St. Devon Anthony Cover v. U.S. Attorney General , 572 F. App'x 778 ( 2014 )


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  •            Case: 13-11023   Date Filed: 07/17/2014   Page: 1 of 16
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 13-11023
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    Agency No. A074-616-204
    ST. DEVON ANTHONY COVER,
    a.k.a. Devon Cover,
    Petitioner,
    versus
    U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent.
    ________________________
    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    ________________________
    (July 17, 2014)
    Before HULL, WILSON and FAY, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 13-11023       Date Filed: 07/17/2014      Page: 2 of 16
    St. Devon Anthony Cover, pro se, petitions for review of the Board of
    Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) decision affirming the immigration judge’s (“IJ”)
    order removing him to Jamaica because of his drug conviction involving 1,000
    kilograms of marijuana. Upon review of the record and consideration of the
    parties’ briefs, we deny the petition.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A.     1988 Entry and 1999 Adjustment of Status
    In 1988, Cover, a Jamaican citizen, entered the United States as a non-
    immigrant visitor. In 1999, Cover’s status was adjusted to a lawful permanent
    resident.
    B.     2007 Conviction and Notice to Appear
    In 2007, Cover pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
    1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
    (b)(1)(B)(vii), 846. The district court sentenced Cover to 70 months’
    imprisonment. Cover did not appeal. 1
    As a result of his conviction, in May 2007, the Department of Homeland
    Security (“DHS”) issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”), charging Cover as a native
    and citizen of Jamaica who was removable for two reasons: (1) under INA
    1
    In 2008, Cover did file a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, but the sentencing
    court denied him relief. In 2013, Cover’s habeas corpus petition was dismissed. Cover did not
    appeal either ruling.
    2
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    § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), as an alien who had been convicted of an aggravated felony,
    and (2) under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), as an alien who had been convicted of a
    controlled substance offense. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (a)(2)(B)(i). The NTA
    was not served, however, until 2011.
    C.    August 2011 IJ Hearing
    At the August 2011 hearing in immigration court, Cover appeared pro se.
    The IJ asked Cover, “[A]re you from Jamaica, and you speak English?” Cover
    responded, “Yes, sir.” Cover asked for additional time to prepare. His hearing
    was rescheduled for October 27, 2011.
    D.    Cover’s 2011 Motion for Termination of Removal Proceedings
    Prior to the October 27 hearing, Cover, pro se, filed a “Motion for
    Termination of Removal Proceedings And Motion for Issuance of an Order
    Directing the Department of Homeland Security to Renew Expired Permanent
    Resident Card.” In the motion, Cover admitted that (1) he was a permanent
    resident, residing in the United States since 1988, and a noncitizen and (2) his
    permanent resident card expired in June 2009. Cover requested that the IJ order
    the agency to renew his card.
    Cover also acknowledged that he had pled guilty to a controlled substance
    offense and, as a result, was removable. Cover argued that the government was
    estopped from removing him because it had induced Cover to plead guilty by
    3
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    telling him that he would not be removed. Cover alleged that the promise was
    made orally; it was not included in his written plea agreement.
    Cover’s attachments to the motion to terminate included: (1) several letters
    from Cover’s family members asking that Cover not be removed to Jamaica, two
    of which stated that Cover’s place of birth was Jamaica and (2) a letter to a prison
    official, at the correctional facility where Cover was incarcerated, requesting
    immigration law materials because, inter alia, he was a “deportable alien” and a
    “non-U.S. citizen[].”
    E.    Pre-October 27, 2011 Government Exhibits
    Sometime prior to the October 27 hearing, the government filed two
    exhibits: (1) a Form I-213 Record of Deportable/Inadmissible Alien, indicating that
    Cover’s place of birth and citizenship was Jamaica; and (2) a criminal judgment
    showing that Cover was convicted of the crime described in NTA. A stamp on the
    judgment, by the U.S. District Court Clerk for the Middle District of Florida,
    certified the document as a “true and correct copy of the original.”
    F.    October 27, 2011 Removal Order
    At the October 27, 2011 hearing, the IJ asked Cover if he would admit the
    allegations in the NTA. Cover admitted he was a convicted felon, but declined to
    answer further.
