Gregory F. Rohde v. Bank of America, N.A. , 591 F. App'x 932 ( 2015 )


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  •                                                         [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 14-12905
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-03059-SCJ
    GREGORY F. ROHDE,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (February 3, 2015)
    Before MARCUS, PRYOR and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Gregory F. Rohde appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for leave
    to file an amended complaint. 1 Rohde filed an initial and first amended complaint
    against Appellee Bank of America, N.A. (BANA) alleging BANA wrongfully
    foreclosed on his home. BANA moved to dismiss Rohde’s first amended
    complaint because a subsequent Georgia Supreme Court decision rendered
    Rohde’s arguments nonviable. Rohde agreed Georgia law no longer supported the
    wrongful foreclosure claim as pleaded in his first amended complaint. Rohde
    moved, however, for leave to amend his first amended complaint to assert a new
    reason why the foreclosure was wrongful. The district court concluded Rohde’s
    proposed amendments were futile and denied the motion for leave to file a second
    amended complaint. We affirm. 2
    A proposed amendment is futile when the complaint as amended would not
    survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 
    169 F.3d 1310
    , 1320 (11th Cir. 1999). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
    contain sufficient factual allegations to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on
    its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007). In considering a
    1
    In his notice of appeal, Rohde also sought review of the district court’s order granting
    the defendant’s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. Rohde did not argue the district
    court erred by dismissing the first amended complaint in his initial brief, and he has therefore
    abandoned the issue. United States v. Jernigan, 
    341 F.3d 1273
    , 1284 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[A]
    party seeking to raise a claim or issue on appeal must plainly and prominently so indicate.”).
    2
    When the district court denies a motion for leave to amend because the amendment
    would be futile, we review the denial de novo. Fla. Evergreen Foliage v. E.I. DuPont De
    Nemours & Co., 
    470 F.3d 1036
    , 1040 (11th Cir. 2006).
    2
    motion to dismiss, we must accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint. See
    Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009). We need not, however, accept as true
    the complaint’s legal conclusions. 
    Id.
    Rohde’s proposed amended complaint alleges BANA’s foreclosure was
    wrongful because the foreclosure notice BANA sent to him did not comply with
    Georgia’s notice requirements. Under Georgia law, a foreclosure notice “shall
    include the name, address, and telephone number of the individual or entity who
    shall have full authority to negotiate, amend, and modify all terms of the mortgage
    with the debtor.” O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2(a).
    Rohde’s proposed amended complaint does not support a plausible claim
    that BANA’s foreclosure notice was deficient. Rohde alleges the foreclosure
    notice falsely stated BANA was the entity with “full authority to negotiate, amend
    and modify all terms of the mortgage” when, in fact, the “true entity” with this
    panoply of authority was some other unidentified, undisclosed owner or investor.
    These are just legal conclusions reciting the statutory notice requirements. Iqbal,
    
    556 U.S. at 679
     (“While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a
    complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations.”). Rohde’s complaint
    does not allege facts identifying the unknown owner or point to any specific
    contracts, rules, or communications with BANA supporting Rohde’s theory that
    BANA possessed only limited authority to modify the terms of his mortgage.
    3
    Without more, Rohde’s proposed amended complaint cannot survive a motion to
    dismiss. Therefore, the district court did not err by denying as futile Rohde’s
    motion for leave to amend his first amended complaint.
    AFFIRMED.
    4