Wing Kei Ho v. City of Boynton beach ( 2023 )


Menu:
  • USCA11 Case: 22-11542    Document: 27-1      Date Filed: 03/01/2023    Page: 1 of 10
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eleventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 22-11542
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ____________________
    WING KEI HO,
    HO YEH KAREN,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    versus
    CITY OF BOYNTON BEACH,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    D.C. Docket No. 9:21-cv-81023-DMM
    USCA11 Case: 22-11542      Document: 27-1     Date Filed: 03/01/2023     Page: 2 of 10
    2                      Opinion of the Court                22-11542
    ____________________
    Before NEWSOM, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Wing and Karen Ho, proceeding pro se, appeal the district
    court’s dismissal of their amended complaint against the City of
    Boynton Beach alleging claims under Florida and federal law based
    on the City’s planned demolition of their building. On appeal, the
    Hos assert the district court erred in dismissing their amended
    complaint (in part without prejudice and in part with prejudice) for
    failure to state a claim. They also argue that the district court
    should not have denied their motion for an extension of time to file
    a second amended complaint and dismissed the action with preju-
    dice for failure to timely file a second amended complaint. After
    careful review, we affirm.
    I
    The Hos first assert that the district court should not have
    dismissed their amended complaint because, according to them,
    their complaint was not a shotgun pleading and they have evidence
    that their property is safe and should not be foreclosed. The Hos
    challenge the district court’s ruling on each of the following claims
    presented in their amended complaint — (1) discrimination, (2)
    negligence, (3) unjust enrichment, (4) commercial bad faith, (5) in-
    tentional infliction of emotional distress, (6) tortious interference
    with a business relationship, and (7) request for a preliminary in-
    junction.
    USCA11 Case: 22-11542      Document: 27-1      Date Filed: 03/01/2023      Page: 3 of 10
    22-11542                Opinion of the Court                         3
    We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure
    to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Glover v. Liggett
    Grp., Inc., 
    459 F.3d 1304
    , 1308 (11th Cir. 2006). We accept factual
    allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light
    most favorable to the plaintiff. 
    Id.
     Though pro se parties are held
    to a less stringent pleading standard, they still must suggest some
    factual basis for a claim. Jones v. Fla. Parole Comm’n, 
    787 F.3d 1105
    , 1107 (11th Cir. 2015).
    Rule 8 requires pleadings to contain “a short and plain state-
    ment of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While detailed factual allegations are not
    required, a pleading that offers “labels and conclusions or a formu-
    laic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Ash-
    croft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).
    To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain
    facts that allow the court to draw a reasonable inference that the
    defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. 
    Id.
     The
    two-pronged approach that a court should follow in evaluating the
    sufficiency of a complaint is as follows: (1) eliminate any allegations
    in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions, and (2) assume
    the veracity of the well-pleaded factual allegations and determine
    whether they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. 
    Id.
     at 680–
    82.
    The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination in var-
    ious areas such as public accommodations, public education, feder-
    ally assisted programs, and employment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a,
    USCA11 Case: 22-11542       Document: 27-1       Date Filed: 03/01/2023     Page: 4 of 10
    4                       Opinion of the Court                   22-11542
    2000c, 2000d, 2000e. Likewise, Florida law prohibits discrimination
    in education, employment, and public accommodations. 
    Fla. Stat. § 760.07
    .
    The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
    prohibits states from denying people the equal protection of the
    laws, which means “all persons similarly situated should be treated
    alike.” City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 
    473 U.S. 432
    , 439
    (1985) (quotation marks omitted). To state an equal protection
    claim, a plaintiff must show (1) that he is similarly situated to others
    who have received more favorable treatment and (2) that the state
    engaged in invidious discrimination against him based on race, re-
    ligion, national origin, or some other constitutionally protected in-
    terest. Sweet v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 
    467 F.3d 1311
    , 1318–19 (11th
    Cir. 2006).
    The elements of negligence under Florida law are: (1) a duty
    to the plaintiff, (2) defendant’s breach of that duty, (3) legal or prox-
    imate cause, and (4) actual damages. Wallace v. Dean, 
    3 So. 3d 1035
    , 1046 & n.18 (Fla. 2009). Florida courts have recognized that
    a governmental entity’s enforcement of laws and protection of
    public safety, including building inspection and condemnation, do
    not create a common law duty of care. Trianon Park Condomin-
    ium Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 
    468 So. 2d 912
    , 919–20 (Fla.
    1985).
    The elements of an unjust enrichment claim under Florida
    law are: (1) the plaintiff conferred a benefit on the defendant, who
    has knowledge thereof; (2) the defendant voluntarily retained the
    USCA11 Case: 22-11542       Document: 27-1       Date Filed: 03/01/2023     Page: 5 of 10
    22-11542                Opinion of the Court                           5
    benefit; and (3) the circumstances are such that it would be inequi-
    table for the defendant to retain the benefit. Tooltrend, Inc. v.
