Slater v. Progress Energy Service Co. , 441 F. App'x 637 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-14939 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEP 23, 2011
Non-Argument Calendar
JOHN LEY
________________________ CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 8:09-cv-00208-SCB-EAJ
MINDY SLATER,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ENERGY SERVICES GROUP INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED,
a.k.a. ESG International, Inc.,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendant,
PROGRESS ENERGY SERVICE COMPANY, LLC,
A subsidiary of Progress Energy, Inc., et al.,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllDefendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(September 23, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT, CARNES and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Mindy Slater appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Progress Energy Service Company, LLC, a subsidiary of Progress Energy,
Inc., and Florida Power Corporation d/b/a Progress Energy, Inc., (collectively
“Progress Energy”) in her discrimination suit alleging pregnancy discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(k) and
2000e-2(a), and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (“FCRA”), Fla. Stat. § 760.10,
and retaliation under the Florida Whistleblower Act (“FWA”), Fla. Stat. § 448.102.
On appeal Slater argues that: (1) she established a prima facie case of pregnancy
discrimination; (2) Progress Energy’s reason for her termination was pretext for
pregnancy discrimination; (3) she established that her termination was retaliatory; (4)
the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the use of a crane operator
applicant’s (“COA”) confidential medical records in Progress Energy’s summary
judgment motion but denied Slater the opportunity to depose the COA; and (5) the
district court abused its discretion by denying Slater further discovery. After careful
review, we affirm.
“[W]e review the granting of summary judgment de novo, and the district
court’s findings of fact for clear error.” Robinson v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 595 F.3d
21269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2010). If the movant satisfies the burden of production
showing no genuine issue of fact, “the nonmoving party must present evidence
beyond the pleadings showing that a reasonable jury could find in its favor.” Shiver
v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). “We draw all
factual inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Id.Nevertheless, the non-moving party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact
through speculation. Id. “In reviewing a district court’s discovery order, [we] must
consider whether the judge abused his discretion.” Langston v. ACT, 890 F.2d 380,
388 (11th Cir. 1989). Under this standard, “a party must be able to show substantial
harm to its case from the denial of its requests for additional discovery.” Leigh v.
Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1219 (11th Cir. 2000). We also “review a denial
of discovery under Rule 56(f) for abuse of discretion.” Jackson v. Cintas Corp., 425
F.3d 1313, 1316 (11th Cir. 2005).
First, we are unpersuaded by Slater’s claim that she established a prima facie
case of pregnancy discrimination by showing that she was subject to a higher standard
than her predecessor, and that Progress Energy had failed to follow its discipline
policy when it terminated her. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it “an
unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any
individual with respect to h[er] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
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employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act provides that
“women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so
affected but similar in their ability or inability to work.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k). “The
analysis required for a pregnancy discrimination claim is the same type of analysis
used in other Title VII sex discrimination suits.” Armindo v. Padlocker, Inc., 209
F.3d 1319, 1320 (11th Cir. 2000). Additionally, “decisions construing Title VII guide
the analysis of claims under the Florida Civil Rights Act.” Harper v. Blockbuster
Entertainment Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998).
“In evaluating disparate treatment claims supported by circumstantial evidence,
we use the framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green.” Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004).
“Under [the McDonnell Douglas] framework, the plaintiff first has the burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, which creates a rebuttable
presumption that the employer acted illegally.” Id. A plaintiff may establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by showing that: (1) she is a member of a group protected
by Title VII; (2) she was qualified for the position or benefit sought; (3) she suffered
an adverse effect on her employment; and (4) she suffered from a differential
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application of work or disciplinary rules. Spivey v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., 196
F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 1999).
“When a plaintiff alleges discriminatory discipline, to determine whether
employees are similarly situated, we evaluate whether the employees are involved in
or accused of the same or similar conduct and are disciplined in different ways.”
