Thomas S. Burrell v. Teacher's Retirement System , 353 F. App'x 182 ( 2009 )


Menu:
  •                                                          [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT           U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    ________________________            NOVEMBER 16, 2009
    THOMAS K. KAHN
    No. 09-10733                       CLERK
    Non-Argument Calendar
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 08-00330-CV-F-N
    THOMAS S. BURRELL,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    TEACHER'S RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF ALABAMA,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Alabama
    _________________________
    (November 16, 2009)
    Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, TJOFLAT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Appellant Thomas S. Burrell, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
    dismissal of his civil action for violations of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
    rights under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
    , disability benefits under the Employment
    Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 
    29 U.S.C. § 1132
    (a), and state law
    claims for fraud and interference with contractual rights. On appeal, Burrell
    argues that the Teacher’s Retirement System of Alabama (TRSA) violated ERISA
    and other federal laws by modifying his wife’s retirement benefits after her death.
    He also asserts that the district court violated his due-process rights by dismissing
    his complaint.
    We review de novo a “district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss under
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, accepting the
    allegations in the complaint as true and construing them in the light most favorable
    to the plaintiff.” Castro v. Sec’y of Homeland Sec., 
    472 F.3d 1334
    , 1336 (11th
    Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). We review “de novo a district
    court’s ruling regarding Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Williams v. Dist. Bd. of
    Trs. of Edison Cmty. Coll., 
    421 F.3d 1190
    , 1192 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    “The Eleventh Amendment protects a State from being sued in federal court
    without the State’s consent.” Manders v. Lee, 
    338 F.3d 1304
    , 1308 (11th
    2
    Cir. 2003). “Although the express language of the [Eleventh] [A]mendment does
    not bar suits against a state by its own citizens, the Supreme Court has held that an
    unconsenting state is immune from lawsuits brought in federal court by the state’s
    own citizens.” 
    Id.
     at 1308 n.8 (quoting Carr v. City of Florence, 
    916 F.2d 1521
    ,
    1524 (11th Cir. 1990)). “It is also well-settled that Eleventh Amendment
    immunity bars suits brought in federal court when . . . an ‘arm of the State’ is
    sued.” Manders at 1308. “To receive Eleventh Amendment immunity, a
    defendant need not be labeled a ‘state officer’ or ‘state official,’ but instead need
    only be acting as an ‘arm of the State,’ which includes agents and instrumentalities
    of the State.” 
    Id.
    Although Burrell asserts that the district court denied his due-process rights
    by dismissing his complaint, he does not argue that it erred by finding that his
    federal claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment. (See generally Pl.’s Br).
    Moreover, he does not argue that the district court erred by dismissing his
    supplemental state law claims, failing to convert the motion to dismiss to a motion
    for summary judgment after he submitted additional documents with his amended
    complaint, or failing to rule on his motion to amend. (See generally id.). Thus,
    these issues should be deemed abandoned on appeal. See Horsley v. Feldt, 304
    
    3 F.3d 1125
    , 1131 n.1 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that issues not briefed on appeal by
    pro se litigants are deemed abandoned on appeal).
    Regardless, the district court did not err in dismissing his federal claims
    based on Eleventh Amendment immunity because TRSA is an instrumentality of
    the state as provided by 
    Ala. Code § 16-25-2
    (b). See Manders, 
    338 F.3d at
    1308-
    09; see also Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 
    491 U.S. 58
    , 66, 
    109 S. Ct. 2304
    ,
    2310, 
    105 L. Ed. 2d 45
     (1989) (noting that Congress did not abrogate Eleventh
    Amendment immunity with the passage of § 1983). Although Burrell’s complaint
    requested “equitable relief,” he did not request any prospective equitable relief to
    end continuing violations of federal law. See Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor,
    
    180 F.3d 1326
    , 1336 (11th Cir. 1999) (recognizing an exception to Eleventh
    Amendment immunity “for suits against state officers seeking prospective
    equitable relief and to end continuing violations of federal law”). Burrell’s due-
    process argument also fails because he did not raise the issue below. See Hurley v.
    Moore, 
    233 F.3d 1295
    , 1297 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Arguments raised for the first time
    on appeal are not properly before this Court.”). Accordingly, we affirm the district
    court’s judgment of dismissal.
    AFFIRMED.
    4