    CMT Utensili, SRL, 
    198 F.3d 802
    , 805 (11th Cir. 1999). Unjust en-
    richment is a form of implied or quasi-contract. 
    Id.
    “In Florida, sovereign immunity is the rule, rather than the
    exception.” Pan-Am Tobacco Corp. v. Dep’t of Corr., 
    471 So. 2d 4
    , 5 (Fla. 1984). Florida law waives sovereign immunity for the
    state and its subdivisions for tort liability but not contractual liabil-
    ity. 
    Id.
     (citing 
    Fla. Stat. § 768.28
    ). The Florida Supreme Court has
    found that sovereign immunity is not a defense to express contract
    claims. 
    Id.
     at 4–5. But Florida courts have held that sovereign im-
    munity is a defense to implied contracts. See City of Fort Lauder-
    dale v. Israel, 
    178 So. 3d 444
    , 447 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
    Despite a waiver of tort immunity, Florida law bars munici-
    pal liability for acts by its agents “committed in bad faith or with
    malicious purpose or in a manner exhibiting wanton and willful
    disregard of human rights, safety, or property.” 
    Fla. Stat. § 768.28
    (9)(a). We have explained that Florida courts have held
    that claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress are barred
    under this statute. Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 
    792 F.3d 1313
    , 1330 (11th Cir. 2015).
    The elements of tortious interference with a business rela-
    tionship are: (1) the existence of a business relationship,
    (2) knowledge of the relationship on the part of the defendant,
    (3) an intentional and unjustified interference with the relationship
    by the defendant, and (4) damage to the plaintiff as a result of the
    USCA11 Case: 22-11542      Document: 27-1      Date Filed: 03/01/2023      Page: 6 of 10
    6                       Opinion of the Court                 22-11542
    breach of the relationship. Ethan Allen, Inc. v. Georgetown
    Manor, Inc., 
    647 So. 2d 812
    , 814 (Fla. 1994). A contract is not re-
    quired, but “the alleged business relationship must afford the plain-
    tiff existing or prospective legal or contractual rights.” 
    Id.
     The el-
    ements for tortious interference with contract are the same, but a
    contract is required. See Smith v. Ocean State Bank, 
    335 So. 2d 641
    ,
    643 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
    To obtain a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs must show: (1)
    they have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) ir-
    reparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the
    threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever damage the
    proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if is-
    sued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.
    Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 
    840 F.3d 1244
    , 1247 (11th Cir.
    2016). A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic
    remedy. 
    Id.
     The movant bears the burden of persuasion. 
    Id.
     An
    injury is irreparable only if it cannot be undone through monetary
    remedies. Ne. Fla. Chapter of Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of Am. v.
    City of Jacksonville, 
    896 F.2d 1283
    , 1285 (11th Cir. 1990).
    Due process requires notice and the opportunity to be heard
    before the deprivation of property at the hands of the government.
    Grayden v. Rhodes, 
    345 F.3d 1225
    , 1232 (11th Cir. 2003). A proce-
    dural due process claim requires a showing of: (1) a constitutionally
    protected liberty or property interest, (2) state action, and (3) con-
    stitutionally inadequate process. 
    Id.
    USCA11 Case: 22-11542       Document: 27-1      Date Filed: 03/01/2023      Page: 7 of 10
    22-11542                Opinion of the Court                          7
    Here, the district court did not err in dismissing the Hos’
    amended complaint in part with prejudice and in part without prej-
    udice for failure to state a claim. Glover, 
    459 F.3d at 1308
    .
    First, the Hos failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim
    of discrimination based on federal or state discrimination statutes
    or the Constitution. Their claims of discrimination do not fall un-
    der either the federal or Florida civil rights laws because those stat-
    utes only cover discrimination in education, employment, and
    public accommodations, not based on the deprivation of property.
    42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000c, 2000d, 2000e; 
    Fla. Stat. § 760.07
    . Their
    claims of an equal protection violation also fail. Even liberally con-
    strued, the Hos did not allege that the other owner whose land the
    City bought was similarly situated to them simply by stating that
    land was “compatible.” Sweet, 
    467 F.3d at
    1318–19; Jones, 
    787 F.3d at 1107
    . Neither the amended complaint nor the attached exhibits
    make clear that they are similarly situated landowners. Sweet, 
    467 F.3d at
    1318–19; Griffin Indus., 496 F.3d at 1205–06.
    Second, the district court properly dismissed their negli-
    gence claim because they failed to allege sufficient facts to show
    that the City owed the Hos a duty of care. Wallace, 
    3 So. 3d at 1046
    . Florida law recognizes that governmental entities do not
    owe a duty of care when they inspect buildings and enforce laws,
    so any action in condemnation or enforcing liens did not create a
    duty of care. Trianon Park Condominium Ass’n, 
    468 So. 2d at
    919–
    20.
