Inez T. Manigault v. Commissioner, Social Security Administration , 609 F. App'x 982 ( 2015 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 14-11117
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 1:11-cv-00793-MHS
INEZ MANIGAULT,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant - Appellee,
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Atlanta, GA (Region IV),
Defendant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(April 21, 2015)
Before TJOFLAT, MARCUS and WILLIAM PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM:
The District Court, adopting the Report and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge, granted the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration
(“the Commissioner”) summary judgment on the claims Inez Manigault brought
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–
634, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17.
Manigault’s claims were (1) that she was denied a promotion to the position of
Lead Legal Assistant due to her age,1 and (2) that she was subject to retaliation—
the denial of the Lead Legal Assistant position in the Atlanta North Office of the
Social Security Administration Office of Disability Adjudication and Review
(ODAR) and a thirty-day suspension from work—for complaining to the Equal
Employment Opportunity (“EEO”) office about her suspension. The District Court
found for the Commissioner on these claims on the ground that Manigault failed to
establish a prima facie case for relief. Proceeding pro se, she appeals the rulings,
arguing that the record reveals a prima facie case on both claims. 2 We disagree
and therefore affirm. 3
1
Manigault was born on March 20, 1950.
2
The District Court granted summary judgment on the claims Manigault asserted in her
second amended complaint, which, like her previous complaints, she filed pro se. Before the
Magistrate Judge, she sought leave to amend that complaint. The Magistrate Judge denied leave.
Manigault did not challenge the decision in her objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
2
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The relevant facts are these. Manigault was employed by ODAR from 1998
until January 2011, when she retired. She was a Senior Case Technician/Legal
Assistant in ODAR’s Atlanta North Hearing Office 4 from 2001 until January 2011,
except for the year, April 30, 2006, through April 29, 2007, she spent in ODAR’s
Downtown Atlanta Office on temporary assignment as a Paralegal Specialist.
The circumstances that led to Manigault’s filing of this lawsuit began on
July 26, 2007, three months after her temporary assignment to the Downtown
Office had ended. Manigault went to the Downtown Office to retrieve some
personal belongings she had left at her workstation there. When she arrived, she
discovered that her belongings had been boxed up and moved from the
workstation. Brenda Gardner, a supervisor in the Downtown Office, told her
where she could find them, and Manigault, visibly upset, became loud and
belligerent, addressing Gardner and those in the area with profanity. A Federal
Recommendation filed with the District Court. Assuming that she somehow preserved the issue
for review here, we find no abuse of discretion in the denial of leave to amend. Manigault also
claims that she was denied due process of law in connection with the 30-day suspension.
Manigault failed to present her due process claim to the District Court; hence, it did not rule on
the claim. Neither do we.
3
We review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, taking the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party below, Manigault. Castleberry v.
Goldome Credit Corp., 408 F.3d 773, 785 (11th Cir. 2005).
4
Her job was to prepare cases for hearings before the Administrative Law Judges.
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Protective Service officer was summoned and escorted Manigault out of the
building. She was immediately placed on administrative leave and remained in
that status until October 10, 2007.
On October 29, 2007, Manigault’s supervisor in the Atlanta North Hearing
Office, Lynette Montalvo, issued a memorandum proposing that Manigault be
suspended for 30 days without pay based on the July 26, 2007, incident. Manigault
responded to this proposal in January 2008. In April 2008, while the proposal was
under consideration by Catherine Palmer, who was in charge of the Atlanta North
Hearing Office, Manigault applied for an open position as Lead Legal Assistant.
Palmer was also charged with selecting the person who would fill the position.
On May 28, 2008, Palmer issued a decision suspending Manigault for 30
days, effective June 8, 2008, for her “discourteous, disrespectful, and disruptive
behavior and use of profanity” at the Downtown Office on July 26, 2007.
On June 5, 2008, Manigault complained to the EEO Office about her suspension.
On June 13, Palmer appointed Patricia Pendergrass to the Lead Legal Assistant
position. On June 24, an EEO counsellor notified Palmer of Manigault’s
complaint, and inquired about her decision to suspend Manigault.
I.
Under the ADEA, an employer may not discriminate against an employee
who is at least 40 years old. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 631(a). In proving an age-
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discrimination claim, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case either by showing
direct evidence of discrimination or by indirect evidence. Damon v. Fleming
Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1358 (11th Cir. 1999). Indirect
evidence is circumstantial evidence. Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., 161 F.3d 1318,
1330 (11th Cir. 1998). “[R]emarks by non-decisionmakers or remarks unrelated to
the decisionmaking process itself are not direct evidence of discrimination.” Id.
We have adopted a variation of the test articulated by the Supreme Court in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d
668 (1973), for circumstantial-evidence cases arising under the ADEA. See
Mitchell v. Worldwide Underwriters Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 565, 566 (11th Cir. 1992).
To make out a prima facie case of age discrimination, the plaintiff may show that
(1) she was a member of the protected group of people between the ages of 40 and
70, (2) she was subject to adverse employment action, (3) a substantially younger
person filled the position she sought, and (4) she was qualified for the job she
sought. See Damon, 196 F.3d at 1359.