Burke-Fowler v. Orange County, Fla., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2006)
(quotation omitted). On the other hand, “[a] plaintiff alleging pregnancy
discrimination need not identify specific non-pregnant individuals treated differently
from her, if the employer violated its own policy in terminating her.” Armindo, 209
F.3d at 1321.
In this case, Slater has not shown that she was held to a higher standard than
her predecessor. Like her predecessor, Slater was expected to administer vision tests
and accurately report the results. However, the record shows that Slater made a
critical error in improperly administering a vision test, unlike her predecessor.
Further, contrary to her claim, Slater was not held responsible for reading and
interpreting an applicant’s medical history, because, as the record shows, her
supervisor responded to Slater’s error by asking the nurses to observe Slater and
ensure that she knew how to perform the examinations, indicating that her supervisor
clearly felt that Slater erred in conducting the vision test itself.
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The record further shows that Progress Energy began disciplining Slater before
her pregnancy about her absences and other performance issues with both verbal
counseling and in an e-mail. In addition, Progress Energy did not violate its
discipline policy when it terminated Slater because the evidence shows that levels of
discipline could be skipped for serious offenses, and Slater’s critical error in
administering the vision test was a serious offense. Thus, Slater has not established
a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination.
Nor do we find any merit to Slater’s claim that Progress Energy’s reason for
her termination was pretext for pregnancy discrimination because she was never
disciplined before she announced her pregnancy, she was set-up to commit a critical
error in the COA’s vision test, Progress Energy gave conflicting reasons for her
termination, and Progress Energy destroyed relevant documents belonging to Slater’s
supervisor. “If the plaintiff [establishes a prima facie case of discrimination], then the
defendant must show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment
action.” Burke-Fowler, 447 F.3d at 1323. If the defendant’s reason is legitimate and
non-discriminatory, “then the plaintiff must prove that the reason provided by the
defendant is a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Id.Even assuming Slater established a prima facie case, she has not shown pretext
on this record. First, as noted, Slater was counseled about her absences before she
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announced her pregnancy, and she failed to show that her performance issues and
Progress Energy’s concerns about those issues only began after her pregnancy
announcement. Second, despite Slater’s claim that the COA’s medical records were
altered, the record shows that Slater was not terminated for misreading the medical
records, but rather was terminated for improperly administering the applicant’s vision
test, and Slater’s speculations about Progress Energy’s actions following her critical
error do not amount to evidence of a plan to discriminate. Third, the record shows
that Progress Energy always maintained that its reasons for Slater’s termination were
because of her performance issues and her critical error in the vision test. Finally,
Slater has failed to explain how Progress Energy’s destruction of documents showed
a pretext for pregnancy discrimination.
We also reject Slater’s claim that her termination was in retaliation for an
e-mail in which she had complained about her supervisor’s pregnancy discrimination
less than a month before she was terminated. Title VII prohibits an employer from
retaliating against an employee for filing a charge or reporting discrimination. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). A retaliation claim is also analyzed under the McDonnell
Douglas framework. Goldsmith v. City of Artmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1162-63 (11th
Cir. 1993).
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The Florida Whistleblower’s Act provides that “[a]n employer may not take
any retaliatory personnel action against an employee because the employee has . . .
[o]bjected to, or refused to participate in, any activity, policy, or practice of the
employer which is in violation of a law, rule, or regulation.” Fla. Stat. § 448.102(3).
In analyzing retaliation claims under the FWA, courts may apply the analysis used in
Title VII retaliation cases. See Sierminski v. Transouth Financial Corp., 216 F.3d
945, 950 (11th Cir. 2000) (“In the absence of any guiding caselaw, the district court
correctly applied the analysis in Title VII retaliation cases.”). Thus, to make a prima
facie case for retaliation, the plaintiff may show: (1) a statutorily protected
expression; (2) an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal link between the
protected expression and the adverse action. Sullivan v. National R.R. Passenger
Corp., 170 F.3d 1056, 1059 (11th Cir. 1999).
