALJ
    concluded that there was nothing in the record showing that Brown’s need for
    supplemental oxygen was permanent, or showing to what extent he needed
    supplemental oxygen. As a result, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
    determination that he did not require continuous supplemental oxygen. 1
    Brown’s challenge to the ALJ’s finding as to his credibility also fails. The
    ALJ provided several reasons for finding Brown’s statements about his need for
    continuous oxygen not credible. In particular, she pointed to inconsistencies
    between his testimony and evidence in the record. We will not disturb that finding.
    Foote v. Chater, 
    67 F.3d 1553
    , 1562 (11th Cir. 1995) (“A clearly articulated
    credibility finding with substantial supporting evidence in the record will not be
    disturbed by a reviewing court.”).
    Brown also challenges the ALJ’s determination at step five that he could
    perform work in the national or regional economy based on a vocational expert’s
    testimony. He argues that the ALJ asked the vocational expert an improper
    1
    In his reply brief, Brown argues that the ALJ failed to consider his need to carry his
    supplemental oxygen in assessing his upper extremity limitations. Because he raised that
    argument for the first time in his reply brief, we do not address it. See Jackson v. Comm’r of
    Soc. Sec., 
    601 F.3d 1268
    , 1274 n.4 (11th Cir. 2010).
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    hypothetical question because the question was based on his residual functional
    capacity, “which failed to account for [his] need to use supplemental oxygen.” But
    because the ALJ did not “fail[ ] to account” for Brown’s need for supplemental
    oxygen in determining his residual functional capacity, the ALJ did not err in
    posing hypothetical questions to the vocational expert that did not describe his
    need for supplemental oxygen. The ALJ’s hypothetical questions included all of
    the impairments that Brown met his burden to show. As a result, substantial
    evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that Brown could perform jobs that were
    available in significant numbers in the national economy. See 
    Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1180
    (“In order for a vocational expert’s testimony to constitute substantial
    evidence, the ALJ must pose a hypothetical question which comprises all of the
    claimant’s impairments.”).
    Finally Brown contends that, “[i]f the ALJ believed that the record was
    insufficient regarding [his] need for supplemental oxygen, then she should have
    further developed the issue.” An ALJ has a basic obligation to develop a full and
    fair record, Welch v. Bowen, 
    854 F.2d 436
    , 440 (11th Cir. 1988), and the record
    shows that the ALJ fulfilled that obligation in this case. Brown has not identified
    what evidence was available to him that the ALJ could have used in developing the
    record, and it was his burden to show that that his need for supplemental oxygen
    would prevent him from performing the jobs identified by the vocational expert.
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    See Moore v. Barnhart, 
    405 F.3d 1208
    , 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[The social
    security] regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate
    both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work.”).
    During the disability hearing, the ALJ elicited testimony from Brown as to
    his need for oxygen. She specifically asked Brown about his two oxygen
    prescriptions, the dates of those prescriptions, and the extent to which he needed
    oxygen. The ALJ noted that Brown “came to the hearing . . . with [portable]
    oxygen.” The record also contains other evidence of Brown’s respiratory
    condition and medical care, including records of hospital discharges that do not
    instruct Brown to use home oxygen. As a result, Brown’s contention that the ALJ
    should have “further developed” the record as to his need for oxygen is unfounded.
    AFFIRMED.
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