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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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Nos. 18-13535; 19-11185
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:16-cv-25254-JEM
ANTHONY KING,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
AKIMA GLOBAL SERVICES, LLC,
Defendant - Appellee.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
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(June 7, 2019)
Before MARCUS, WILSON, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Anthony King filed a complaint against Akima Global Services, LLC in
Florida state court alleging various violations of the Florida Civil Rights Act
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(FCRA), Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1). Akima removed the case to federal court based on
diversity jurisdiction and filed an answer. Akima later filed a motion to amend its
answer after the deadline to assert the federal enclave doctrine as a defense, which
the district court granted. Near the end of discovery, the district court granted
Akima’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding that the federal enclave
doctrine barred King’s FCRA claims. King now appeals, arguing that the district
court erred by allowing Akima to amend its answer and granting Akima’s motion
for judgment on the pleadings.
I. Motion to Amend Answer
A. Background
King was employed by Doyan-Akal JV, which provided services at Krome
Detention Center under a contract with the federal government. After Doyan’s
contract expired, the federal government contracted with Akima to provide
services at Krome. The new contract required all existing employees to apply to,
and interview with, Akima. King was not hired by Akima, which King alleged
was due to his race, religion, and national origin.
After the deadline to amend its answer passed, Akima filed a motion for
leave to add the federal enclave doctrine as a defense, citing the Southern District
of Florida’s recent decision in Booker v. Doyon Security Services, LLC, CM/ECF
for S.D. Fla. Dist. Ct., 1:16-cv-24146-JAL, doc. 40. Booker held that the federal
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enclave doctrine barred a different Krome employee from raising state
employment claims. Akima argued that adding the federal enclave defense was
appropriate because Booker supported its argument, the decision was issued after
Akima filed its answer, and King would not be prejudiced because the addition
came before the end of discovery and before the dispositive motion deadline.
B. Discussion
We review the grant of a motion to amend the pleadings after the deadline
for abuse of discretion. Moore v. Baker,
989 F.2d 1129, 1131 (11th Cir. 1993). A
party may amend a pleading after the scheduling deadline “only by leave of court
or by written consent of the adverse party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Leave to amend
“should be freely given when justice so requires.”
Id. The party seeking leave to
amend after the scheduling order deadline must show good cause. Smith v. School
Bd. of Orange Cty.,
487 F.3d 1361, 1366 (11th Cir. 2007). Because it should be
freely given, a district court must generally give a justification if it denies leave to
amend.
Moore, 989 F.2d at 1131.
Although the district court did not explain its decision to allow the
amendment, Akima demonstrated good cause. See
id. Akima sought to raise the
federal enclave defense after Booker was issued, which held that the federal
enclave doctrine barred a Krome employee’s FCRA claims. Although the district
court allowed the amendment seven months after Booker was issued and the law
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firm that represented the defendant in Booker was also Akima’s counsel, the
federal enclave doctrine, if applicable, bars King’s claims. Akima also
demonstrated that King would not be prejudiced by the amendment because leave
was granted well before the discovery deadline. The district court thus did not
abuse its discretion in granting Akima’s motion to amend.
II. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
A. Background
King next appeals the district court’s decision granting Akima’s motion for
judgment on the pleadings. Relying on Booker, Akima argued that even accepting
the allegations in King’s complaint as true, the federal enclave doctrine barred
King’s FCRA claims. In Booker, the plaintiff was a Krome employee that alleged
violations of the FCRA against Doyon Security Services, a security company
contracted to provide services at Krome. Booker v. Doyon Security Services, LLC,
CM/ECF for S.D. Fla. Dist. Ct., 1:16-cv-24146-JAL, doc. 40 at *5. Dayon filed a
motion to dismiss based on the federal enclave doctrine.
Id. at *4. The court took
judicial notice that Krome opened in 1980 and began housing immigration
detainees in 1981.
Id. To do so, the court relied on two reports—one prepared by
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and another by the Office of the
Inspector General (OIG).
Id. The court in Booker determined that the FCRA had
no force or effect at Krome because the FCRA was enacted in 1992, after Krome
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was ceded to the federal government.
Id. at *5. The district court thus dismissed
the complaint for failure to state a claim.
Id.
The district court in this case took judicial notice of the Booker opinion,
citing it as the basis for granting Akima’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
King argues that the district court here erroneously took judicial notice of the
Booker opinion, the materials cited in Booker, and a Miami Herald article to
conclude that Krome is a federal enclave. 1
B. Discussion
We review a district court’s grant of a motion for judgment on the pleadings
de novo. Cannon v. City of West Palm Beach,
250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir.
