Chadwick Willacy v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections ( 2017 )


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  •            Case: 14-13797   Date Filed: 03/30/2017   Page: 1 of 24
    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________
    No. 14-13797
    ________________________
    D.C. Docket No. 6:08-cv-00619-GAP-KRS
    CHADWICK WILLACY,
    Petitioner - Appellant,
    versus
    SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
    ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
    Respondents - Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    ________________________
    (March 30, 2017)
    Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Case: 14-13797       Date Filed: 03/30/2017      Page: 2 of 24
    In this capital case, Chadwick Willacy appeals the district court’s denial of
    his federal habeas petition. Willacy was convicted and sentenced to death for the
    brutal murder of his next door neighbor, which he carried out to cover up the fact
    that he had robbed her. After the Florida Supreme Court vacated his first death
    sentence on an issue unrelated to this appeal, Willacy received a new sentencing
    phase and again received a death sentence. Following an unsuccessful direct
    appeal from that sentence and collateral proceedings in the Florida state courts,
    Willacy filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the
    Middle District of Florida, which the district court denied.
    Willacy appeals the rejection of his petition on three grounds. First, he
    contends that he was denied the right to a fair trial because the State failed to
    inform the trial court of the fact that the jury foreman, Edward Clark, was under
    prosecution during the trial and therefore ineligible for jury service. Second, he
    asserts that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because counsel failed
    to inquire adequately during voir dire into juror Clark’s status. Third, Willacy
    contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in investigating and
    presenting to the jury a case in mitigation of the death penalty.
    After a thorough review of the briefing and the record, and with the benefit
    of oral argument, we affirm the denial of Willacy’s petition. 1 With regard to both
    1
    Willacy’s motion to stay further appellate proceedings is DENIED.
    2
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    claims based on juror Clark’s alleged prosecution, the Florida Supreme Court held
    that Clark’s participation in a pretrial intervention program did not amount to a
    prosecution under state law, and we cannot disturb that finding. Thus, Willacy’s
    claims that he was denied a fair trial due to Clark’s status and that trial counsel
    rendered ineffective assistance in failing to inquire further into Clark’s status
    necessarily must fail. As regards the claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective
    assistance at the penalty phase, we conclude that Willacy has failed to demonstrate
    that his counsel’s performance prejudiced his proceedings.
    I.     FACTUAL BACKGROUND
    Willacy was convicted in Florida of first degree premeditated murder,
    burglary, robbery, and arson. A jury initially recommended a death sentence by a
    vote of 9 to 3, which the trial court accepted. Willacy appealed, and the Florida
    Supreme Court affirmed his conviction but vacated his death sentence due to a
    problem involving a prospective juror not relevant to this appeal. See Willacy v.
    State (“Willacy I”), 
    640 So. 2d 1079
    (Fla. 1994). On remand, a jury voted 11 to 1
    to recommend a death sentence, and the trial court again accepted the
    recommendation. The Florida Supreme Court upheld this second death sentence,
    see Willacy v. State (“Willacy II”), 
    696 So. 2d 693
    (Fla. 1997), which is the
    sentence relevant to the instant proceedings. Below we recount the events that led
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    to Willacy’s conviction and sentence, evidence adduced at his state postconviction
    proceedings, and the course of his federal habeas proceedings.
    A. Facts Elicited at Trial
    Marlys Sather, the victim in this case, returned home from work around
    lunchtime unexpectedly and found Willacy, her next door neighbor, burglarizing
    her house. Willacy 
    II, 696 So. 2d at 694
    ; see also Willacy v. State (“Willacy III”),
    
    967 So. 2d 131
    , 135 (Fla. 2007) (affirming the denial of postconviction relief).
    Willacy bludgeoned Sather, bound her ankles with wire and duct tape, and “choked
    and strangled her with a cord with a force so intense that a portion of her skull was
    dislodged.” Willacy 
    III, 967 So. 2d at 135
    . Willacy obtained Sather’s car keys and
    ATM pin number and card, drove her car to her bank, and withdrew money out of
    her bank account. 
