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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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Nos. 18-12826; 18-12941
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket Nos. 1:05-cr-00083-CC-LTW-1,
1:17-cr-00123-CC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TRAVIS JENARD WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
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(February 26, 2019)
Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Travis Williams appeals his 48-month sentence for violating conditions of
his supervised release. On appeal, he argues that the district court erred by failing
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to consult the Guidelines, failing to properly elicit objections, and imposing a
substantively unreasonable sentence. We disagree and affirm.
I.
Williams first argues that the district court failed to consult the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. “[D]istrict courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines,
must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”
United States v. Crawford,
407 F.3d 1174, 1178 (11th Cir. 2005). This
“consultation requirement, at a minimum, obliges the district court to calculate
correctly the sentencing range prescribed by the Guidelines.”
Id. (emphasis in
original). At the revocation of supervised release hearing, the district court asked
the government for the appropriate Guideline range. The government responded
with the Guideline range and its calculation for arriving at that range. The
government also provided the statutory maximum sentence. The district court
accepted the government’s calculation, with no objection from Williams. The
district court expressly noted that it “consider[ed] the sentence under both the
custody guideline range as well as the statutory maximum sentence.” Williams
does not dispute that the government’s calculation was correct, and Crawford does
not require the district court to independently calculate the Guideline range. See
id.
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II.
Second, Williams argues that, at the conclusion of his revocation hearing,
the district court failed to elicit “fully articulated objections” under United States v.
Jones,
899 F.2d 1097 (11th Cir. 1990), overruled on other grounds by United
States v. Morrill,
984 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir. 1993). We review Jones claims de
novo.
Id. Under Jones, district courts must “elicit fully articulated objections,
following imposition of a sentence, to the court’s ultimate findings of fact and
conclusions of
law.” 899 F.2d at 1102. Jones requires district courts to both
(1) “give the parties an opportunity not only to resolve the objections contained in
the addendum, but also . . . to object to the district court’s ultimate findings of fact
and conclusions of law”; and (2), if an objection is made, “elicit from counsel an
articulation of the grounds on which the objection is based.”
Id. The district
court’s inquiry is insufficient when the court’s questions, along with defense
counsel’s responses, do not indicate that defense counsel understood the court to be
eliciting objections. See United States v. Campbell,
473 F.3d 1345, 1348 (11th Cir.
2007) (noting that we have held questions such as “is there anything further?” or
“anything else?” insufficient).
The district court did not violate Jones. After imposing Williams’s sentence,
the district court stated that it “wishe[d] to hear from both the defendant and his
attorney as to whether or not they oppose the sentence imposed.” This was meant
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to elicit objections, which Williams’s attorney understood and offered. Williams’s
attorney promptly objected to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. This
objection indicates that Williams’s counsel understood the court to be eliciting
objections. This elicitation is sufficient under Jones. See
id.
III.
Williams next argues his sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is
longer than necessary to satisfy the purposes of the Guidelines. Specifically,
Williams argues that his history of mental illness and the time he already served in
state and federal custody justify a shorter sentence. Upon revocation of supervised
release, the district court must impose a substantively reasonable sentence. United
States v. Vandergrift,
754 F.3d 1303, 1307 (11th Cir. 2014). The party challenging
the sentence bears the burden to show that it is unreasonable. United States v.
Tome,
611 F.3d 1371, 1378 (11th Cir. 2010). We will only vacate a sentence if we
are convinced it is outside the reasonable range of sentences for a given case.
United States v. Irey,
612 F.3d 1160, 1189–90 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), after finding that a defendant has violated a
condition of supervised release, a district court may revoke the term of supervised
release and impose a term of imprisonment after considering: (1) the nature and
circumstances of the offense; (2) the history and characteristics of the defendant;
(3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the Sentencing
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Guidelines and policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to
avoid unwarranted disparity among defendants; and (7) the need to provide
restitution to victims. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)–(D), (a)(4)–(7). When
imposing a sentence for the violation of supervised release, the court’s goal is to
sanction “the defendant’s breach of trust,” not the defendant’s original criminal
offense conduct. U.S.S.G. § 7A n.3(b).
Williams has not met his burden of showing that his sentence was
substantively unreasonable. The court considered Williams’s history of mental
illness and that Williams had already served time in both state and federal custody.
But in considering Williams’s “breach of trust,”
id., the district court also properly
considered the Guidelines factors, including undisputed facts about Williams’s
criminal history and his long history of violating the terms of his probation. See 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e). Moreover, Williams’s argument that the time he has already
served justifies a reduced sentence is unavailing. Williams’s state sentence was for
his underlying state crime and the sentence imposed by the district is for his breach
of trust in violating the terms of his supervised release. These are separate
concerns. See U.S.S.G. § 7A n.3(b). In light of these facts, we are not convinced
that the sentence is outside the reasonable range of sentences given the facts of this
case. See
Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189–90. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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