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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 18-13024
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:16-cv-00814-MSS-MAP
SCOTT BARFIELD,
Plaintiff-Counter Defendant-Appellee,
versus
APRO INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Defendant-Counter Claimant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(July 17, 2019)
Before MARTIN, NEWSOM and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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This appeal arises out of Appellee Scott Barfield’s suit against APRO
International, Inc. (APRO) for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.
Following trial, a jury returned a verdict finding Barfield had not proven his claim
for breach of contract, but awarded him damages for unjust enrichment. APRO
appeals the jury’s verdict, arguing the district court erred when it (1) denied
APRO’s motion for judgment as a matter of law; (2) denied APRO’s motion to
modify the verdict form; and (3) denied APRO’s renewed motion for judgment as
a matter of law following the jury’s verdict. After review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In February 2016, Barfield initiated an action against APRO in the Manatee
County, Florida Circuit Court, alleging the existence of a contract for payment of
salary, pursuant to which APRO agreed to pay its officers, including Barfield, a
portion of their salary at a later date. Barfield claimed he was never paid the
deferred portion of his salary. After removing the case to federal court, APRO
answered, denying the existence of any deferred-salary agreement and maintained
Barfield was not owed any unpaid salary. APRO also asserted a counterclaim,
pursuant to which APRO sought, in part, a declaratory judgment stating APRO had
fulfilled its contractual obligation to compensate Barfield—an obligation that did
not include payment of deferred salary—and Barfield had been paid all salary to
which he was entitled. The case proceeded to trial.
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A. Evidence Presented to the Jury
Because this appeal largely concerns whether the evidence presented at trial
was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, we focus on the facts as they were
presented at trial through testimony and exhibits.
Barfield was one of the original officers, stockholders, and directors of
APRO. At the time APRO was formed, Barfield was employed at another
company, PM Services, Inc., which was owned by Carole Metour, another APRO
stockholder and director. From October 2010 to the end of May 2011, Barfield
provided financial and accounting services to APRO in his capacity as an
employee of PM Services. On June 1, 2011, Barfield began working for APRO
full time as Director of Accounting. His employment with APRO was documented
in a written offer of employment, which indicated his starting compensation would
be $43.27 per hour, or approximately $90,000 annually.
Almost immediately, however, on July 1, 2011, Wanda Hale, APRO’s
president and CEO, issued a memorandum to all “Executive Management” (which
included Barfield, Hale, and Alicia Reilly) stating as follows:
As of the payroll ending July 8th all executive management personnel
will be on deferred salary until further notice. This decision was
necessary to maintain sufficient operating capital until contract billings
can be established. During this time managers may request
distributions from salary, not to exceed 40% of their deferred balance.
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According to Barfield and the memo itself, the decision to defer compensation was
necessary because APRO had very little revenue at the time, owing in part to its
failure to procure any “prime contracts” from the U.S. government. Although Hale
did not issue the memorandum until July 2011, Barfield was aware at the time he
accepted the offer of employment from APRO that his salary would be deferred.
In accordance with the memorandum, none of the executive management
received full compensation from July 2011 through April 2013. Once APRO’s
revenues had grown to the point that it could begin paying the executive
management some compensation, Hale circulated a compensation formula
proposal for review, based on information from the Economic Research Institute
(ERI).
In April 2013, the APRO Board of Directors held a telephone meeting,
during which they adopted a resolution setting target salaries for the three
executives based on the ERI data. They also decided the executives would begin
receiving compensation in the amount of 15 percent of the ERI target salaries
beginning on May 1, 2013. The resolution further provided for increases in
compensation for the executives without prior approval of the Board in the event
APRO met certain performance objectives. Barfield was present for the meeting
and received a copy of the meeting minutes. There was no discussion during this
meeting explicitly approving deferred salaries.
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Effective November 1, 2013, the Board increased executive compensation
from 15 percent to 30 percent, consistent with the April 2013 resolution. The
salaries remained at this level until January 2016, when the Board again increased
salaries from 30 percent to 80 percent of the target ERI salaries.
Throughout this time, Barfield, as Director of Accounting, had been in
charge of maintaining APRO’s financial records. Starting in January 2013, 1
APRO’s financial records—including salary deferral schedules, balance sheets,
and corporate tax returns—indicated the deferred salaries were carried as an APRO
liability. Barfield testified that Hale regularly reviewed APRO’s financial records,
and she did not object to APRO’s carrying the deferred officer salaries as a
liability. He further testified that, following the April 2013 Board meeting, he had
discussions with Hale concerning “how we were going to handle the deferred
salaries” and how they were to be accounted for in APRO’s financial records.
Barfield resigned his employment with APRO in February 2016.
