Case: 13-15956 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 1 of 10
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-15956
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cr-20346-MGC-21
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CARLOS ALFONSO ALMANZA SANCHEZ,
a.k.a. Caliche,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(April 3, 2015)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges, and JONES, ∗ District
Judge.
∗
Honorable Steve C. Jones, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Georgia,
sitting by designation.
Case: 13-15956 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 2 of 10
PER CURIAM:
Carlos Alfonso Almanza Sanchez and various co-conspirators planned to use
a 90-foot submarine—which cost $6,000,000 to build and was capable of carrying
3,000 kilograms of cocaine—to transport drugs to the United States. For his part
in the scheme, Mr. Almanza Sanchez was convicted of conspiracy to manufacture
and distribute cocaine, knowing that the cocaine was bound for the United States,
in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 959(a)(2) and 963. The district court sentenced him to
135 months’ imprisonment.
Mr. Almanza Sanchez appeals, asserting a number of challenges to his
conviction. After review of the record, and with the benefit of oral argument, we
affirm.
I
Oscar Agusto Gutierrez Garcia, a Colombian naval officer, recruited Mr.
Almanza Sanchez, a veteran of the Colombian Navy, to take part in the cocaine-
smuggling scheme. Mr. Gutierrez Garcia initially recruited Mr. Almanza Sanchez
to serve as a mechanic on a submarine based in Ecuador, promising him $50,000
for his services. Before it could get underway, however, the Ecuadorian submarine
was seized by the Ecuadorian army. Mr. Almanza Sanchez then joined the crew of
a second submarine based in Colombia and agreed to serve as its co-captain in
exchange for $100,000. Colombian law enforcement officials seized that
2
Case: 13-15956 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 3 of 10
submarine and apprehended Mr. Almanza Sanchez, along with several other
individuals, before the submarine set off on its voyage. The Colombian authorities
found 3,000 kilograms of cocaine and a weapons cache not far from where the
submarine was seized.
A federal grand jury charged Mr. Almanza Sanchez with conspiracy to
manufacture and distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, knowing that the
cocaine would be unlawfully imported into the United States, in violation of
21
U.S.C. §§ 959(a)(2), 960(b)(2)(B), and 963. After being extradited to the United
States, Mr. Almanza Sanchez was tried by a jury and convicted on the sole charge
in the indictment. At trial, one of the most contested issues was whether Mr.
Almanza Sanchez knew that the drugs were intended to be imported into the
United States.
II
On appeal, Mr. Almanza Sanchez contends that the district court erred by
admitting expert testimony as to drug trafficking routes; that the district court erred
by admitting hearsay testimony as to the training Colombian sailors receive about
drug trafficking routes; that
21 U.S.C. §§ 959(a)(2) and 963 do not apply
extraterritorially; and that cumulative error, including improper comments by the
government during closing argument, denied him a fair trial.
3
Case: 13-15956 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 4 of 10
A
We first address Mr. Almanza Sanchez’s argument that the district court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to try him because
21 U.S.C. §§ 959(a)(2) and
963 do not apply extraterritorially. This argument is foreclosed by binding circuit
precedent, as we have held that §§ 959(a)(2) and 963 apply extraterritorially. See
United States v. Caicedo-Asprilla,
632 F.2d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir. 1980) (addressing
§ 959(2)—the predecessor to § 959(a)(2)—and § 963).1
B
Mr. Almanza Sanchez next argues that the district court erred by admitting
expert testimony by Agent Erik Holm of the United States Coast Guard relating to
drug trafficking routes on the Pacific Ocean. We disagree.
We review a district court’s decision to admit expert testimony for an abuse
of discretion. See United States v. Frazier,
387 F.3d 1244, 1258 (11th Cir. 2004)
(en banc). And we have explained that “an experienced narcotics agent may testify
as an expert to help a jury understand the significance of certain conduct or
methods of operation unique to the drug distribution business.” United States v.
Garcia,
447 F.3d 1327, 1335 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
1
In Bonner v. City of Pritchard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted as
binding precedent all decisions by the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981.
4
Case: 13-15956 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 5 of 10
The government called Agent Holm as an expert witness to testify about
drug trafficking routes from South America to Mexico and the United States via
the Pacific Ocean. Mr. Almanza Sanchez objected to Agent Holm’s testimony,
arguing that it was cumulative, not helpful to the jury, and unfairly prejudicial.
After holding a Daubert hearing, 2 the district court overruled Mr. Almanza
Sanchez’s objections on the condition that Agent Holm testify only as to drug
trafficking routes, and not as to Mr. Almanza Sanchez’s knowledge about the
cocaine’s intended destination.
The record establishes that Agent Holm served on active duty with the
United States Coast Guard for more than 22 years and had extensive experience
investigating drug trafficking in the eastern Pacific. Agent Holm’s experience
included working with confidential informants and interviewing drug traffickers,
and he had previously testified as an expert on semi-submersible drug trafficking
operations. Agent Holm also indicated that he was familiar with the practices of
cocaine smugglers operating out of South and Central America. He explained that
the majority of cocaine smuggled through the eastern Pacific towards Central
America or Mexico ends up in either the United States or Mexico.
Agent Holm had significant experience and knowledge about the drug
trafficking routes from South and Central America to the United States. His
2
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579 (1993).
5
Case: 13-15956 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 6 of 10
opinions were sufficiently reliable, and his testimony could have helped the jury
understand the evidence. See Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of Monroe
Cnty., Fla.,
402 F.3d 1092, 1107 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he proponent must
demonstrate that the witness is qualified to testify competently, that his opinions
are based on sound methodology, and that his testimony will be helpful to the trier
of fact.”).