    Id. He then
    drove back to Sather’s house, hid her car around the
    block, and made several trips from Sather’s house to her car with stolen items in
    tow. 
    Id. After taking
    “a significant amount of property” from Sather’s house,
    Willacy drove the car to a nearby plaza, left it, and jogged back to Sather’s house.
    
    Id. Willacy went
    back inside and, apparently to conceal evidence of his crimes,
    set Sather’s body on fire. He disabled the house’s smoke detectors, doused Sather
    with gasoline he found in the garage, placed a fan from Sather’s guest room at her
    4
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    feet to provide oxygen for the fire, and struck several matches to set her body
    ablaze. 
    Id. According to
    the medical examiner’s testimony at trial, Sather was
    alive when Willacy set her body on fire; her death was caused by inhalation of
    smoke from her burning body. 
    Id. The State
    also entered into evidence for the
    jury’s review several photographs law enforcement took of Sather’s body after the
    murder.
    At trial, the State offered ample evidence that Willacy was the perpetrator of
    Sather’s murder. Witnesses reported seeing a man matching Willacy’s description
    near Sather’s house and driving her car on the day of the murder. 
    Id. Investigators found
    Willacy’s fingerprints on several items at Sather’s house, including the fan
    at Sather’s feet and the gas can. 
    Id. Willacy’s girlfriend
    contacted the police when
    she discovered a woman’s check register in Willacy’s wastebasket, and police
    identified the register as belonging to Sather. 
    Id. When police
    obtained a search
    warrant on Willacy’s home, they recovered some of Sather’s property and several
    articles of clothing containing blood consistent with Sather’s blood type. 
    Id. Based on
    this evidence, the jury found Willacy guilty of first degree
    premeditated murder, burglary, robbery, and arson. 2
    B. Motion for New Trial
    2
    Although the jury subsequently recommended a death sentence and the trial judge
    imposed one, as noted above this sentence was overturned on appeal. Thus, we do not recount
    the facts pertinent to that first penalty phase proceeding.
    5
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    Following his conviction and first death sentence, Willacy moved for a new
    trial. As relevant to this appeal, Willacy asserted that he was denied a fair trial
    because the State failed to disclose that jury foreman Clark was at the time of the
    trial under prosecution. Testimony adduced at an evidentiary hearing showed that
    Clark had been arrested approximately eight months before trial and charged with
    grand theft. His case was submitted for a pretrial intervention program (“PTI”)
    coordinated by Christopher White, the lead prosecutor on Willacy’s case. Clark
    was accepted into PTI five days before jury selection began in Willacy’s case but
    did not receive notice of his acceptance into PTI until after he was seated as a
    juror.3 White had knowledge of Clark’s participation in the program during
    Willacy’s trial but failed to inform the trial judge.
    Florida law at the time of Willacy’s trial provided that “[n]o person who is
    under prosecution for any crime . . . shall be qualified to serve as a juror.” Fla.
    Stat. § 40.013(1) (1991). Willacy argued:
    [T]he state had a legal obligation to inform the court as well as the
    defense upon learning this information. However, the state only made
    a half-hearted and ineffective effort to inform the defense, they failed
    to follow up on the information to confirm it, and they totally failed to
    inform the court. The result of these defaults was to deprive
    defendant of a lawfully constituted jury, requiring a new trial.
    3
    Clark signed an agreement to participate in the program in exchange for a term of
    probation after Willacy was convicted.
    6
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    Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, R. 3656
    (emphasis added). In support, Willacy cited several cases concerning a party’s
    right to a fair trial, including three addressing a criminal defendant’s Sixth
    Amendment fair trial right. 4 The trial court denied the motion for new trial.
    4
    We reject the State’s contention and the district court’s conclusion that Willacy’s fair
    trial claim is procedurally barred from our review. The district court found that this claim was
    barred because “it was raised on direct appeal and decided adversely to Petitioner,” and “[i]t does
    not appear that Petitioner raised this claim in his appeal of the denial of his motion for
    postconviction relief.” Doc. 84 at 21. But the district court’s own finding demonstrates why
    Willacy’s claim is properly before this Court.