    4
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    The IJ found Cover removable to Jamaica. The government pointed out that
    “for the record . . . all of the matters contained in the NTA are addressed and
    admitted in some form in [Cover]’s motions that he’s filed with the Court.”
    G.    March 2012 BIA Appeal
    Cover appealed to the BIA. In March 2012, the BIA remanded Cover’s case
    to the IJ for further proceedings. The BIA noted that the IJ did not issue a separate
    oral or written decision setting forth his rationale for ordering Cover removed and
    therefore ordered the record returned to the IJ for preparation of a full decision.
    The BIA directed the IJ to determine “anew” whether Cover was removable as
    charged.
    H.    May 2012 Release from Prison and Request to Subpoena Witnesses
    In May 2012, Cover finished his criminal sentence and was released to the
    custody of immigration officials.
    In the immigration court, Cover filed a “request to Subpoena Witnesses,”
    including the Assistant U.S. Attorney (“AUSA”) involved in Cover’s criminal case
    and Cover’s former defense attorneys. Cover’s request alleged that these witnesses
    could attest to: (1) his cooperation with the government; and (2) the government’s
    promise that he would not be removed if he pled guilty.
    5
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    The IJ denied the subpoena request because Cover had not established that
    the evidence was essential to the instant proceedings.2
    I.    August 2012 Government Exhibits
    Subsequently, in immigration court, the government filed several exhibits
    establishing that Cover was removable. As to Cover’s alienage, the exhibits
    included copies of: (1) the 2005 decision on Cover’s Application for
    Naturalization, showing that the application was administratively denied due to
    poor moral character; (2) Cover’s Jamaican passport, stating that he was born in
    Kingston, Jamaica; (3) a 1999 INS Memorandum of Creation of Record of Lawful
    Permanent Residence, listing Cover’s country of birth as Jamaica; (4) a 1999
    Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status on which Cover
    listed his country of birth as Jamaica; and (5) Cover’s Birth Registration Form,
    showing he was born in Kingston, Jamaica. Only the last document—the Birth
    Registration Form—was a certified copy.
    As to Cover’s criminal conviction, the government submitted a certified
    judgment of Cover’s drug conspiracy conviction that was identical to the certified
    judgment it filed prior to the BIA’s March 2012 remand.
    J.    September 6, 2012 Removal Hearing
    2
    Cover later renewed his request to subpoena witnesses, which the IJ denied.
    6
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    At a removal hearing on September 6, 2012, Cover refused to answer any
    allegations in the NTA and expressly invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege
    against self-incrimination. Cover did argue that he only pled guilty in exchange
    for not being removed and that his conviction was obtained in violation of his Fifth
    and Sixth Amendment rights.
    Cover also orally moved to withdraw his October 5, 2011 motion to
    terminate removal proceedings, and the IJ granted the motion. Cover also
    expressly waived his right to apply for asylum, withholding of removal, or
    protection under the Convention Against Torture.
    Cover objected to the government’s August 2012 exhibits as evidence and
    argued that the documents were unauthenticated. The IJ admitted the evidence,
    noted Cover’s objections, and stated that it would “give them the weight that it
    deems appropriate.”
    K.    September 20, 2012 IJ Decision and Order of Removal
    In his September 20, 2012 oral decision, the IJ found that the government’s
    August 2012 exhibits, which the IJ found to be reliable, established Cover’s
    removability. The IJ noted that Cover did not provide any testimony or
    documentation to contradict the evidence against him.
    During the 2012 hearing, the IJ also determined that, (1) even if the
    government orally promised not to remove Cover, he had ample time to
    7
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    collaterally attack his 2007 drug conviction and (2) thus any alleged promise by the
    government did not bar the removal proceedings. The IJ ordered Cover removed
    to Jamaica.
    L.     October 2012 to March 2013 BIA Appeal
    In October 2012, Cover appealed the removal order to the BIA. Cover
    argued, inter alia, that the government’s exhibits about his alienage and criminal
    conviction were unauthenticated, inadmissible, and insufficient to show
    removability.
