Dr. Massood Jallali vs Sec., U.S. Dept of Education, U.S. Dept of Education , 437 F. App'x 862 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 11-10135 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar AUGUST 16, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 0:10-cv-60189-PAS
DR. MASSOOD JALLALI,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(August 16, 2011)
Before WILSON, MARTIN and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Massood Jallali appeals the district court’s dismissal of his pro se
complaint, filed pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C.
§ 701 et seq., seeking declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus compelling
the U.S. Department of Education (“DOE”) and the Secretary of Education
(“Secretary”) to act on his written allegations regarding Nova Southeastern
University’s (“Nova”) refusal to award him a medical degree. In his complaint,
Jallali claimed that the Secretary failed to perform his duty by not investigating
and resolving Jallali’s allegations that Nova acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
refusing to issue him a degree. The district court granted the defendants’ Rule
12(b)(6) motion and dismissed Jallali’s complaint.
On appeal, Jallali argues that the district court erred in dismissing his
complaint because his claims were not barred by the doctrine of collateral
estoppel. He explains that state court litigation addressed whether Nova had acted
in an arbitrary and capricious manner in refusing to issue him a medical degree; it
did not implicate the Secretary’s duties to enforce the student loan Program
Participation Agreement (“PPA”) between Nova and the DOE. Jallali concedes
that he has no private right to enforce the PPA. Instead, he argues that he has the
right to make a written complaint to the Secretary or the DOE regarding a
participating institution’s compliance with the PPA, and that the Secretary has a
duty to investigate such a complaint.
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We may affirm on any ground supported by the record, regardless of
whether the district court relied upon or considered that ground below. Thomas v.
Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). We
review the district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) de novo, applying the same legal standards as the district
court. Edwards v. Prime, Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010). Pro se
pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings filed by lawyers and,
thus, are construed liberally. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263
(11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam).
Although the district court did not address jurisdictional issues in
dismissing Jallali’s complaint, we must examine whether the district court had
jurisdiction. United States v. Alabama, 791 F.2d 1450, 1454 (11th Cir. 1986); see
also Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Norton, 324 F.3d 1229, 1240 (11th Cir.
2003). “The subject matter jurisdiction of the district court is a question of law
and, therefore, subject to de novo review.” United States v. Perez, 956 F.2d 1098,
1101 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
In his complaint, Jallali cited the APA as authority for granting relief, but
the APA does not provide an independent basis for subject matter jurisdiction.
See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107 (1977). Rather, the federal question
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statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, confers jurisdiction on federal courts to review agency
action. Id. at 105.
The APA provides that “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute and
final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are
subject to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. A valid APA claim must challenge
“agency action,” which includes “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order,
license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act.”
5 U.S.C. § 551(13). The APA provides, in pertinent part, that a reviewing court
shall: “(1) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed;
and (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), (2)(A).
“If the claim challenges a failure to act, it falls under 5 U.S.C. § 706(1),
which allows courts to compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably
delayed.” Fanin v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 572 F.3d 868, 877 (11th Cir.
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). A court may take action pursuant to
§ 706(1) only where “‘an agency failed to take a discrete agency action that it is
required to take.’” Id. at 877–78 (quoting Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance,
542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004)). A “failure to act” does not include a “denial.” S. Utah
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Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. at 63.
“If the claim attacks an agency’s action, instead of its failure to act, and the
statute allegedly violated does not provide a private right of action, then the
‘agency action’ must also be a ‘final agency action.’” Fanin, 572 F.3d at 877(quoting § 704). To be considered final, an agency’s action (1) “must mark the
consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking process”; and (2) “must be one by
which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal
consequences will flow.” Nat’l Parks, 324 F.3d at 1236 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Federal jurisdiction is lacking “when the administrative action in
question is not ‘final’ within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 704.” Id.In his complaint, Jallali claimed that the Secretary failed to perform his duty
by refusing to investigate and resolve Jallali’s allegations regarding Nova’s refusal
to award him a degree; thus, Jallali asked the court to enter a declaratory judgment
and issue a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary to act. Because Jallali
challenged an agency action, i.e., the DOE’s denial of his request to investigate his
claims, Jallali’s APA claim falls under § 706(2). See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (providing
that a reviewing court shall “hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law . . . .”). While this agency action appears to
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be the end of the agency’s decisionmaking regarding Jallali’s administrative
complaint, the action is not one “by which rights or obligations have been
determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” See Nat’l Parks, 324
F.3d at 1236. The DOE’s letter merely informed Jallali that it did not have
authority to give him the relief that he requested; it did not otherwise affect his
legal rights or interests. Therefore, the agency action is not “final” for the
purposes of the APA. Moreover, Jallali has provided no legal authority for his
contention that the DOE was obligated or empowered to order Nova to award him
a degree. Therefore, to the extent that he sought to bring a claim under § 706(1)
based on the DOE’s failure to act, his claim fails because there was no legally
required agency action. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. at 64.
Because the agency action that Jallali challenged was not “final” or
“required” for purposes of the APA, the district court lacked jurisdiction over his
complaint.1
AFFIRMED.
1
Jallali also challenges the district court’s limitation of discovery prior to its ruling on
the defendants’ motion to dismiss. In light of the district court’s lack of jurisdiction over Jallali’s
complaint, we need not consider his challenge to the court’s limitation of discovery.
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