B. APRO’s First Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law
At the close of Barfield’s case in chief, APRO moved for judgment as a
matter of law, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a), as to all of Barfield’s causes of
action and Count 1 of APRO’s counterclaim (its request for a declaratory
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Barfield did not seek deferred compensation for 2011 or 2012. He testified the officers
“had agreed that we weren’t going to accrue the deferred officer salaries until we had a line of
credit application in place or we were moving towards that once we won a contract.”
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judgment). The district court denied the motion, finding that, based on the
evidence presented, “the jury could conclude based upon the manner in which
[A]PRO continued to maintain the deferred officer compensation as a liability that
it was due to be paid and is still yet unpaid.”
At the close of all evidence, APRO renewed its motion, and the district court
again denied it, noting the jury would have to decide whether a contract existed
and, if so, what material terms it included.
C. The Jury Instructions and Verdict Form
By the time the case was submitted to the jury, the only remaining claims
were Barfield’s claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The parties
and the court agreed that, under Florida law, Barfield would only be entitled to
damages for unjust enrichment in the event the jury found there was no contract for
the payment of salary at all. Consistent with this, the court provided the jury with
the following instruction:
No Claim for Unjust Enrichment if There is an Express Contract
A claim for unjust enrichment is based on a legal fiction that implies
the existence of a contract between the parties, even though they did
not assent to one. Therefore, a claim for unjust enrichment cannot be
asserted if the parties entered into an express contract regarding the
issue in dispute. If you find that Mr. Barfield and APRO International
entered into an express contract regarding salary, you must find your
verdict in favor of APRO International on that aspect of Count II of the
Complaint.
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The court, however, rejected APRO’s request to revise Question 1 of the
verdict form, which read, “Did Plaintiff Barfield prove that the Parties entered into
a contract for the payment of officer deferred compensation?” If the jury answered
“NO” to Question 1, the form directed the jury to skip to Question 4, which asked
whether Barfield had proven his claim for unjust enrichment. APRO expressed
concern that the verdict form could be confusing to the jury because, when read in
conjunction with the above jury instruction, it could lead the jury to believe that the
“express contract” referred to in the instruction was an express contract that included
a deferred-salary term, as opposed to any express contract regarding salary.
The court declined to alter the verdict form, concluding the form was
sufficiently clear and noting that “[t]he only contract claim [Barfield has] brought is
one for deferred compensation, and if that’s not proven then he loses on his contract
claim.”
While reading the instructions to the jury, the district court projected the
written instructions for the jurors to read, and the jurors were permitted to take copies
of the instructions back to the jury room. The court also reviewed the verdict form
with the jurors.
D. The Jury’s Verdict and APRO’s Post-Judgment Motion
The jury returned a verdict finding Barfield had not proven he and APRO had
entered into a contract for the payment of deferred officer compensation, but that he
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had proven his claim for unjust enrichment. It awarded him damages in the amount
of $154,000 as to that claim.
Following the verdict, APRO timely renewed its Rule 50(a) motion for
judgment as a matter of law, arguing that: (1) the parties’ express contract regarding
Barfield’s salary—which APRO claimed was evidenced in the minutes of the April
2013 meeting—precluded a verdict for unjust enrichment; and (2) the verdict form
was inconsistent with the jury instructions and caused jurors to be confused. The
district court ultimately denied the motion, and the instant appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. APRO’s Rule 50(a) Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law
We review the district court’s denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of
law under Rule 50(a) de novo, applying the same standard as the district court.
Ross v. Rhodes Furniture, Inc.,
146 F.3d 1286, 1289 (11th Cir. 1998). “We
consider all the evidence, and the inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co.,
513 F.3d
1261, 1275 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted). “We will reverse only if the
facts and inferences point overwhelmingly in favor of one party, such that
reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict.”
Id. (quotations omitted).
APRO argues the district court erred when it denied APRO’s motion for
judgment as a matter of law following the close of Barfield’s case in chief.
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Specifically, APRO contends the jury would not have had a “legally sufficient
evidentiary basis to find” the existence of an express contract for the payment of
deferred salary. APRO also argues the district court erred when it denied APRO’s
renewed motion following the jury’s verdict.
Under Florida law, contract formation requires the following elements:
“(1) offer; (2) acceptance; (3) consideration; and (4) sufficient specification of the
essential terms.” Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.,
564 F.3d 1256, 1272 (11th Cir.
2009) (citing St. Joe Corp. v. McIver,
875 So. 2d 375, 381 (Fla. 2004)). Moreover,
“mutual assent is a prerequisite for the formation of any contract.” Kolodziej v.
