W.L. Petrey Wholesale Co., Inc. v. Great American Insurance Company , 622 F. App'x 849 ( 2015 )


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  •             Case: 15-10629   Date Filed: 08/06/2015   Page: 1 of 8
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 15-10629
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cv-00868-CSC
    W.L. PETREY WHOLESALE CO., INC.,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    versus
    GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Alabama
    ________________________
    (August 6, 2015)
    Before TJOFLAT, JULIE CARNES and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 15-10629     Date Filed: 08/06/2015   Page: 2 of 8
    In this case, W.L. Petrey Wholesale Company (“Petrey”) appeals the district
    court’s summary judgment in favor of defendants Great American Insurance
    Company (“Great American”). After careful consideration of the parties’ briefs
    and the record, we affirm.
    I.
    Petrey sells wholesale goods and supplies to convenience stores through a
    network of sales people. Justin Bree was a route salesperson for Petrey in central
    and southern Indiana from 2007 until 2013, when he was fired because his primary
    customer requested that he not service its stores any longer. Route salespersons
    are required to drive a Petrey company truck and to rent a storage facility in which
    to store Petrey inventory. When Bree was fired, Petrey took possession of his
    delivery truck and its contents, his computer equipment, and the storage unit where
    Bree kept Petrey’s inventory.
    A month after Bree’s termination, Petrey discovered that the inventory in the
    storage unit was short by 82,510 bottles of 5-Hour Energy products, worth
    $111,415.35. Petrey audited Bree’s route inventory records and took a physical
    count of the route inventory in the storage unit; a comparison of the physical
    inventory count with the computer generated perpetual inventory count revealed a
    shortage of physical inventory. An additional comparison of the physical
    inventory count with the records of all route transactions involving 5-Hour Energy
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    products confirmed the exact shortage amount of 82,510 bottles. Petrey also
    compared Bree’s orders for those products with his sales, which revealed a pattern
    of Bree’s ordering more 5-Hour Energy products than his sales would have
    required.
    Petrey filed a claim with its insurance company, Great American, under a
    Crime Protection Policy, which insured against “loss of, and loss from damage to,
    money, securities and other property resulting directly from dishonest acts
    committed by an employee.” Crime Protection Policy, Doc. 17-2 at 6. 1 Great
    American denied the claim based on the inventory shortages exclusion in the
    policy, which read: “We will not pay for . . . [l]oss, or that part of any loss, the
    proof of which as to its existence or amount is dependent upon: (a) An inventory
    computation; or (b) A profit and loss computation.” Id. at 11.
    Petrey filed this action for breach of the insurance contract and subsequently
    added a claim for bad faith. Great American filed a motion to dismiss or, in the
    alternative, for summary judgment based solely on the inventory shortage
    exclusion. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment,
    concluding that the inventory shortage exclusion applied and barred Petrey’s claim.
    Petrey timely appealed.
    1
    Citations to “Doc.” herein refer to docket entries in the district court record in this case.
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    II.
    We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Liese v.
    Indian River Cty. Hosp. Dist., 
    701 F.3d 334
    , 341 (11th Cir. 2012). “At this stage
    in the proceedings we are required to view all of the evidence in a light most
    favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s
    favor.” 
    Id. at 342
     (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is
    appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
    fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
    56(a).
    III.
    Under Alabama law, 2 to prevail on either its breach of contract or bad faith
    claim, Petrey must show that the loss is covered by the insurance policy. See State
    Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Brechbill, 
    144 So. 3d 248
    , 258 (Ala. 2013). Here, it is
    undisputed that the policy covers loss of property caused by employee theft. But
    the insurance policy expressly excludes employee theft claims that are dependent
    upon proof of loss by an inventory calculation or profit and loss calculation. Such
    exclusions are intended to protect insurers from errors that may be inherent in a
    2
    Because this is a diversity case concerning an Alabama insurance contract, we apply
    Alabama substantive law. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Era Oxford Realty Co. Greystone,
    LLC, 
    572 F.3d 893
    , 894 n.1 (11th Cir. 2009). Petrey does not contend otherwise.
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    business’s self-created inventory records (for example, as a result of negligence or
    improper bookkeeping). See American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Burchfield, 
    232 So. 2d 606
    , 609 (Ala. 1970). Petrey does not argue that the exclusion is ambiguous.
    We therefore must consider whether Petrey’s claims for missing inventory are
    based upon either type of prohibited calculation.
    In Burchfield, the Alabama Supreme Court confronted a similar insurance
    policy provision, which excluded from coverage a
    loss, or [] that part of any loss, as the case may be, the proof of which,
    either as to its factual existence or as to its amount, is dependent upon
    an inventory computation or a profit and loss computation; provided,
    however, that this paragraph shall not apply to loss of Money,
    Sec[u]rities or other property which the Insured can prove, through
    evidence wholly apart from such computations, is sustained by the
    Insured through any fraudulent or dishonest act or acts committed by
    any one or more of the Employees.