Mr. Almanza Sanchez also argues that Agent Holm’s testimony was
cumulative and unfairly prejudicial. This argument also fails. The testimony was
not cumulative because Agent Holm addressed the routes that drug traffickers
generally use. The testimony from other witnesses addressed the training received
by those serving in the Colombian Navy and the specific smuggling routes that Mr.
Almanza Sanchez and his co-conspirators intended to use.
As for Mr. Almanza Sanchez’s claim that Agent Holm’s testimony was
unfairly prejudicial, the district court ensured this was not the case by limiting his
testimony to drug trafficking routes generally. Agent Holm did not testify as to
Mr. Almanza Sanchez’s personal knowledge or the particular submarine operations
in this case.
In sum, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
allowing Agent Holm to testify as an expert.
6
Case: 13-15956 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 7 of 10
C
Mr. Almanza Sanchez next contends that the district court abused its
discretion by allowing Wilfer Torres and Rafael Olaya Quintero to testify that
sailors in the Colombian Navy, like Mr. Almanza Sanchez, are taught that most
cocaine entering the eastern Pacific from Colombia is bound for the United States.
Mr. Almanza Sanchez argues that this testimony was inadmissible hearsay, but we
again disagree.
“We review a district court’s hearsay ruling for abuse of discretion.” United
States v. Brown,
441 F.3d 1330, 1359 (11th Cir. 2006). “An out-of-court statement
is considered hearsay only if the witness (other than the declarant) is testifying to
the statement in order to prove or demonstrate the truth of that statement.” United
States v. Fox,
613 F.2d 99, 101 (5th Cir. 1980). Thus, “[s]tatements not offered for
the truth of the matter asserted are not hearsay.” United States v. Gonzales,
606
F.2d 70, 77 (5th Cir. 1979).
Mr. Torres, a lieutenant in the Colombian Navy, testified that he was
stationed at the Guapi Base for two years and that during training sailors received
information about drug trafficking routes. Specifically, Mr. Torres testified that
Colombian sailors are instructed that drug traffickers use rivers in Colombia to
enter the Pacific Ocean and head north to Mexico, the United States, the
Dominican Republic, and other destinations.
7
Case: 13-15956 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 8 of 10
Mr. Olaya Quintero, a Marine Lieutenant Colonel in the Colombian Navy
and a former commandant at the Guapi Base, also testified for the government. He
stated that sailors at the Guapi Base are instructed about drug trafficking routes and
that the training at all Colombian naval bases along the Pacific Ocean is the same.
Mr. Quintero also testified that sailors learn that the drugs go through Panama,
Central America, and Mexico and that when they reach a certain size, the drug
shipments always end up in the United States. Mr. Quintero was not at the Guapi
Base when Mr. Almanza Sanchez was stationed there, but he testified that the
training at Colombian naval bases had been the same for many years.
The testimony of Messrs. Torres and Quintero was not offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted—i.e., that most drugs smuggled on the Pacific Ocean
from Colombia are bound for the United States. Rather, their testimony was
offered to demonstrate the type of training members of the Colombian navy
received at the Guapi Base with regard to drug trafficking routes. From this
testimony, the jury could reasonably infer that, as a sailor in the Colombian Navy,
Mr. Almanza Sanchez received the same training, and thus, it was more likely than
not that he knew about drug trafficking routes in the eastern Pacific.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the testimony of
Messrs. Torres and Quintero.
8
Case: 13-15956 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 9 of 10
D
At the close of trial, the district court instructed the jury that it need not find
that Mr. Almanza Sanchez knew all the details of the conspiracy in order to convict
him of the charged offense. The government referred to this portion of the jury
instruction during its closing argument. Mr. Almanza Sanchez argues that, by
doing so, the government diminished its burden of proof as to whether he knew
that the cocaine was intended for the United States, and thus deprived him of a fair
trial. We find no merit to this argument.
Mr. Almanza Sanchez’s contention about the government’s closing
argument is distorted. When the government stated that Mr. Almanza Sanchez
could be convicted of conspiracy without full knowledge of all the details of the
unlawful plan to transport cocaine to the United States, see D.E. 635 at 127:10-11,
the government was not implying that Mr. Almanza Sanchez could be convicted
without knowledge that the cocaine was bound for the United States. Rather, it
was driving home the point that, as the district court accurately explained, Mr.
Almanza Sanchez did not have to know every detail of the plan to be convicted for
conspiring to commit the crime. See United States v. Knowles,
66 F.3d 1146, 1159
(11th Cir. 1995) (“A conspirator need not know all of the members or details of a
conspiracy to be held responsible as a co-conspirator.”).
9
Case: 13-15956 Date Filed: 04/03/2015 Page: 10 of 10
With respect to Mr. Almanza Sanchez’s knowledge about the intended
destination of the cocaine, the government explained that it did not have to prove
that Mr. Almanza Sanchez had a “specific conversation” with someone as to the
intended destination of the drugs in order to prove that he knew the drugs were
bound for the United States. See D.E. 635 at 163:3-8. Rather, the jurors could
draw “reasonable inferences,” based on all the evidence, that Mr. Almanza
Sanchez knew the drugs were headed for the United States. Id. at 9-12. That
argument was not improper.
Mr. Almanza Sanchez’s attempt to cherry-pick certain statements made by
the government during closing arguments is unavailing. We have reviewed the
record and find no error, plain or otherwise, in the government’s arguments.
E
Finally, Mr. Almanza Sanchez argues that he was denied a fair trial based on
cumulative error. We have stated, however, that “[w]here there is no error or only
a single error, there can be no cumulative error.” United States v. Gamory,
635
F.3d 480, 492 (11th Cir. 2011). Finding no error here, we reject Mr. Almanza
Sanchez’s contention of cumulative error.
III
For the forgoing reasons, we affirm Mr. Almanza Sanchez’s conviction.
AFFIRMED.
10