Mason,
774 F.3d 736, 741 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Gibson v. Courtois,
539 So. 2d
459, 460 (Fla. 1989) (“Mutual assent is an absolute condition precedent to the
formation of the contract.”)). “A valid contract—premised on the parties’ requisite
willingness to contract—may be ‘manifested through written or spoken words, or
inferred in whole or in part from the parties’ conduct.’”
Id. (quoting L & H Constr.
Co. v. Circle Redmont, Inc.,
55 So. 3d 630, 634 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)).
Implicit in APRO’s assertion that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law at various points in the proceeding is its contention that the evidence presented
to the jury was consistent with one, and only one, conclusion: Barfield and APRO
entered into an express contract for compensation—the parameters of which are
detailed in the minutes of the April 2013 Board meeting—that did not include
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payment of deferred salary. The district court disagreed, ultimately concluding a
jury could just as reasonably conclude either that the parties entered into an
enforceable contract for payment of salary that included deferred salary or that no
enforceable contract was ever formed between the parties.
Given the relatively informal nature of the negotiation between the parties
and the absence of any formal employment contract, we agree with the district
court that there were factual questions concerning the parties’ intentions that were
properly submitted to the jury. APRO makes much of the minutes from the April
2013 Board meeting, which reflect the Board’s adoption of a resolution to begin
paying the officers, including Barfield, a percentage of their annual salaries. They
insist the minutes establish conclusively that the parties entered into an express
contract for payment of salary, the terms of which are fully and exclusively laid out
in that document. But we see no reason to focus particularly on this document to
the exclusion of the parties’ other actions and correspondence, including the 2011
memorandum indicating the officers’ salaries would be deferred, APRO’s financial
records, and Hale’s communications with Barfield—both before and after the April
2013 Board meeting—concerning salary.
Given the evidence before it, the jury could reasonably have concluded, as it
apparently did, that no enforceable contract for the payment of salary existed at all,
on the ground there was no agreement as to the essential terms of the contract and,
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therefore, no mutual assent. See Kolodziej, 774 F.3d at 741; Vega,
564 F.3d at
1272. Because the facts and inferences here do not “point overwhelmingly in
favor of” APRO’s view, we see no reason to reverse on the ground that the district
court was required to direct a verdict for APRO on either count of the complaint.
See Goldsmith,
513 F.3d at 1275.
B. The Verdict Form
“On appeal, we examine whether the jury instructions and verdict form,
considered as a whole, were sufficient so that the jurors understood the issues and
were not misled.” McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp.,
99 F.3d 1068, 1072 (11th
Cir. 1996) (quotations omitted). We review de novo the “subsidiary issue of
whether the jury instructions and verdict form accurately reflect the law.”
Id.
(quotations omitted).
As it argued below, APRO maintains the verdict form was misleading and
inconsistent with applicable law. Specifically, APRO speculates the jury could
have erroneously believed Barfield could recover damages for unjust enrichment
even if it found an express agreement existed as to the payment of salary, so long
as it found that express agreement did not include a deferred-salary term.
However, as APRO acknowledges, the jury instructions included an accurate
statement of the law, informing the jury that “[i]f you find that Mr. Barfield and
APRO International entered into an express contract regarding salary, you must
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find your verdict in favor of APRO International on that aspect of Count II of the
Complaint.”
“A jury is presumed to follow its instructions,” Weeks v. Angelone,
528 U.S.
225, 234 (2000), and we see no reason to deviate from that presumption here. We
acknowledge that Question 1 on the verdict form asked the jury to consider only
the discrete question of whether the parties entered into an express agreement for
the payment of deferred salary, as opposed to whether they entered into any
agreement concerning salary. But as the district court noted, that was the specific
question before the jury concerning Count I of Barfield’s complaint—if there was
no agreement as to deferred salary, he was not entitled to damages for breach of
contract, regardless of whether there was an otherwise valid contract for the
payment of salary.
Having answered that question in the negative, the jury was properly
instructed to move on to Question 4, which concerned Barfield’s claim for unjust
enrichment, and the jury was correctly instructed that they must find in APRO’s
favor if they found “an express contract regarding salary.” APRO’s assertion that
Question 1’s particular focus on the discrete question of deferred salary led the jury
to misunderstand the specific instructions it received concerning unjust enrichment
is speculative. Such speculation is insufficient to overcome the presumption that
the jury followed its instructions.
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Accordingly, we conclude the jury instructions and verdict form accurately
reflected the law, and “were sufficient so that the jurors understood the issues and
were not misled.” See McNely,
99 F.3d at 1072.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the forgoing, we affirm the jury’s verdict awarding Barfield
damages for unjust enrichment.
AFFIRMED.
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