    A petitioner must give the state courts “one full opportunity to resolve [his claim] by
    invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.” See
    O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 
    526 U.S. 838
    , 845 (1999). In so doing, the petitioner must “fairly
    present” his claim to the state courts. Mason v. Allen, 
    605 F.3d 1114
    , 1119 (11th Cir. 2010).
    Willacy has done both.
    Willacy fairly presented his claim that the State violated his right to a fair trial by
    asserting in his motion for new trial and direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court that the
    State’s failure to inform the trial court of Clark’s status was error and by citing and discussing
    Sixth Amendment fair trial case law. Although Willacy’s arguments throughout this direct
    review process were less refined than they are now, we conclude that a “reasonable reader would
    understand the claim’s particular legal basis and specific factual foundation” to be the same here
    as in the state courts. Pope v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 
    680 F.3d 1271
    , 1286 (11th Cir. 2012)
    (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, the state postconviction trial court
    understood the claim Willacy asserted on direct review to be based on his “right to a fair trial,”
    the same right he has asserted in federal court. Order Denying in Part Defendant’s Amended
    Motion for Postconviction Relief at 3, 5.
    Willacy thus gave the state courts “one full opportunity” to address and resolve his claim
    that his right to a fair trial was violated when the State failed to notify the trial court of Clark’s
    status. 
    Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 845
    . Nothing more was required. See 
    id. To exhaust
    a claim, a
    petitioner does not have “to ask the state for collateral relief, based on the same evidence and
    issues already decided by direct review.” 
    Id. at 844.
    In any event, the State expressly waived
    any exhaustion defense in its pleadings to the district court. See Response to Amended Petition,
    Doc. 75 at 25 (“Petitioner has exhausted each of the 12 issues raised in the habeas petition. To
    the extent Petitioner may not have exhausted any part of a claim, Respondents waive exhaustion
    and note that any such claim would be procedurally defaulted.”). A “state’s explicit waiver of
    [the exhaustion] defense before the district court forecloses it being asserted here.” Dorsey v.
    Chapman, 
    262 F.3d 1181
    , 1187 (11th Cir. 2001).
    7
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    C. First Direct Appeal
    The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Willacy’s motion for new
    trial, concluding, as to juror Clark: “Willacy mistakenly equates Clark’s placement
    in the Pretrial Intervention Program with prosecution. Pretrial intervention is
    merely an alternative to prosecution. Since Clark was not under prosecution,
    Willacy’s motion for a new trial was properly denied.” Willacy 
    I, 640 So. 2d at 1082-83
    (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, because the
    trial court erroneously denied the defense an opportunity to rehabilitate a
    prospective juror when the juror expressed concern about recommending the death
    penalty, the Florida Supreme Court vacated Willacy’s death sentence and
    remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 
    Id. at 1082.
    D. Resentencing Proceedings
    At the sentencing phase at issue here, the State called a number of witnesses
    to testify to explain to the new jury the crime and the evidence linking Willacy to
    it. See Willacy 
    II, 696 So. 2d at 694
    . The State also presented the testimony of
    Sather’s son and two daughters to illustrate for the jury the impact of her death.
    Each of Sather’s adult children testified to the close relationship Sather shared with
    Willacy fairly presented his fair trial claim to the state courts throughout one full round of
    state appellate review. Thus, his claim is not subject to a procedural bar.
    8
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    her children and grandchildren and to the grief and loss they had experienced as a
    result of the murder.
    Defense counsel presented nine witnesses in mitigation, all friends and
    family of Willacy’s. The witnesses, who all knew Willacy as a child, testified to
    his positive traits—namely, that he was a considerate, respectful, thoughtful, and
    well-liked child and adolescent. Several of these witnesses also testified that
    Willacy had a drug problem: he became addicted to crack cocaine in high school
    and sought treatment, although he later relapsed. Willacy’s younger sister Heather
    and two of his childhood friends testified that Willacy enjoyed a strong
    relationship with his family. But Willacy’s mother and father told the jury that his
    father, Colin Willacy, was “very hard” on his children. Ex. G-19 at 2826
    (testimony of Audrey Willacy); 
    id. at 2836
    (testimony of Colin Willacy). Colin
    testified that he “inflicted corporal punishment if . . . Chad were to do anything,
    and never once would Chad in any way respond . . . in a violent way.” 