    In March 2013, the BIA affirmed. The BIA determined that Cover made
    several explicit references, in testimony and in written submissions to the court,
    that he had been convicted of the felony described in the NTA. Any alleged error
    in considering the criminal judgment was harmless. With respect to alienage, the
    BIA found no clear error in the IJ’s findings of fact and that DHS established
    Cover’s alienage based on the totality of the record. The BIA also determined that
    Cover’s constitutional challenges lacked merit.
    Cover timely filed this petition for review.3
    II. JURISDICTION
    3
    We review only the BIA’s decision, except to the extent that it adopts the IJ’s opinion.
    See Mu Ying Wu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    745 F.3d 1140
    , 1153 (11th Cir. 2014). The BIA did not
    expressly adopt the IJ’s opinion, so we review only the BIA’s decision. See 
    id. 8 Case:
    13-11023      Date Filed: 07/17/2014       Page: 9 of 16
    We lack jurisdiction to review a final removal order against an alien who is
    removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) due to a prior conviction for an
    aggravated felony, which includes a drug trafficking crime. INA § 242(a)(2)(C), 8
    U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C); see INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B). 4
    Similarly, we lack jurisdiction to review a final removal order against an alien who
    is removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i), due to a conviction for a controlled
    substance offense. INA § 242(a)(2)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).
    However, we retain jurisdiction to review whether the statutory conditions
    limiting review exist. Sebastian-Soler v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    409 F.3d 1280
    , 1283
    (11th Cir. 2005). Thus, we have jurisdiction to review whether Cover (1) is an
    alien (2) who is removable by reason of having committed a crime covered by the
    statute. 
    Id. 5 We
    also have jurisdiction over constitutional claims: INA § 242(a)(2)(D)
    vests this Court with jurisdiction to review all appeals that present “constitutional
    claims or questions of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); Alvarez Acosta v. U.S.
    Att’y Gen., 
    524 F.3d 1191
    , 1195-96 (11th Cir. 2008).
    4
    We review our own subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Amaya-Artunduaga v. U.S.
    Att’y Gen., 
    463 F.3d 1247
    , 1250 (11th Cir. 2006).
    5
    In this case, our jurisdictional inquiry here actually merges with the merits of Cover’s
    appeal. See Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 
    358 F.3d 828
    , 832-33 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (determining
    this Court’s jurisdictional inquiry as to whether it could review an alien’s removal order merged
    with the merits of the alien’s appeal into whether the government sufficiently proved that the
    alien was convicted of a deportable offense).
    9
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    III. REMOVABILITY
    The government “has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing
    evidence” that the individual in removal proceedings is (1) an alien and (2)
    deportable. INA § 240(c)(3)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A). 6
    Evidence of foreign birth gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of alienage,
    and the burden shifts to the individual in removal proceedings to prove citizenship.
    Matter of Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I. & N. Dec. 153, 164 (BIA 2001). An alien who,
    after admission, is convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
    1,000 kilograms or more of marijuana is deportable. 7 See INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii),
    (a)(2)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), (a)(2)(B)(i); INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8
    U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).
    The BIA has determined that, although some form of authentication is
    required of domestic or foreign records presented in immigration proceedings,
    “any authentication procedure that comports with common law rules of evidence
    constitutes an acceptable level of proof.” Matter of Velasquez, 25 I. & N. Dec.
    6
    We review the BIA’s factual findings to determine whether they are supported by
    substantial evidence. 
    Adefemi, 386 F.3d at 1026-27
    . “Under the substantial evidence test, we
    view the record evidence in the light most favorable to the agency’s decision and draw all
    reasonable inferences in favor of that decision.” 
    Id. at 1027.
    We may reverse the BIA’s factual
    findings only when the record so compels. 
    Id. Constitutional questions
    and legal conclusions
    are reviewed de novo. Zhou Hua Zhu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
    703 F.3d 1303
    , 1307 (11th Cir. 2013).
    7
    The term “removable” encompasses the term “deportable.” Dormescar v. U.S. Att’y
    Gen., 
    690 F.3d 1258
    , 1261 (11th Cir. 2012).
