United States v. Dontreaun Tremayne Alexander , 682 F. App'x 873 ( 2017 )

Case: 16-10568 Date Filed: 03/23/2017 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 16-10568
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:15-cr-00018-JA-DAB-2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
DONTREAUN TREMAYNE ALEXANDER,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(March 23, 2017)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JORDAN and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Dontreaun Alexander appeals his convictions for obstructing interstate
commerce by robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and brandishing a firearm during that
robbery, id. § 924(c)(1)(A). Alexander challenges, for the first time, the validity of
his guilty plea. We affirm.
Because Alexander failed to move to withdraw his plea, our review is for
plain error. See United States v. Rodriguez, 751 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir. 2014).
That standard requires Alexander to prove that an error occurred that is plain and
that affects his substantial rights. See id.
The district court did not plainly err in accepting Alexander’s pleas of guilty.
During the plea colloquy, Alexander stated that he had reviewed his case with
counsel; he had knowingly and voluntarily entered a written plea agreement with
the government; he had not been induced or coerced to plead guilty; he understood
the charges against him and the consequences of pleading guilty; and the factual
statement in his plea agreement described his offenses accurately. Alexander also
acknowledged that he had read and understood his indictment and the plea
agreement, both of which recited the elements of his offenses. Alexander argues
that the district court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 by failing to
explain the element of “interstate commerce,” but “[n]othing in the text of Rule 11
imposes such an obligation” on the district court, see Rodriguez, 751 F.3d at 1254,
particularly when Alexander passed up the invitation to inquire about any “word
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[he] d[id]n’t understand.” The district court was entitled to find that Alexander
“understood what he was admitting and that what he was admitting constituted the
crimes charged.” United States v. Siegel, 102 F.3d 477, 480 (11th Cir. 1996).
Alexander argues that there is an insufficient factual basis to accept his pleas
of guilty, and the government responds that Alexander waived his argument by
pleading guilty. We reject both arguments. We can consider Alexander’s argument
because our earliest precedents hold that the entry of a knowing and voluntary plea
does not bar a defendant from contesting the factual basis for that plea. See United
States v. Puentes-Hurtado, 794 F.3d 1278, 1286–87 (11th Cir. 2015). And the
district court did not plainly err in finding there was a factual basis to establish that
Alexander’s crimes caused a “minimal effect” on interstate commerce. See United
States v. Rodriguez, 218 F.3d 1243, 1244 (11th Cir. 2000). Alexander admitted that
he entered a Circle K convenience store brandishing a firearm; that its cashier
foiled Alexander’s plan to steal currency from the safe and cash register; and that
the store “was engaged in interstate commerce and was forced to shut down for
several hours following the robbery, resulting in the disruption of interstate
commerce through that establishment.” See United States v. Ransfer, 749 F.3d 914,
936 (11th Cir. 2014); United States v. Dean, 517 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 2008).
We AFFIRM Alexander’s convictions.
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