    USCA11 Case: 22-11542      Document: 27-1      Date Filed: 03/01/2023     Page: 8 of 10
    8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11542
    Third, the district court properly dismissed their unjust en-
    richment claim because unjust enrichment is a quasi-contractual
    theory and sovereign immunity is a defense to an implied contract
    under Florida law. Tooltrend, 198 F.3d at 805; Israel, 178 So. 3d at
    447.
    Fourth, the district court also properly dismissed the Hos’
    “commercial bad faith” claim because there is no indication such a
    claim exists under Florida law.
    Fifth, the district court properly dismissed their intentional
    infliction of emotional distress claim because it is barred by sover-
    eign immunity under Florida law. Weiland, 
    792 F.3d at 1330
    .
    Sixth, the district court properly dismissed the Hos’ tortious
    interference claim because they did not allege that they had an ex-
    isting business relationship or contract with which the City inter-
    fered. Ethan Allen, 
    647 So. 2d at 814
    ; Smith, 
    335 So. 2d at 643
    . In-
    stead, they simply stated that they would like to use the space for a
    Buddha Temple or civil rights office but made no mention of a con-
    tract or existing relationship.
    Lastly, the district court properly dismissed their request for
    a preliminary injunction to prevent demolition. The Hos did not
    allege facts sufficient to show their Fourth, Fourteenth, or Fifth
    Amendment rights were violated, so it is unlikely that they would
    prevail on the merits. Wreal, 
    840 F.3d at 1247
    . Moreover, even if
    they had alleged facts sufficient to show they could prevail on the
    merits, the district court correctly denied their request for a
    USCA11 Case: 22-11542      Document: 27-1      Date Filed: 03/01/2023     Page: 9 of 10
    22-11542               Opinion of the Court                         9
    preliminary injunction because the Hos did not show any harm
    was irreparable. 
    Id.
     They asked for monetary damages in addition
    to their injunctive relief, indicating that monetary damages were
    adequate. Ne. Fla. Chapter of Ass’n of Gen. Contractors of Am.,
    896 F.2d at 1285.
    Accordingly, the court properly concluded that the Hos’
    amended complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be
    granted, and we affirm as to this issue.
    II
    The Hos next argue that dismissal with prejudice was too
    severe a sanction and that the district court should have allowed an
    extension of time to file a second amended complaint.
    We review a district court’s dismissal for failure to comply
    with the rules of court for abuse of discretion. Betty K Agencies,
    Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 
    432 F.3d 1333
    , 1337 (11th Cir. 2005). We
    will not disturb the district court’s decision unless we find the dis-
    trict court made a clear error of judgment or applied the wrong
    legal standard. Guideone Elite Ins. Co. v. Old Cutler Presbyterian
    Church, 
    420 F.3d 1317
    , 1325 (11th Cir. 2005).
    A district court has inherent power to manage its docket.
    Betty K Agencies, 
    432 F.3d at 1337
    . A district court may also dis-
    miss a case for the failure to prosecute or comply with a court or-
    der. 
    Id.
     (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)). A court may extend the time
    a party has to act for good cause if a motion is made after the time
    to act has passed because of excusable neglect. Fed. R. Civ. P.
    USCA11 Case: 22-11542     Document: 27-1      Date Filed: 03/01/2023     Page: 10 of 10
    10                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11542
    6(b)(1)(B). The fact that a party is proceeding in a matter pro se
    does not excuse their failure to comply with procedural rules.
    Albra v. Advan, Inc., 
    490 F.3d 826
    , 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
    A dismissal with prejudice is an extreme sanction that may
    only be imposed when (1) a party engages in a clear pattern of delay
    or willful contempt and (2) the district court specifically finds that
    lesser sanctions would not suffice. Betty K Agencies, 
    432 F.3d at
    1337–38. Consideration of lesser sanctions may be implicit or ex-
    plicit. Gratton v. Great Am. Commc’ns, 
    178 F.3d 1373
    , 1374 (11th
    Cir. 1999). “While dismissal is an extraordinary remedy, dismissal
    upon disregard of an order, especially where the litigant has been
    forewarned, generally is not an abuse of discretion.” Moon v. New-
    some, 
    863 F.2d 835
    , 837 (11th Cir. 1989).
    Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deny-
    ing the Hos’ motion for an extension of time to file a second
    amended complaint regarding their claims that were dismissed
    without prejudice and dismissing the action with prejudice. The
    Hos exhibited a pattern of delay in missing deadlines and failing to
    comply with discovery requests after multiple warnings by the dis-
    trict court, and the court explicitly found that lesser sanctions
    would not suffice. Accordingly, we also affirm as to this issue.
    AFFIRMED.