    Id. at 2837.
    After hearing this testimony, the jury recommended a death sentence by a
    vote of 11 to 1. Willacy 
    III, 967 So. 2d at 136
    . The trial judge found five
    aggravating circumstances: the homicide was (1) committed in the course of a
    felony; (2) committed to avoid lawful arrest; (3) committed for pecuniary gain; (4)
    especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel (“HAC”); and (5) committed in a cold,
    calculated, and premeditated manner without any pretense of moral or legal
    9
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    justification (“CCP”). See 
    id. at 136
    n.4. The judge found no statutory mitigating
    factors and 31 nonstatutory mitigating factors, all of which it found carried little
    weight. See 
    id. at 136
    & n.5 (listing nonstatutory mitigating factors). After
    weighing these factors, the judge adopted the jury’s recommendation and imposed
    a death sentence.
    E. Second Direct Appeal and State Postconviction Proceedings
    The Florida Supreme Court affirmed Willacy’s death sentence on direct
    appeal. Willacy II, 
    696 So. 2d 693
    (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 
    522 U.S. 970
    (1997).
    Willacy then initiated state postconviction proceedings, in which, as relevant here,
    he asserted that counsel from the guilt phase of his trial, Kurt Erlenbach, rendered
    ineffective assistance in failing to conduct adequate voir dire of jury foreman
    Clark; and counsel from the guilt phase of his trial, James Kontos, rendered
    ineffective assistance in failing to investigate and present an adequate case in
    mitigation of the death penalty. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing
    on both of these claims. We recount the testimony relevant to Willacy’s penalty
    phase ineffective assistance claim below. With respect to his guilt phase
    ineffective assistance claim, however, we need not recount the testimony adduced
    because, as we discuss in Part III.A, the Florida Supreme Court’s determination
    that Clark was not under prosecution within the meaning of state law forecloses
    this claim entirely. See Bolender v. Singletary, 
    16 F.3d 1547
    , 1573 (11th Cir.
    10
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    1994) (“[T]he failure to raise nonmeritorious issues does not constitute ineffective
    assistance.”).
    As we detail below, we assume for purposes of analyzing Willacy’s penalty
    phase ineffective assistance claim under the test set forth in Strickland v.
    Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    (1984), that trial counsel performed deficiently. Thus,
    we do not recount Kontos’s testimony. Rather, we focus on the evidence adduced
    at the postconviction evidentiary hearing and whether that evidence, when
    combined with the mitigation Kontos presented and reweighed against the
    evidence in aggravation, would have led to a reasonable probability of a different
    outcome. See 
    id. at 695.
    Postconviction counsel introduced roughly two types of evidence at
    Willacy’s evidentiary hearing: evidence of (1) childhood physical abuse; and (2)
    mental health problems, including substance abuse in adolescence and adulthood.
    We discuss these in turn.
    Willacy’s three family members who testified during the penalty phase—his
    sister Heather and his parents, Audrey and Colin—testified at the postconviction
    evidentiary hearing about Colin’s physical abuse of his wife and children. Heather
    and Audrey recounted that Colin often drank to excess, and when he did, he would
    become physically violent with his wife and children. Heather testified that she
    and her brother would cry together when they witnessed their father hit their
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    mother. Both Heather and Audrey testified that Willacy bore the brunt of his
    father’s abuse, often for little reason or none at all, beginning when he was eight
    years old and continuing until his mid to late teens. Some of the beatings were
    severe: on one occasion that all three family members recounted, Colin beat
    Willacy with a broken chair leg. Colin admitted that his beatings of Willacy
    worsened as Willacy grew older, recalled threatening to kill Willacy, and testified
    that he once broke a broomstick on Willacy while beating him. The family
    testified that Willacy’s parents kicked him out of the house when he was a teenager
    and that he was homeless for a time.