    10
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    680, 684 (BIA 2012) (alteration and quotation marks omitted); see Matter of D-R-,
    25 I. & N. Dec. 445, 458 (BIA 2011). “The guiding principle is that proper
    authentication requires some sort of proof that the document is what it purports to
    be.” Matter of Velasquez, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 684 (quotation marks omitted). 8
    Here, substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that the
    government established that Cover was removable. As to alienage, the certified
    copy of Cover’s Birth Registration Form showed that he was born in Kingston,
    Jamaica. The IJ found that the copy of Cover’s Birth Registration Form was
    reliable, and the document was certified as a true copy of the original. This was
    sufficient to authenticate the document. See 
    id. Because the
    government
    presented evidence of Cover’s foreign birth, a rebuttable presumption of alienage
    arose. See Matter of Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 164. Cover did not
    submit any evidence to rebut this presumption.
    As to his conviction for a deportable offense, a certified copy of the
    judgment entered in Cover’s criminal case showed that he was convicted of
    conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 1,000 kilograms or more of
    marijuana. 9 See 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6(a); see also INA § 240(c)(3)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C.
    8
    We reject Cover’s claim that 8 C.F.R. § 1287.6 is the only way to authenticate official
    records.
    9
    Cover’s argument—that the conviction record submitted by the government was not
    properly authenticated because it did not feature the seal of the court and was not attested to by
    the district court judge—fails. His stance relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1738, which is applicable only to
    judgments from courts of a “State, Territory, or Possession” of the United States, whereas the
    11
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    § 1229a(c)(3)(B)(i) (stating that a certified official record of judgment and
    conviction “shall constitute proof of a criminal conviction”). Further, Cover
    admitted his guilty plea multiple times. 10 We cannot say that the record compels
    reversal of the BIA’s determination that the government’s evidence established
    Cover’s removability.
    V. DUE PROCESS
    “To establish due process violations in removal proceedings, aliens must
    show that they were deprived of liberty without due process of law, and that the
    asserted errors caused them substantial prejudice.” See Lonyem v. U.S. Att’y
    Gen., 
    352 F.3d 1338
    , 1341-42 (11th Cir. 2003).
    A.     Evidence Produced Following March 2012 BIA Remand
    Cover argues that his due process rights were violated by the IJ holding a
    second hearing after the BIA’s March 2012 remand. He contends that the IJ
    conviction at issue was in a federal district court. Similarly, his argument that additional
    certification was required because the document was submitted by electronic means is without
    merit, because the document was certified by a court official as an official record from its
    repository, as required by the relevant statutory provision. INA § 240(c)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C. §
    1229a(c)(3)(C).
    10
    Cover also argues that his conviction may not be used as the basis for his removability
    because it was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. Cover may not collaterally
    attack his underlying conviction in an immigration proceeding. See Mohammed v. Ashcroft, 
    261 F.3d 1244
    , 1251 (11th Cir. 2001) (stating that the petitioner’s purported due process claim—that
    he was not advised of the immigration consequences of his guilty plea— should be challenged in
    a collateral attack on his conviction and is not reviewable in a removal proceeding).
    12
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    should have determined his removability based solely on the evidence presented
    prior to the IJ’s first order of removal in October 2009. 11
    Under the circumstances of this case, the IJ was not barred from considering
    the government’s evidence filed following the BIA’s March 2012 remand. 12 Cover
    had admitted removability in his October 5, 2011 motion and his own attachments,
    and thus, during the October 27, 2011 hearing, the government had no need to
    present evidence establishing Cover’s removability.
    After the BIA’s March 2012 remand of Cover’s case, Cover moved to
    withdraw his October 5, 2011 motion (admitting his alienage and conviction for a
    deportable offense). After that motion was granted, it was only then that the
    government had to introduce evidence to show Cover’s removability. At that
    point, the IJ held a hearing on the sufficiency of the government’s evidence, and
    the IJ found Cover removable. Therefore, Cover’s due process rights were not
    violated by the IJ’s consideration of the government’s evidence presented after the
    BIA’s March 2012 remand.