A “close temporal proximity” between the employee’s protected activity and
adverse actions may be sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a genuine issue
of material fact of a causal connection. Brungart v. BellSouth Telecommunications,
Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 799 (11th Cir. 2000). However, “when an employer contemplates
an adverse employment action before an employee engages in protected activity,
temporal proximity between the protected activity and the subsequent adverse
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employment action does not suffice to show causation.” Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d
1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006).
Here, because Progress Energy did not discriminate against Slater, she had no
violation of the law to complain about under the FWA, and therefore she was not
subject to retaliation. Fla. Stat. § 448.102(3). As for her reliance on the e-mail in
which she allegedly had complained about her supervisor’s pregnancy discrimination,
a plain reading of the e-mail reveals that it was not a complaint, but rather a
reassurance that Slater’s pregnancy would not cause Progress Energy any problems.
Moreover, the close temporal proximity between Slater’s e-mail and her termination
did not create a causal link between the two because the record shows that Slater’s
supervisor had already contemplated Slater’s termination. Drago, 453 F.3d at 1308.
Likewise, we find no merit in Slater’s claim that the district court abused its
discretion when it allowed the use of the COA’s confidential medical records in
Progress Energy’s summary judgment motion but denied Slater the opportunity to
depose the COA. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for required
disclosure of materials that a party will use to support its claims or defenses:
a party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the other
parties . . . a copy -- or a description by category and location -- of all
documents, electronically stored information, and tangible things that
the disclosing party has in its possession, custody, or control and may
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use to support its claims or defenses, unless the use would be solely for
impeachment . . .
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure further set forth the consequences of
noncompliance with Rule 26(a):
If a party fails to provide information or identify a witness as required
by Rule 26(a) or (e), the party is not allowed to use that information or
witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless
the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1).
In this case, the district court’s protective order admitting a redacted version
of the COA’s medical records was not an abuse of discretion. Indeed, Slater has not
shown that Progress Energy’s delay in producing the documents violated any rule of
civil procedure. Nor has she shown that the exclusion of the records and the
deposition of the COA would have shown that her supervisor had not actually
believed that Slater had erred in administering the vision test, or that the district
court’s denial of discovery otherwise resulted in substantial harm to her case. Leigh,
212 F.3d at 1219.
Finally, we reject Slater’s argument that the district court abused its discretion
by denying Slater further discovery once she learned that Progress Energy had purged
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e-mails and documents belonging to Slater’s supervisor. Rule 56(f) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, before it was amended on December 1, 2010, provided:
If a party opposing [a summary judgment] motion shows by affidavit
that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its
opposition, the court may . . . order a continuance to enable affidavits to
be obtained, depositions to be taken, or other discovery to be undertaken
...
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f)(2) (2010). “A Rule 56(f) motion must be supported by an affidavit
which sets forth with particularity the facts the moving party expects to discover and
how those facts would create a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary
judgment.” Harbert Intern., Inc. v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 1998).
“The party seeking to use rule 56(f) may not simply rely on vague assertions that
additional discovery will produce needed, but unspecified, facts.” Reflectone, Inc.
v. Farrand Optical Co., 862 F.2d 841, 843 (11th Cir. 1989) (quotations omitted).
The Code of Federal Regulations states that,
[i]n the case of involuntary termination of an employee, the personnel
records of the individual terminated shall be kept for a period of one
year from the date of termination. Where a charge of discrimination has
been filed, or an action brought by the Commission or the Attorney
General, against an employer under title VII or the ADA, the respondent
employer shall preserve all personnel records relevant to the charge or
action until final disposition of the charge or the action.
29 C.F.R. § 1602.14.
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The record here shows that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Slater’s request for further discovery regarding Progress Energy’s e-mail
purge. For starters, she waited over a month after learning about the purge to request
further discovery, and the request was therefore untimely. And in any event, Slater’s
request vaguely claimed that undiscovered evidence relating to Slater’s
discrimination claim had been purged, and failed to set forth with particularity the
facts that she expected to discover in relation to the e-mail and document purge.
Harbert Intern., Inc., 157 F.3d at 1280. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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