Joe A. Barnett v. Athens Regional Medical Center Inc. ( 2013 )


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  •              Case: 13-11634    Date Filed: 12/16/2013   Page: 1 of 11
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 13-11634
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 3:10-cv-00083-CAR
    JOE A. BARNETT,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    ATHENS REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER INC.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (December 16, 2013)
    Before WILSON, ANDERSON, and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant Joe A. Barnett, proceeding with counsel, appeals the district
    court’s grant of summary judgment to Athens Regional Medical Center
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    (“ARMC”), Barnett’s former employer, in Barnett’s action for (1) age and race
    discrimination and (2) retaliation, brought under the Age Discrimination in
    Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 691, et seq.; Title VII, 42 U.S.C.
    § 2000e-2, et seq.; and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (“§ 1981”). The district court granted
    summary judgment to ARMC on the basis that Barnett had not established, on
    either of the claims, a prima facie case on the element of an adverse employment
    action.
    I. Discrimination
    Barnett contends that his written caution, his written warning, and his 2009
    performance evaluation amounted to adverse employment actions. Barnett argues
    that the inference could be drawn that an unsatisfactory score on his evaluation
    precluded him from getting a merit increase.
    We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Crawford
    v. Carroll, 
    529 F.3d 961
    , 964 (11th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment must be
    granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
    fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P.
    56(a). If the moving party discharges this burden, the burden then shifts to the
    nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and present specific evidence
    showing a genuine issue of material fact. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), (e). Such
    evidence must consist of more than mere conclusory allegations or legal
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    conclusions. Avirgan v. Hull, 
    932 F.2d 1572
    , 1577 (11th Cir. 1991). When ruling
    on a motion for summary judgment, any inferences must be viewed in the light
    most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Welch v. Celotex Corp., 
    951 F.2d 1235
    , 1237 (11th Cir. 1992).
    Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate against an employee
    for his participation in certain statutorily protected activities:
    It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
    discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed
    any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
    subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
    participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
    under this subchapter.
    42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐3(a).
    First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, and if the plaintiff does
    so, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate,
    nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
    
    450 U.S. 248
    , 252-53, 
    101 S. Ct. 1089
    , 1093, 
    67 L. Ed. 2d 207
    (1981). If the
    employer meets this burden, the plaintiff then has an opportunity to show that the
    employer’s proffered reasons for the adverse employment action were merely
    pretext for discrimination. 
    Id. at 253,
    101 S.Ct. at 1093.
    Because Title VII, the ADEA, and § 1981 “have the same requirements of
    proof and use the same analytical framework” for determining whether a plaintiff
    has made a prima facie showing of either (1) adverse employment action, or
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    (2) retaliation, we will analyze the claims together. Standard v. A.B.E.L. Serv.,
    Inc., 
    161 F.3d 1318
    , 1330 (11th Cir. 1998) (analogizing the analytical framework
    used for Title VII to that used in § 1981 claims); see Chapman v. AI Transport,
    