    11
    To the extent Cover argues that principles of collateral estoppel barred further
    proceedings on removability, we reject his argument. Collateral estoppel only applies “when an
    issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgment.” United States v.
    Valdiviez-Garza, 
    669 F.3d 1199
    , 1201 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted). The BIA’s
    March 2012 remand order was not a final order, and in any event, the BIA did not decide the
    issue of whether the government established that Cover was removable.
    12
    We acknowledge that, generally, following a remand from the BIA, an IJ “has authority
    to consider additional evidence if it is material, was not previously available, and could not have
    been discovered or presented at the former hearing.” In re M-D-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 138, 141 (BIA
    2007).
    13
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    B.     Request for Subpoenas
    Cover also argues that the IJ violated his due process rights by not issuing a
    subpoena to the AUSA involved in his criminal case.
    In an immigration proceeding, the IJ has “exclusive jurisdiction to issue
    subpoenas,” and the IJ shall issue the subpoena “[u]pon being satisfied that a
    witness will not appear and testify or produce documentary evidence and that the
    witness’ evidence is essential.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.35(b)(1), (3).
    Cover argues that the AUSA’s testimony was essential because it would
    have shown that the AUSA told him that he would not be removed if he pled guilty
    and that, because of that oral promise, he cannot be ordered removed.
    Here, there is no indication, much less evidence, that the Attorney General
    delegated to the AUSA involved in Cover’s criminal case the power to make
    promises regarding removability during the plea negotiations in Cover’s case. 13
    See San Pedro v. United States, 
    79 F.3d 1065
    , 1071-72 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding
    that (1) the Attorney General has the power to promise a criminal defendant during
    plea negotiations that he will not be deported, (2) U.S. Attorneys and AUSAs have
    the power to promise a criminal defendant non-deportation only where the
    Attorney General has delegated that power, and (3) the Attorney General had not
    13
    Cover also argues, as he did below, that the BIA erred by not determining that the
    government was estopped from removing him because of the prosecutor’s alleged promise.
    However, that argument also hinges on the prosecutor’s ability to bind DHS with a promise, and
    therefore, fails.
    14
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    delegated that power to U.S. Attorneys or AUSAs by way of the United States
    Attorney’s Manual). Notably too, there is no such promise in Cover’s written plea
    agreement, which states that it constitutes “the entire agreement” between the
    parties.
    Therefore, Cover did not show that the AUSA’s testimony would have been
    essential to the removal proceedings. Thus, it was not error for the IJs’ to refuse to
    subpoena his witnesses, C.F.R. § 1003.35(b), and his due process rights were not
    violated.14
    VI. FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE
    Cover argues that the BIA erred in relying on his statements to the IJ after he
    invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege, admitting that he pled guilty in 2007 to a
    criminal offense.
    The privilege afforded by the Fifth Amendment protects one from “being
    involuntarily called as a witness against himself in a criminal prosecution but also
    privileges him not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding,
    civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in
    future criminal proceedings.” United States v. Lopez-Garcia, 
    565 F.3d 1306
    , 1316
    (11th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted).
    14
    Cover also sought to have his former attorneys testify that they told him that he would
    not be removed if he pled guilty. This evidence was relevant to Cover’s ineffective assistance of
    counsel claim. As discussed above in footnotes, a petitioner cannot collaterally attack his
    conviction in immigration proceedings. Thus, Cover has not shown that this evidence was
    essential.
    15
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    Here, it is unclear to what extent, if any, the BIA relied on Cover’s
    statements, made after he invoked his Fifth Amendment rights, in affirming the
    IJ’s removal order. In any event, Cover has not shown how his admission of his
    alienage or of his 2007 conviction would have exposed him of criminal liability,
    and thus, he was has not shown that he was entitled to invoke his Fifth Amendment
    privilege. See 
    id. Moreover, there
    was substantial evidence to support a finding of
    removability, even without considering statements Cover made in his removal
    proceedings after invoking the Fifth Amendment, such that any error was harmless.
    VII. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we deny Cover’s petition for review.
    PETITION DENIED.
    16