Here, the record supports the District Court’s conclusion that Manigault
failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Patricia Pendergrass
was not substantially younger than Manigault; the two were born within three
months of each other.
II.
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Manigault claims that Palmer’s decisions to suspend her for 30 days and to
select Pendergrass over her for the Lead Legal Assistant position were in
retaliation for her having complained to the EEO Office on June 5, 2008, about the
suspension. 5 Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating “against an
employee ‘because [s]he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because [s]he has made a charge, testified, assisted,
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this
subchapter.’” Coutu v. Martin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 47 F.3d 1068, 1074
(11th Cir. 1995) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)). The ADEA also prohibits such
retaliatory discrimination. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). The same substantive analysis
applies to claims of retaliation brought under the ADEA and Title VII. Weeks v.
Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2002). Under both statutes,
when a plaintiff uses circumstantial evidence to prove a claim, this court applies
the McDonnell Douglas analytical framework to assess the claim. See Standard,
161 F.3d at 1331.
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must first make a
prima facie case of retaliation. Brown v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 597 F.3d 1160,
5
Manigault also claims that Palmer’s decisions were in retaliation for EEO activity in
which she engaged in 2002, when she filed a complaint of discrimination she did not pursue.
The claim is patently frivolous; the six-year period between that activity and Palmer’s challenged
decisions is too remote in time to establish causation.
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1181 (11th Cir. 2010). To successfully establish a prima facie retaliation claim
under the ADEA or Title VII, a plaintiff may show that: (1) she engaged in
statutorily protected expression; (2) she suffered a materially adverse action; and
(3) the adverse action was causally related to the protected expression. See id.; see
also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67–68, 126 S. Ct.
2405, 2415, 165 L. Ed. 2d 345 (2006). The burden of causation can be met by
showing close temporal proximity between the statutorily protected activity and
the adverse employment action, but the temporal relationship must be very close.
See Thomas v. Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007). At a
minimum, however, the adverse act must have followed the protected conduct—
“this minimum proof stems from the important requirement that the employer was
actually aware of the protected expression at the time it took adverse employment
action.” Griffin v. GTE Fla., Inc., 182 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999)
(quotations omitted).
If the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of retaliation and the employer
articulates some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision,
then the plaintiff must show that each proffered reason was pretextual. Brown, 597
F.3d at 1181–82. If the employer offers more than one legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason, the plaintiff must rebut each reason. Chapman v. AI
Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1037 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
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When seeking to show pretext, an employee must meet the employer’s
stated reason “head on and rebut it, and [she] cannot succeed by simply quarreling
with the wisdom of that reason.” Id. at 1030. To show pretext, the plaintiff must
show that a proffered reason is false. Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n, 446 F.3d 1160,
1162–63 (11th Cir. 2006). She “may succeed in this either directly by persuading
the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or
indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence.” Id. at 1163 (quoting Jackson v. Ala. State Tenure Comm’n, 405 F.3d
1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2005)). Conclusory allegations alone are insufficient.
Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371, 1376 (11th Cir. 1996). The
plaintiff must identify “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s rationale.” Holland v. Gee, 677
F.3d 1047, 1055–56 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). In the context of a
promotion, the plaintiff “must show not merely that the defendant’s employment
decisions were mistaken but that they were in fact motivated by a [discriminatory
factor].” Brooks, 446 F.3d at 1163 (quoting Alexander v. Fulton Cnty., 207 F.3d
1303, 1339 (11th Cir. 2000)). To do so, the plaintiff must show that “the
disparities between the successful applicant’s and her own qualifications were of
such weight and significance that no reasonable person, in the exercise of impartial
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judgment, could have chosen the candidate selected over the plaintiff.” Id.
(quoting Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 732 (11th Cir. 2004)).
The District Court did not err in concluding that Manigault failed to
establish a prima facie case of retaliation, for she failed show a causal link between
the adverse acts of non-promotion or suspension and her protected activity of
complaining to the EEO Office on June 5, 2008. See Brown, 597 F.3d at 1181.
Palmer decided both to suspend Manigault and to select Pendergrass to fill the
Lead Legal Assistant position before June 24, 2008, when she first received notice
of Manigault’s EEO complaint.6 Because Palmer was not aware of Manigault’s
EEO complaint at the time she made either decision, Manigault cannot show the
requisite causal link between statutorily protected conduct and the adverse
employment action. See Griffin, 182 F.3d at 1284. Even if we were to assume that
Manigault did establish a causal link, the Commissioner articulated the following
legitimate reasons for the adverse employment actions: Palmer suspended
Manigault because of her disruptive outburst at the Downtown Office and
promoted Pendergrass because she as more qualified than Manigault—Pendergrass
had more experience with the Electronic Folder Process (“EFP”), an automated
system which the office would be using; she was responsible for training staff in
6
Though Manigault had contacted Palmer prior to June 2008, the subject matter of their
communications did not concern statutorily protected activities.
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the EFP; and she had demonstrated an ability to interact effectively with other
staff. Manigault has failed to show that these reasons were pretextual. See Brown,
597 F.3d at 1181–82.
AFFIRMED.
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