    229 F.3d 1012
    , 1024 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (giving the modified prima facie
    elements required under the ADEA, including that there be an adverse employment
    action).
    Generally, a plaintiff may establish his “prima facie case of disparate
    treatment by showing that [he] was a qualified member of a protected class and
    was subjected to an adverse employment action in contrast with similarly situated
    employees outside the protected class.” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 
    376 F.3d 1079
    , 1087 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
    We have held that “memoranda of reprimand or counseling that amount to
    no more than a mere scolding, without any following disciplinary action, do not
    rise to the level of adverse employment actions sufficient to satisfy the
    requirements of Title VII.” Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 
    245 F.3d 1232
    , 1236
    (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation and alteration omitted). The negative evaluation must
    actually lead to a material change in the terms or conditions of employment, such
    as “an evaluation that directly disentitles an employee to a raise of any
    significance.” Gillis v. Georgia Dept. of Corr., 
    400 F.3d 883
    , 888 (11th Cir.
    2005). Although proof of direct economic consequences is not required in all
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    cases, “the asserted impact cannot be speculative and must at least have a tangible
    adverse effect on the plaintiff’s employment.” 
    Davis, 245 F.3d at 1239
    .
    In this case, we conclude from the record that Barnett has failed to establish
    his prima facie case of discrimination because he was not subjected to an adverse
    employment action. The written reprimands and negative performance review had
    no effect on Barnett’s employment. Indeed, Barnett admitted that his two written
    reprimands did not result in his termination, demotion, suspension, a reduction in
    pay, or a change in job duties. Barnett also admitted that neither of the written
    warnings he received would have prevented an employee from receiving a merit
    raise. Further, Barnett could only speculate that his employer might have
    considered these as grounds for future adverse employment action. See 
    Davis, 245 F.3d at 1239
    . Barnett argued that the written reprimands and the negative
    performance evaluation were steps in Defendant’s progressive disciplinary policy
    which could have led to harsher disciplinary action. However, he could not
    establish that these actions actually led to any tangible effect on his employment.
    Both Title VII and the comparable language in the ADEA “focuses on the effects
    of the action on the employee rather than the motivation of the employer.” Smith
    v. City of Jackson, 
    544 U.S. 228
    , 235‐36, 
    125 S. Ct. 1536
    , 1542, 
    161 L. Ed. 2d 410
    (2005) (emphasis in the original). Thus, he did not discharge his burden.
    Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see 
    Avirgan, 932 F.2d at 1577
    . Moreover, inferences based on
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    speculation and conjecture are not reasonable. Avenue CLO Fund, Ltd. v. Bank of
    Am., NA, 
    723 F.3d 1287
    , 1294 (11th Cir. 2013). Thus, based on the above, the
    inference could not be drawn that an unsatisfactory score on his evaluation would
    preclude a merit increase.
    Moreover, ARMC ultimately separated Barnett from employment under
    medical resignation, and no evidence showed that Barnett’s separation occurred for
    any reason other than his exhaustion of Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and
    non‐FMLA leave and the indeterminacy of his return. Finally, any stress that
    Barnett suffered as a result of the reprimands and negative performance review
    was not an adverse employment action. The anti-discrimination statutes do “not
    guarantee a stress‐free working environment.” Hipp v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co.,
    
    252 F.3d 1208
    , 1233‐34 (11th Cir. 2001). Because Barnett cannot establish that he
    suffered an adverse employment action, Barnett’s Title VII, ADEA, and § 1981
    discrimination claims fail as a matter of law. Thus, we hold that the district court
    did not err in granting summary judgment to ARMC on these claims.
    II. Retaliation
    Barnett argues that the record contained sufficient facts to show that,
    because he reported the age and race discrimination, he suffered the following
    adverse employment actions: unwarranted reprimands; a negative performance
    evaluation; denial of his request for vacation; and, ultimately, removal from
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    employment. Barnett contends, initially, that the burden never shifted to him, the
    non-moving party, because ARMC never met its initial burden to demonstrate that
    the record contained no facts supporting the retaliation claim. Further, Barnett
    mentions that the district court violated his basic constitutional rights to due
    process, specifically his right to be heard on his retaliation claim.
    To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation, under Title VII,
    § 1981, and the ADEA, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he participated in a
    protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was
    a causal connection between the plaintiff’s participation in the protected activity
    and the adverse employment action. Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 
    996 F.2d 1155
    ,
    1162-63 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating the elements required for a prima facie showing
    of retaliation under Title VII, which are also applicable to § 1981 and ADEA
    retaliation claims); see Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ’g Co., 
    9 F.3d 913
    , 915,
    919 (11th Cir. 1993) (retaliation under ADEA); CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries,
    
    553 U.S. 442
    , 457, 
    128 S. Ct. 1951
    , 1961, 
    170 L. Ed. 2d 864
    (2008) (retaliation
    claims permitted under § 1981).
    However, an “adverse employment action” in the retaliation context does not
    carry the restrictive definition that it does in the discrimination setting. In
    particular, “the antiretaliation provision [under Title VII], unlike the substantive
    provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and
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    conditions of employment.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 
    548 U.S. 53
    ,
    64, 
    126 S. Ct. 2405
    , 2412-13, 
    165 L. Ed. 2d 345
    (2006). Instead, the test is whether
    “a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially
    adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable
    worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” 
    Id. at 68,
    126 S.Ct.
    at 2415 (quotations omitted). Further, “the significance of any given act of
    retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances. Context matters.”
    