    Postconviction counsel called a licensed psychologist, Dr. William
    Riebsame, to testify about Willacy’s drug abuse and mental illness, as well as the
    impact of the abuse he suffered at the hands of his father. Dr. Riebsame had
    performed an initial competency evaluation on Willacy before trial, but he
    conducted a more extensive evaluation in preparation for postconviction
    proceedings. In addition to corroborating the testimony of Willacy’s family
    members regarding the physical abuse Willacy suffered, Dr. Riebsame testified
    that Willacy met the diagnosis for cocaine abuse, cannabis abuse, alcohol abuse,
    Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (“ADHD”) and Antisocial Personality
    Disorder. Dr. Riebsame acknowledged that as a child Willacy had threatened to
    kill someone, started a fire at school, and killed small animals, reporting that such
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    behavior is common in children who suffer chronic and severe physical abuse. Dr.
    Riebsame also noted a “significant correlation” between this kind of childhood
    abuse and an Antisocial Personality Disorder diagnosis in adulthood.
    In addition to these diagnoses, Dr. Riebsame opined that, at the time of the
    offense, Willacy likely met the criteria for cocaine intoxication and cocaine
    withdrawal. In his view, Willacy met the statutory mitigator of having committed
    the offense while under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,
    citing Willacy’s crack cocaine binge and ADHD symptoms. 5
    The State called psychiatrist Dr. Jeffrey Danziger, who evaluated Willacy
    and reviewed Dr. Riebsame’s conclusions. Dr. Danziger did not dispute Willacy’s
    history of child abuse (which he acknowledged could be mitigating), nor did he
    disagree with Dr. Riebsame’s conclusions that Willacy met the diagnoses for
    cannabis abuse, cocaine abuse, and alcohol abuse. Dr. Danziger did, however,
    disagree with Dr. Riebsame’s assessment that Willacy was under extreme mental
    or emotional disturbance at the time of the offense. He also expressed doubt that
    Willacy suffered from ADHD. Other than the abuse Willacy endured as a child,
    Dr. Danziger found nothing mitigating in his background.
    Dr. Danziger, like Dr. Riebsame, diagnosed Willacy with Antisocial
    Personality Disorder. He testified to “reports of torture of animals including . . .
    5
    See Fla. Stat. § 921.141(6)(b) (now codified at § 921.141(7)(b)).
    13
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    burying animals up to their necks and running them over with lawnmowers as a
    child.” Dr. Danziger agreed with Dr. Riebsame that child abuse and Antisocial
    Personality Disorder were correlated.
    The trial court rejected Willacy’s ineffective assistance claim, the Florida
    Supreme Court affirmed, and the Supreme Court of the United States denied
    Willacy’s petition for writ of certiorari. See Willacy 
    III, 967 So. 2d at 142-44
    , cert.
    denied sub. nom., Willacy v. Florida, 
    552 U.S. 1265
    (2008). Based on the
    evidence adduced at the state postconviction evidentiary hearing, the Florida
    Supreme Court concluded that Willacy failed to show counsel performed
    deficiently or that any deficiency prejudiced him. Id.; see 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687
    (explaining that, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant
    “must show that counsel’s performance was deficient” and “that the deficient
    performance prejudiced the defense”).
    The Florida Supreme Court held that counsel was not deficient in choosing
    to present Willacy’s positive attributes, rather than negative qualities, in an attempt
    to present him as a life worth saving. Willacy 
    III, 967 So. 2d at 143-44
    . With
    respect to prejudice, the Florida Supreme Court opined that “presenting this
    mitigating evidence would likely have been more harmful than helpful,”
    acknowledging “that antisocial personality disorder is a trait most jurors tend to
    look disfavorably upon.” 
    Id. at 144
    (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
    id. 14 Case:
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    (“An ineffective assistance claim does not arise from the failure to present
    mitigating evidence where that evidence presents a double-edged sword.”). “Thus,
    there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would have
    been different if Kontos had chosen to focus on Willacy’s abuse and mental health
    issues rather than on the positive aspects of Willacy’s life.” 