    
    Id. at 607
    . The plaintiff, a wholesale grocer, filed a lawsuit against its insurer
    claiming coverage for a loss due to employee theft. A jury entered an award for
    the grocer based on an inventory computation. The insurance company sought a
    new trial, arguing this evidence was excluded by the insurance policy. The
    Alabama Supreme Court rejected the argument, holding that “the prohibition is
    against recovery on proof of inventory loss alone.” 
    Id. at 609
    . The prohibition did
    not apply to the grocer because it had offered independent proof, in the form of
    sworn affidavits by three of its employees that they stole company property, of the
    loss it suffered as a result of employee dishonesty: “[W]e do not believe that the
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    provisions of the policy preclude after that proof has been made, the use of
    inventory records to show the amount of the loss.” Id.; see also Fidelity & Deposit
    Co. v. Southern Utilities, Inc., 
    726 F.2d 692
    , 695 (11th Cir. 1984) (“More recent
    decisions tend to allow an inference of employee dishonesty to be drawn from
    relatively thin circumstantial evidence and then to permit the full extent of the
    losses to be proven by inventory comparisons. Generally, these cases have required
    some proof of dishonesty by employees as a condition precedent to the admission
    of inventory comparisons to establish the full amount of loss.”).
    Petrey has provided no independent evidence of Bree’s theft; it relies solely
    on inventory comparisons to prove the claimed loss.3 Petrey argues that its
    physical inventory count provided independent evidence by showing that Bree
    ordered the goods in question, received them from Petrey, did not deliver them to
    his customers, and did not have them on hand in his storage locker. But this
    argument is circular, as Petrey has supported these assertions only with order and
    sales records — which boil down to inventory comparison computations. See Fid.
    & Deposit Co. of Md. v. So. Utils., Inc., 
    726 F.2d 692
    , 695 (11th Cir. 1984) (“An
    3
    Petrey argues on appeal that the fact that Bree vanished after he was fired is evidence
    that he stole the 5-Hour Energy bottles. Petrey did not make this argument to the district court,
    see Access Now, Inc. v. Southwest Airlines Co., 
    385 F.3d 1324
    , 1329-30 (11th Cir. 2004)
    (declining to consider argument raised for the first time on appeal); but, in any event, the record
    contradicts Petrey’s assertion that Bree disappeared after he was confronted about the missing
    inventory. Petrey only discovered the shortage a month after Bree’s termination for reasons
    unrelated to theft, and only then did Petrey attempt to contact Bree with “no success.” Parks
    Affidavit, Doc. 21-1 at 25-26.
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    inventory computation is an inventory arrived at by taking a beginning inventory,
    adding purchases and deducting the cost of merchandise sold.” (internal quotation
    marks omitted)). Burchfield requires independent evidence of employee
    dishonesty, which is absent here.
    Petrey also argues that it provided independent evidence of employee
    dishonesty by showing that only Petrey employees had access to Bree’s inventory.
    We agree with the Second Circuit that “circumstantial evidence that, if a loss in
    fact was sustained, [the insured’s] employees were the perpetrators” is not
    independent evidence of the existence of a loss. Dunlop Tire & Rubber Corp. v.
    Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 
    479 F.2d 1243
    , 1247 (2d Cir. 1973). Petrey’s assertion
    that only its employees could have stolen the 5-Hour Energy bottles “presupposes
    the factual existence of a loss” and “merely tends to foreclose the possibility of
    theft by persons other than employees,” rather than prove that employees stole
    anything from the company. 
    Id.
    Finally, Petrey argues that Great American’s own prior coverage
    determinations show that the inventory shortage exclusion does not apply here. In
    2011, Petrey filed a claim for theft of merchandise worth $102,897.05 by an
    employee, Jason McKean. The same Crime Prevention Policy was in place then,
    and the policy included the same inventory shortage exclusion that is at issue here.
    Great American paid the claim to Petrey in full without contest. Petrey now argues
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    that because the claim for Bree’s theft was essentially identical, it too should be
    covered by the policy. But Alabama law forbids courts from using extrinsic
    evidence (such as the parties’ course of dealing) to interpret an unambiguous
    contractual provision. Drummond Co. v. Walter Indust., 
    962 So. 2d 753
    , 780 (Ala.
    2006). Petrey does not argue that the inventory shortage exclusion is ambiguous,
    and we think the provision is clear on its face. We therefore may not consider the
    extrinsic evidence relating to the McKean claim when interpreting the exclusion.4
    Because Petrey cannot point to any evidence of loss by employee theft other
    than its own inventory comparison computations, the loss was excluded from
    coverage. The district court properly granted summary judgment to Great
    American.
    AFFIRMED.
    4
    Similarly, Alabama law prevents Petrey from using the McKean claim to argue that
    Great American has waived its right to exclude the Bree claim from coverage. See Home Indem.
    Co. v. Reed Equip. Co., 
    381 So. 2d 45
    , 50-51 (Ala. 1980) (“[T]he doctrine [of waiver] is not
    available to bring within the coverage of a policy risks not covered by its terms or risks expressly
    excluded therefrom.”).
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