United States v. Marie Louis ( 2012 )


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  •                                                        [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________           FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 11-12501         ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    Non-Argument Calendar        FEB 16, 2012
    ________________________        JOHN LEY
    CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 0:89-cr-06122-UNA-3
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    MARIE LOUIS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    ________________________
    (February 16, 2012)
    Before CARNES, WILSON and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Marie Louis, a foreign national and former federal prisoner, appeals the
    district court’s denial of her petition for a writ of error coram nobis, filed pursuant
    to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651. Relying on the Supreme Court’s then-
    recent decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.      , 
    130 S. Ct. 1473
    (2010), Louis
    sought to vacate her 1990 federal drug-trafficking conviction based on her trial
    attorney’s alleged failure to advise her of the deportation consequences of
    pleading guilty. After conducting a hearing concerning Louis’s plea and counsel’s
    conduct at the time, the district court found that Louis failed to present sound
    reasons for not seeking relief earlier, failed to demonstrate that her attorney did
    not adequately advise her of the immigration consequences of pleading guilty, and
    failed to establish that she suffered any prejudice as a result of counsel’s alleged
    error.
    Louis now appeals, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by
    denying her coram nobis petition because Padilla applies retroactively to cases on
    collateral review and her former attorney failed to advise her that a guilty plea
    would automatically subject her to deportation.
    We review the denial of coram nobis relief for an abuse of discretion.
    United States v. Peter, 
    310 F.3d 709
    , 711 (11th Cir. 2002). A district court abuses
    its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures,
    2
    or relies on findings of fact that are clearly erroneous. United States v. Jordan,
    
    582 F.3d 1239
    , 1249 (11th Cir. 2009). Nonetheless, issues that are not plainly and
    prominently raised on appeal are deemed abandoned and will not be considered.
    United States v. Jerigan, 
    341 F.3d 1273
    , 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003). This includes
    issues that are simply referenced in passing without substantive argument as to
    their merits. 
    Id. A writ
    of error coram nobis is “an extraordinary remedy of last resort
    available only in compelling circumstances where necessary to achieve justice.”
    United States v. Mills, 
    221 F.3d 1201
    , 1203 (11th Cir. 2000). The bar for coram
    nobis relief is high, and the writ may issue only where (1) “there is and was no
    other available avenue for relief,” and (2) “the error involves a matter of fact of the
    most fundamental character which has not been put in issue or passed upon and
    which renders the proceeding itself irregular and invalid.” Alikhani v. United
    States, 
    200 F.3d 732
    , 734 (11th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, a district court may
    consider a coram nobis petition only where “the petitioner presents sound reasons
    for failing to seek relief earlier.” 
    Mills, 221 F.3d at 1204
    .
    A petitioner asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must show
    both that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient
    performance prejudiced her defense. Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687
    3
    (1984). Before the Supreme Court issued its 2010 decision in Padilla, most
    courts, including this one, held that counsel was under no constitutional obligation
    to advise a client of the possible deportation consequences of pleading guilty. See,
    e.g., Padilla, 559 U.S. at    , 130 S.Ct. at 1481 n.9 (collecting cases); see also
    United States v. Campbell, 
    778 F.2d 764
    , 768-69 (11th Cir. 1985). In Padilla, the
    Supreme Court rejected this view, holding that an attorney renders deficient
    performance by failing to advise a non-citizen client that a guilty plea “carries a
    risk of deportation.” 559 U.S. at        , 130 S.Ct. at 1486. The Supreme Court did
    not, however, alter or address the prejudice requirement for obtaining relief, which
    continues to demand a showing that there was a reasonable probability that, but
    for counsel’s errors, the petitioner would not have pleaded guilty and would have
    insisted on going to trial. See 
    id. at ,
    130 S.Ct. at 1478, 1483-84; Hill v.
    Lockhart, 
    474 U.S. 52
    , 59 (1985).
    Circuits are split as to whether Padilla should be given retroactive effect to
    convictions that became final prior to its issuance, pursuant to the principles set
    forth in Teague v. Lane, 
    489 U.S. 288
    (1984). See, e.g., Chaidez v. United States,
    
    655 F.3d 684
    , 686 (7th Cir. 2011) (Padilla does not apply retroactively to cases on
    collateral review); United States v. Orocio, 
    645 F.3d 630
    , 641 (3d Cir. 2011)
    (Padilla does apply retroactively). And although this circuit has not addressed the
    4
    issue, we need not do so here.
    In this case, the district court assumed that Padilla was retroactively
    applicable but found that Louis failed to satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland.
    Louis fails to challenge this finding in her brief and thus has abandoned it.1
    Accordingly, Louis has not shown that the district court abused its
    discretion in denying her petition, and we affirm the district court’s denial of her
    petition for a writ of error coram nobis.
    AFFIRMED.
    1
    She has also abandoned any challenge to the district court’s alternate findings, each of
    which standing alone would be a sufficient basis to deny relief.
    5