2001). We analyze the district court’s decision to take judicial notice of certain
facts under an abuse of discretion standard. Lodge v. Kondaur Capital Corp.,
750
F.3d 1263, 1273 (11th Cir. 2014). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is
governed by the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Carbone v. Cable News Network, Inc.,
910 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir.
2018). Rule 12 provides that a party may move for judgment on the pleadings
after the pleadings are closed but early enough not to delay trial. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(c). Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when there are no material facts in
1
King also argues that Akima’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was untimely. We
disagree. Akima filed the motion after the pleadings were closed and four months before trial.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
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dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Scott v.
Taylor,
405 F.3d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir. 2005). All facts alleged in the complaint
must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Id. If it is
clear from the pleadings that the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any set of
facts consistent with the complaint, the district court should dismiss the complaint.
Horsley v. Rivera,
292 F.3d 695, 700 (11th Cir. 2002).
The federal enclave doctrine gives Congress the power to “exercise
exclusive Legislation . . . over all Places purchased by the Consent of the
Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts,
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.” U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 17. The federal government thus has the power to acquire land from the
states for certain specified uses and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over those
lands, which are known as federal enclaves. See Paul v. United States,
371 U.S.
245, 263 (1963). Under this doctrine, state law that is adopted after the creation of
the enclave generally does not apply on the enclave. See
id. at 268. But, in the
absence of federal law that displaces state law, those state laws that existed at the
time that the enclave was ceded to the federal government remain in full force and
effect. See
id. at 263, 268. The FCRA was enacted in 1992. See Fla. Stat.
§ 760.01(1).
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There are two exceptions to the rule that only state law in effect at the time
of the acquisition applies to the federal enclave. First, Congress may authorize the
application of state laws enacted after the creation of the enclave. See United
States v. Sharpnack,
355 U.S. 286, 294–95 (1958). Second, the state may reserve
jurisdiction at the time of cession. See
Paul, 371 U.S. at 264–65. The jurisdiction
exercised by the federal government over federal enclaves is exclusive unless the
deed of cession provides otherwise, or the cession is not accepted in the manner
required by law. Lord v. Local Union No. 2088, Int’l Broth. Of Elec. Workers,
AFL-CIO,
646 F.2d 1057, 1059 (5th Cir. 1981). When a state does not reserve
jurisdiction, federal law—and state law existing at the time of acquisition—
exclusively control. See
Paul, 371 U.S. at 268. Under Florida’s cession statute,
the state grants exclusive jurisdiction over ceded land to the federal government
but retains concurrent jurisdiction for civil and criminal process. See Fla. Stat. §
6.04.
A court may take judicial notice of a fact that is not subject to reasonable
dispute when either (1) it is generally known within the trial court’s territorial
jurisdiction or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Fed. R. Civ. P. 201(b). A statement of
fact appearing in a newspaper does not itself establish that the fact is “capable of
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot
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reasonably be questioned.” See Cofield v. Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
936 F.2d 512,
517 (11th Cir. 1991).
The district court erred in granting Akima’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings. Although judicial notice of certain facts in the DHS report, OIG report,
and Miami-Herald article was appropriate because those facts were beyond
dispute, the limited record before the district court could not conclusively establish
that Krome was a federal enclave. First, in Booker neither party raised, and the
court did not consider, whether Florida reserved any jurisdiction over Krome. See
Lord, 646 F.2d at 1058. Second, the sources cited in Booker also did not establish
whether Florida consented to the cession of the Krome land to the federal
government, or even if Florida did consent, whether the state retained any
jurisdiction over the land at the time of cession. Even though Florida’s cession
statute provides that the state retains concurrent jurisdiction for civil and criminal
process when land is ceded to the federal government, a court must look to the
deed of cession to determine if the terms of the statute apply or whether an
exception was made. See
id. Third, the parties disputed many material facts,
including the circumstances under which Florida ceded Krome to the federal
government and whether Florida retained jurisdiction over employment matters.
King is entitled to discovery on those issues, making judgment on the pleadings
inappropriate at this juncture. See
Scott, 405 F.3d at 1253. Without conclusive
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evidence on the application of the federal enclave doctrine and its exceptions to the
Krome property, the district court could not determine that Akima was entitled to
judgment on the pleadings as a matter of law.
III. Conclusion
We therefore affirm the district court’s decision to allow Akima to amend its
answer to add the federal enclave defense. But we vacate and remand the district
court’s decision granting Akima’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Consistent with the parties’ stipulation, because we remand, we also vacate the
cost judgment against King in the consolidated appeal.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART.
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