    Id. F. Federal
    Habeas Proceeding
    After he had exhausted his state appeals, Willacy filed a petition for a writ of
    habeas corpus in federal district court, raising several claims including his fair trial
    and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The district court denied Willacy
    relief and denied him a certificate of appealability. We granted Willacy a
    certificate of appealability on his claims that his right to a fair trial was violated
    when the State failed to inform the trial court of Clark’s ineligibility to serve as a
    juror, trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to conduct adequate
    voir dire of Clark to discover his ineligibility, and trial counsel’s investigation and
    presentation of mitigating evidence at Willacy’s penalty phase was constitutionally
    deficient.
    II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    “When reviewing a district court’s grant or denial of habeas relief, we
    review questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact de novo, and findings
    of fact for clear error.” Reaves v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 
    717 F.3d 886
    , 899
    15
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    (11th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). An ineffective assistance of
    counsel claim “presents a mixed question of law and fact that we review de novo.”
    Pope v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 
    752 F.3d 1254
    , 1261 (11th Cir. 2014). So too
    does a claim that a juror’s potential bias violated a petitioner’s right to a fair trial.
    See Irvin v. Dowd, 
    366 U.S. 717
    , 723 (1961).
    Because the Florida state courts decided each of Willacy’s three claims on
    the merits, we must review these claims under the standards set by the
    Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Williams
    v. Taylor, 
    529 U.S. 362
    , 402-03 (2000). AEDPA bars federal courts from granting
    habeas relief to a petitioner on a claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state
    court unless the state court’s adjudication:
    (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
    unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
    as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
    (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
    determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented
    in the State court proceeding.
    28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). “‘[C]learly established Federal law’ under § 2254(d)(1) is
    the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the
    time the state court renders its decision.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 
    538 U.S. 63
    , 71-72
    (2003). With respect to § 2254(d)(2), “[s]tate court fact-findings are entitled to a
    presumption of correctness unless the petitioner rebuts that presumption by clear
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    and convincing evidence.” Conner v. GDCP Warden, 
    784 F.3d 752
    , 761 (11th Cir.
    2015).
    III.   DISCUSSION
    A. Fair Trial and Guilt Phase Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
    Two of the claims in Willacy’s certificate of appealability—his fair trial
    claim and his guilt phase ineffective assistance of counsel claim—are founded on
    the same assertion: that jury foreman Clark was under prosecution during
    Willacy’s trial and therefore was ineligible to serve as a juror under Florida law.
    See Fla. Stat. § 40.013(1) (1991). Based on this assertion, Willacy contends that
    the State’s failure to bring the fact of Clark’s prosecution to the attention of the
    trial court resulted in the deprivation of his right to a fair trial. And, Willacy
    argues, in failing to question Clark effectively during voir dire to reveal this
    pending prosecution, trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in violation of
    Willacy’s right to counsel. Both of these claims must fail: the Florida Supreme
    Court determined that Clark was not under prosecution within the meaning of
    Florida law, and “[w]e are not at liberty to challenge” that conclusion. Cargill v.
    Turpin, 
    120 F.3d 1366
    , 1381 (11th Cir. 1997).
    The Supreme Court has warned that “it is not the province of a federal
    habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law questions. In
    conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a
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    conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle
    v. McGuire, 
    502 U.S. 62
    , 67-70 (1991) (concluding that a federal due process
    claim based on the alleged improper admission of evidence must fail when that
    evidence was in fact properly admitted under state law). Here, the Florida
    Supreme Court dismissed Willacy’s argument that Clark’s placement in PTI was
    equivalent to prosecution under Florida law, holding that “[p]retrial intervention is
    merely an alternative to prosecution,” and “Clark was not under prosecution.”
    Willacy 
    I, 640 So. 2d at 1082-83
    (internal quotation marks omitted). Under
    Estelle, we cannot disturb the Florida Supreme Court’s determination.