    Id. at 69,
    126 S.Ct. at 2415. Moreover, “[t]he anti‐retaliation provision [of Title
    VII] protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that
    produces an injury or harm.” 
    Id. at 67,
    126 S.Ct. at 2414. The Supreme Court
    stated that “material adversity” is distinguishable from mere “trivial harms.” 
    Id. at 68,
    126 S.Ct. at 2415.
    In this case, neither the reprimands, the negative evaluation, nor the denial of
    Barnett’s vacation request were adverse employment actions. There was no
    evidence that Barnett suffered harm from any action that would have deterred a
    reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. See
    Burlington, 548 U.S. at 
    68, 126 S. Ct. at 2415
    . In particular, nothing in the record
    showed that these acts were materially adverse in that they would have affected
    any future pay raise or his future job status in any way. On the contrary, the
    evidence established that these acts had no effect on his job status whatsoever.
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    Notably, AMRC issued the two reprimands, for Barnett’s contribution to the delay
    in two projects, in November 2009, prior to Barnett making his discrimination
    complaint in December 2009. Based on this timing, ARMC could not have
    retaliated against Barnett through these reprimands.
    Additionally, the negative performance evaluation would not, by itself, have
    deterred a reasonable person from making a charge of discrimination, especially in
    this case, where such an evaluation, by itself, would not impact his salary or job
    status. See 
    id. Further, the
    denial of a vacation request would not have deterred a
    reasonable employee from making, or supporting, a discrimination charge. See 
    id. Under the
    particular circumstances of this case, no evidence existed as to why
    Barnett’s request was denied. Moreover, Barnett had been out on medical leave
    for almost a month, and four days after returning to work, he requested additional
    time off. It would have been reasonable for an employee to expect that his
    vacation request would be denied if he had been away from work for almost a
    month.
    Finally, it was not clear whether Barnett’s separation was an adverse
    employment action at all. Barnett had taken leave from employment for medical
    reasons, and, once Barnett exhausted all of his FMLA and non‐FMLA leave,
    AMRC had no choice but to separate him from employment. Further, the
    circumstances at the time indicated that Barnett would likely never be returning to
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    work. Barnett’s doctor ordered indefinite leave for an undetermined period of
    time. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would not be deterred from
    filing a charge of discrimination.
    Even assuming Barnett’s separation was an adverse employment action,
    there was no evidence showing that it was the result of anything other than the
    exhaustion of his FMLA and non‐FMLA leave. Thus, Barnett’s report of
    discrimination and his separation from employment were “completely unrelated.”
    See 
    Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1566
    . Moreover, Barnett reported the alleged
    discrimination in December 2009, and was separated from employment six months
    later in June 2010. Thus, Barnett’s protected activity and his separation from
    employment were too remote to provide a sufficient causal relationship. See
    Higdon v. Jackson, 
    393 F.3d 1211
    , 1220-21 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that, while a
    one-month gap might suggest causal relationship, a three-month gap between the
    protected activity and the adverse employment action was insufficient to establish
    causation). In sum, the record reflects no evidence that Barrett’s removal from
    employment was retaliatory.
    Based on the above decision, we conclude that the district court correctly
    granted summary judgment to ARMC on Barnett’s retaliation claims because
    Barnett failed to establish his prima facie case. Accordingly, we affirm the grant
    of summary judgment in favor of ARMC.
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    AFFIRMED.
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