Timothy Barabe v. Apax Partners Europe Managers , 359 F. App'x 82 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                          [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________                  FILED
    U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 09-12284                ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    OCTOBER 26, 2009
    Non-Argument Calendar
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    ________________________
    CLERK
    D.C. Docket No. 08-00212-CV-JOF-1
    TIMOTHY BARABE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    APAX PARTNERS EUROPE MANAGERS, LTD.,
    JOHN SAMUEL, individually,
    PAUL FITZSIMMONS, individually,
    IAN JONES, individually,
    MÖLNLYCKE HEALTHCARE US, LCC, and
    ROBERT BENNISON, individually,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Georgia
    ________________________
    (October 26, 2009)
    Before BIRCH, HULL and COX, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Timothy Barabe was an executive employee of Regent Medical Americas, LLC
    (“Regent”). In June 2004, he entered into a Service Agreement with Regent. The
    Service Agreement is governed by Georgia law and the parties agreed to submit to
    the exclusive jurisdiction of Georgia to resolve any litigation related to the Service
    Agreement.
    In August 2005, Mölnlycke Healthcare US, LLC (“Mölnlycke”) acquired
    Regent. Apax Partners Europe Managers, Ltd. (“Apax”) is Mölnlycke’s parent
    corporation. During the acquisition, Apax represented that it did not plan to make
    any particular Regent employee or group redundant. On August 31, 2005, Barabe
    signed a Subscription, Transfer and Investment Agreement (“the Subscription
    Agreement”). The Subscription Agreement sets forth the terms under which Barabe
    would be able to acquire Mölnlycke stock and the manner in which he would be paid
    for his shares in the event of his departure from the company. By its own terms, the
    Subscription Agreement is governed by the laws of England, and the parties agreed
    to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts for any litigation related
    to the Subscription Agreement.
    In May 2006, Mölnlycke informed Barabe that his position at the company was
    redundant and notified him of his termination. As a part of his separation, Barabe
    2
    was forced to sell his shares in Mölnlycke back to the company at a price lower than
    market value.
    Following his separation, Barabe sued Mölnlycke, Apax, and several
    individuals who were Mölynlycke officers and directors. The Amended Complaint
    (“the Complaint”), filed in the Northern District of Georgia, presents eight purported
    claims for relief. (R.1-2 at 12-23.)
    On Defendants’ motions, the district court dismissed each and every claim
    pleaded in the Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), for
    failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. And, Count VI was also
    dismissed for improper venue. (R.2-24; R.2-53.) Barabe appeals the dismissals.
    We consider de novo the district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for failure
    to state a claim, accepting the allegations in the Complaint as true and construing
    them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Hill v. White, 
    321 F.3d 1334
    ,
    1335 (11th Cir. 2003).
    We conclude that the district court’s orders state a proper basis for dismissing
    each claim. As the district court recognized, Count I (Disregard of the Corporate
    Entity), Count II (Joint Venture), and Count III (Agency Relationship) do not plead
    independent causes of action. (R.2-24 at 6 n.1.) Count IV (Breach of Contract
    regarding the Service Agreement) was properly dismissed because the Complaint
    3
    alleges no breach of the Service Agreement other than a breach of the covenant of
    good faith and fair dealing. And, the Complaint predicates the alleged breach of the
    covenant of good faith and fair dealing on an alleged breach of the Subscription
    Agreement, a contract that did not exist at the time the Subscription Agreement was
    executed. (R.2-24 at 7.) Count V (Common Law Fraud) was properly dismissed
    because the Complaint does not plead fraud with particularity and, under the facts as
    alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff could not plead reliance because he signed the
    Service Agreement before the allegedly false representations were made. (R.2-24 at
    9.) Count VI (Breach of Contract regarding the Subscription Agreement) was
    properly dismissed for improper venue because litigation regarding the Subscription
    Agreement must be brought in the courts of England. (R.2-24 at 10.) Count VII
    (Violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1961, the Federal Racketeering Act) was properly dismissed
    as the Complaint does not plead facts to support its allegation that Defendants were
    engaged in an enterprise to commit racketeering activity. (R.2-24 at 12.) The
    Complaint provides no facts regarding false statements or documents made as part of
    an enterprise of racketeering activity. (Id.) And, Count VIII (Racial Discrimination
    in violation of 42 U.S.C. §1981) does not adequately plead facts that suggest
    intentional racial discrimination. (R.2-24 at 12-13.)
    4
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-12284

Citation Numbers: 359 F. App'x 82

Judges: Birch, Cox, Hull, Per Curiam

Filed Date: 10/26/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/2/2023