    The Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion that Clark was not under
    prosecution precludes relief on Willacy’s fair trial and guilt phase ineffective
    assistance of counsel claims. Willacy’s fair trial claim based on Clark’s status is
    foreclosed because under Florida law Clark was eligible to serve on the jury (and
    not considered to harbor a potential for bias). Willacy’s ineffective assistance of
    counsel claim based on Clark’s status also fails because more effective voir dire
    would not have revealed Clark’s ineligibility to serve as a juror. See 
    Bolender, 16 F.3d at 1573
    (“[T]he failure to raise nonmeritorious issues does not constitute
    ineffective assistance.”).
    Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief on both of these claims.
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    B. Penalty Phase Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
    Willacy asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate
    and present evidence about his history of childhood physical abuse and mental
    health problems during the penalty phase and that there is a reasonable probability
    that, had the jury heard that evidence, it would have recommended a sentence other
    than death. Under Strickland, a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to
    effective assistance of trial 
    counsel. 466 U.S. at 686
    . Counsel renders ineffective
    assistance, warranting vacatur of a conviction or sentence, when his performance
    falls “below an objective standard of reasonableness,” taking into account
    prevailing professional norms, and when “there is a reasonable probability that, but
    for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
    different.” 
    Id. at 688,
    694. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
    undermine confidence in the outcome.” 
    Id. at 694.
    We assume for present purposes that Willacy’s trial counsel rendered
    deficient performance in failing to investigate and present a sufficient case in
    mitigation. See Castillo v. Fla., Sec’y of DOC, 
    722 F.3d 1281
    , 1283-84 (11th Cir.
    2013) (making “simplifying assumptions in favor of the petitioner” to facilitate the
    Court’s analysis, including assuming deficient performance and addressing
    Strickland’s prejudice prong only). Thus, we must decide whether counsel’s
    deficient performance prejudiced Willacy in the penalty phase of his trial,
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    considering in addition to the testimony counsel actually elicited at the penalty
    phase the childhood abuse and mental health evidence adduced at the
    postconviction evidentiary hearing.
    Applying AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, we conclude that the
    Florida Supreme Court reasonably determined that Willacy suffered no prejudice
    from his counsel’s failure to present mitigation testimony regarding his history of
    physical abuse, substance abuse, and other mental health problems. The physical
    abuse Willacy witnessed and suffered indisputably is mitigating. See Wiggins v.
    Smith, 
    539 U.S. 510
    , 534-35 (2003) (considering evidence of physical abuse
    petitioner suffered to be mitigating). But the mental health evidence adduced at
    Willacy’s postconviction hearing presented a double-edged sword that could have
    harmed Willacy’s case for a life sentence as much or more than it would have
    helped.
    We have said—just as the Florida Supreme Court said in Willacy’s case—
    that Antisocial Personality Disorder is “a trait most jurors tend to look disfavorably
    upon.” Suggs v. McNeil, 
    609 F.3d 1218
    , 1231 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
    marks omitted); see Willacy 
    III, 967 So. 2d at 144
    . Indeed, we have elaborated that
    evidence of Antisocial Personality Disorder “is not mitigating but damaging.”
    
    Suggs, 609 F.3d at 1231
    (internal quotation marks omitted); see Evans v. Sec’y,
    Dep’t of Corr., 
    703 F.3d 1316
    , 1327 (11th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (characterizing
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    Case: 14-13797     Date Filed: 03/30/2017   Page: 21 of 24
    evidence of antisocial tendencies as amongst “the strongest possible evidence in
    rebuttal” of mitigating mental health evidence). And “evidence of behavioral
    problems while attending school may be potentially damaging and unfavorable.”
    
    Evans, 703 F.3d at 1329
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    We also have observed that “evidence of a defendant’s drug addiction . . . is
    often a ‘two-edged sword’: while providing a mitigating factor, such details may
    alienate the jury and offer little reason to lessen the sentence.” Pace v. McNeil,
    
    556 F.3d 1211
    , 1224 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding that counsel’s failure to introduce
    evidence of petitioner’s crack addiction in the months leading up to the murder did
    not constitute ineffective assistance). Indeed, evidence of drug and alcohol abuse,
    “alone and in combination with the evidence that” a defendant was acutely
    intoxicated at the time of the murder “could [cause] some jurors to vote in favor of
    death” by supplying the jury “an independent basis for moral judgment.” 
