Glenn J. Webber v. Esquire Deposition Services, LLC , 439 F. App'x 849 ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT           FILED
    ________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    AUGUST 31, 2011
    No. 10-12943
    JOHN LEY
    ________________________
    CLERK
    D. C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-21538-PCH
    GLENN J. WEBBER,
    individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    ESQUIRE DEPOSITION SERVICES, LLC,
    a Hobart West Company,
    a.k.a. Esquire, an Alexander Gallo Company,
    ALEXANDER GALLO COMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    No. 10-12944
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-21539-PCH
    PUBLIC CONCEPTS, LLC,
    individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    VERITEXT CORP.,
    d.b.a Veritext Florida Court Reporting Company,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ________________________
    No. 10-12998
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-21537-PCH
    DR. CHARLES J. ADELSON,
    individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
    JACQUELYN LAUZERIQUE,
    individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    versus
    U.S. LEGAL SUPPORT, INC.,
    KLEIN, BURY, REIF, APPLEBAUM & ASSOCIATES, INC,
    d.b.a. U.S. Legal Support,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    2
    ________________________
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (August 31, 2011)
    Before TJOFLAT and MARTIN, Circuit Judges, and DAWSON,* District Judge.
    PER CURIAM:
    In this consolidated case, Glenn Webber, Public Concepts, LLC, Charles
    Adelson and Jacquelyn Lauzerique (“Appellants”) appeal the district court’s
    denial of their requests for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil
    Procedure 23(b)(3). Appellants filed separate suits in the district court against
    several court-reporting firms alleging that their billing practices violated the
    Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (“FDUTPA”), 
    Fla. Stat. § 501.201
    , and unjustly enriched the firms. After having had the benefit of oral
    argument and after thorough review of the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
    We review a district court’s class certification order only for abuse of
    discretion. See Fitzpatrick v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 
    635 F.3d 1279
    , 1282 (11th Cir.
    *
    Honorable Robert T. Dawson, United States District Judge for the Western District of
    Arkansas, sitting by designation.
    3
    2011). “[A]n abuse of discretion occurs if the judge fails to apply the proper legal
    standard or to follow proper procedures in making the determination, or makes
    findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” Birmingham Steel Corp. v. TVA, 
    353 F.3d 1331
    , 1335 (11th Cir. 2003) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). “It is
    irrelevant whether this Court would have granted [class] certification.” Babineau
    v. Fed. Express Corp., 
    576 F.3d 1183
    , 1189 (11th Cir. 2009). “As long as the
    district court’s reasoning stays within the parameters of Rule 23's requirement for
    certification of a class, the district court decision will not be disturbed.”
    Fitzpatrick, 653 F.3d at 1282 (quotation marks omitted).
    Rule 23(b)(3) requires that common questions of law and fact predominate
    over issues affecting only individual members. Rule 23(b)(3) also requires that a
    class action is superior to other available methods for adjudicating the
    controversy. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellants’
    motions for class certification. The district court discussed the difficulties
    associated with identifying class members who fit Appellants’ proposed class
    definition. In analyzing whether common questions of fact and law predominate,
    the district court correctly noted that FDUTPA does not require individualized
    proof of subjective reliance. See Fitzpatrick, 
    635 F.3d at 1283
     (explaining that a
    4
    plaintiff asserting a FDUTPA claim “need not show actual reliance on the
    representation or omission at issue”). The court highlighted, however, how
    differences in the circumstances under which putative class members purchased
    transcripts from the court-reporting firms create many individualized factual and
    legal issues with respect to the FDUTPA claim. Further, this Court has noted that
    “common questions will rarely, if ever, predominate” in an unjust enrichment
    claim. See Vega v. T-Mobile, Inc., 
    564 F.3d 1256
    , 1274 (11th Cir. 2009). In light
    of the individualized questions of fact and law and manageability concerns, the
    district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification.
    AFFIRMED.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-12943, 10-12944, 10-12998

Citation Numbers: 439 F. App'x 849

Judges: Dawson, Martin, Per Curiam, Tjoflat

Filed Date: 8/31/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 8/5/2023