    Suggs, 609 F.3d at 1231
    (internal quotation marks omitted).
    When we consider this new mitigating evidence (much of which could have
    been more harmful than helpful) together with the mitigation evidence presented at
    trial—that Willacy was considerate, respectful, thoughtful, and well-liked as a
    child and adolescent, had a close (if fraught) bond with his family, and sought
    treatment for his drug addiction—and weigh it against the evidence in aggravation,
    21
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    we conclude that the Florida Supreme Court’s no-prejudice determination was
    based a reasonable application of Strickland.
    Furthermore, “[t]his is not a case where the weight of the aggravating
    circumstances or the evidence supporting them was weak.” Sochor v. Sec’y, Dep’t
    of Corr., 
    685 F.3d 1016
    , 1030 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
    After the jury recommended a death sentence, the trial judge found that the
    prosecution proved five aggravating circumstances, including CCP and HAC. The
    Florida courts consistently have recognized “that CCP and HAC are two of the
    weightiest aggravators in Florida’s statutory sentencing scheme.” Brown v. State,
    
    143 So. 3d 392
    , 405 (Fla. 2014). The evidence adduced at Willacy’s
    postconviction evidentiary hearing would not have reduced the impact of these
    powerful aggravators sufficiently to undermine our confidence in the outcome of
    his penalty phase proceedings.
    Evidence elicited at the postconviction hearing would not have mitigated the
    strength of the HAC aggravator, which “‘pertains more to the nature of the killing
    and the surrounding circumstances’” than the petitioner’s mental state. Hardwick
    v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 
    803 F.3d 541
    , 561 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stano v.
    State, 
    460 So. 2d 890
    , 893 (Fla. 1984)). And the weight of the HAC aggravator
    was extremely strong in this case. The State introduced evidence to the jury that
    Sather was bludgeoned, bound by the ankles with wire and duct tape, and choked
    22
    Case: 14-13797      Date Filed: 03/30/2017       Page: 23 of 24
    and strangled with a cord with a force so intense that a small portion of her skull
    was dislodged. She was left in this condition—alive—for some time while
    Willacy plundered her home. Ultimately, Willacy burned Sather alive, and she
    died from smoke inhalation from her own burning body. The jury saw graphic
    photographs that demonstrated the extent of Sather’s injuries as a result of
    Willacy’s brutal attack.
    The abuse Willacy witnessed and suffered 6 might have shifted somewhat the
    balance between the remaining aggravators (including the strong CCP aggravator)
    and mitigating factors in this case. And if the jury had credited Dr. Riebsame’s
    testimony, Willacy’s extreme mental or emotional disturbance might have
    mitigated to some extent the strength of the CCP aggravator. Nevertheless,
    considering the “extremely aggravated” nature of the murder, we cannot say that
    any shift would have been so great as to permit us to set aside the Florida Supreme
    Court’s conclusion that the new evidence was insufficient to give rise to a
    reasonable probability of a sentence other than death. Crawford v. Head, 
    311 F.3d 1288
    , 1320-22 (11th Cir. 2002) (concluding that “there was no reasonable
    probability that” evidence that a petitioner grew up with an alcoholic and abusive
    father, “while . . . mitigating, . . . would have convinced the jury to impose life
    6
    We recognize that the jury heard some evidence that Willacy’s father had used corporal
    punishment. Here we consider the increased impact of the much more fulsome evidence of
    physical abuse adduced at the postconviction evidentiary hearing.
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    rather than death in light of the extremely aggravated nature of the crime
    involved”). Thus, we conclude that the Florida Supreme Court’s determination
    that Willacy cannot show prejudice withstands our deferential review under
    AEDPA, and we affirm the denial of relief on his penalty phase ineffective
    assistance of counsel claim.
    IV.    CONCLUSION
    The district court’s denial of Willacy’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is
    affirmed.
    AFFIRMED.
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