Brandon Coffman v. Harry Dallas Battle ( 2019 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 19-10592
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-00022-HLM
BRANDON COFFMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
HARRY DALLAS BATTLE,
in his individual capacity,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
________________________
(September 11, 2019)
Before WILSON, ANDERSON, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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This is a § 1983 excessive force case involving a corrections officer’s use of
a taser on a previously unruly but restrained pretrial detainee. The district court
determined that Defendant-Appellant Harry Dallas Battle (“Battle”) was not
entitled to qualified immunity and granted Plaintiff-Appellee Brandon Coffman’s
(“Coffman”) motion for summary judgment as to Coffman’s claims that (1) Battle
violated Coffman’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from the use of
excessive force, and (2) Battle committed battery under Georgia state law. Even
though the district court concluded that Battle committed battery as a matter of
law, the district court decided that genuine issues of material fact existed as to
whether Battle was entitled to official immunity under Georgia state law. As a
result, it denied Coffman’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of state law
official immunity and indicated that the case would proceed to trial only to resolve
that issue and the issue of damages.1
We have reviewed the parties’ briefs, applicable law, and relevant portions
of the record—including unchallenged video evidence of Battle using his taser on
Coffman after tightening the left wrist strap on Coffman’s restraint chair. We find
no reversible error in the district court’s disposition of Coffman’s motion for
summary judgment as to the federal § 1983 claim. Nor do we find any reversible
1
The district court did grant Battle’s motion for summary judgment as to Coffman’s
emotional distress claim under Georgia law. That decision is not challenged on appeal, and we
therefore do not address it in this opinion.
2
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error in the district court’s denial of Battle’s cross motion for summary judgment
on the issue of official immunity under Georgia law. The district court did not err
in considering hearsay evidence of statements Battle made to Coffman after the
tasing incident, and even assuming arguendo the district court did err in
considering those statements, the error was harmless.2 Consequently, we affirm
the judgment of the district court in all respects.
I.
We assume the parties are familiar with the facts and procedural history of
this case and therefore omit any detailed discussion of those issues here. We
proceed directly to a discussion of the relevant legal issues as applied to the facts
of this case, including whether the district court erred when it determined that
Battle violated Coffman’s Fourteenth Amendment rights as a matter of law; that
Battle was not entitled to qualified immunity because it is clearly established that
the use of force on a subdued detainee is excessive; and that genuine issues of
2
Battle does not directly challenge the district court’s conclusion that Coffman was
entitled to summary judgment on his state law battery claim, and we therefore also decline to
address the issue in this opinion. That said, Battle does argue generally that the district court
failed to properly apply the relevant summary judgment standards, including construing the
record in his favor and giving him the benefit of justifiable inferences, in granting Coffman’s
motion for summary judgment. Given the strength of the video evidence of the tasing incident in
this case, which Battle does not argue has been doctored or shows something different than what
actually happened, we reject Battle’s argument that the district court erred in applying the
relevant summary judgment standards. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S. Ct. 1769,
1775 (2007) (indicating that, on review of summary judgment involving unchallenged video
evidence, we should “view[] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape”).
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material fact remained as to whether Battle was entitled to state law official
immunity.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s decision to grant a motion for summary
judgment, construing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
Jacoby v. Baldwin Cnty., 835 F.3d 1338, 1342 (11th Cir. 2016). Summary
judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Although the non-moving party is generally entitled to
benefit from all justifiable inferences at the summary judgment stage, in cases
involving undisputed video evidence a different rule applies. When there are no
allegations that the video evidence has been doctored, or that the video shows
something different from what actually happened, the Supreme Court has stated
that we should “view[] the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1775 (2007).
III.
A.
The district court did not err when it determined that Battle violated
Coffman’s Fourteenth Amendment rights as a matter of law. To begin, there is no
dispute that Coffman was a pretrial detainee at the time of the incident and that his
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excessive force claim is governed by the Fourteenth Amendment, which “guards
against the use of excessive force against arrestees and pretrial detainees.” J W ex
rel. Tammy Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 904 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir.
2018). Although we were previously tasked with determining whether an officer
employed force “maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm”
when considering a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim, see Piazza v.
Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 923 F.3d 947, 952 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted), the
Supreme Court recently clarified that “a pretrial detainee raising a Fourteenth
Amendment claim needn’t prove an officer’s subjective intent to harm but instead
need show only that ‘the force purposely or knowingly used against him was
objectively unreasonable.’” Id. (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, ___ U.S. ___,
135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015)). In turn, one way of establishing that a use of force
is objectively unreasonable—and thus excessive and unconstitutional—is to show
that the officer “continue[d] to use substantial force against a prisoner who has
clearly stopped resisting—whether because he has decided to become compliant,
he has been subdued, or he is otherwise incapacitated.” Id. at 953 (quoting Danley
v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008)).
Construed in Battle’s favor, the record does indicate that Coffman had
caused significant trouble for Battle and his fellow officers on the night at issue in
this appeal. Battle says Coffman threatened “to beat [Battle’s] ass,” and Coffman
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also violently kicked his cell door for several minutes. He even flooded two
different holding cells by placing a rag in the toilet and continuously flushing the
toilet until it overflowed. Having had enough, officers eventually placed Coffman
in a restraint chair inside the suicide cell. The suicide cell did not have any toilets,
but it was equipped with a video camera.
The clear video evidence taken from that camera, which Battle does not
argue has been doctored or shows something other than what actually happened,
shows Coffman sitting in a restraint chair next to another inmate in a similar
restraint chair. Coffman’s torso is bound to the chair at the waistline by a seatbelt-
like strap, as are both of his shoulders. Similarly, both of Coffman’s arms are
bound to the armrests of the restraint chair at the wrists. As the video progresses,
Coffman is shown freeing his left arm and left shoulder from the restraints. His
torso, right shoulder, and right arm remain securely bound to the restraint chair.
He then uses his left arm to loosen (or attempt to loosen) his fellow inmate’s
restraints. About this time, Battle (the officer) received word from a fellow officer
that Coffman was “out of his chair.” The fellow officer did not provide Battle with
any further detail, and there is no indication that Battle saw the video of Coffman
removing his left arm and shoulder from the restraint chair before he returned to
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the suicide cell. By the time Battle entered the suicide cell, 3 Coffman had returned
his left arm to the wrist restraint on the armrest of the restraint chair. The left wrist
restraint is visibly loose. Battle walks over next to Coffman, and less than ten
seconds after entering the room Battle tightens the strap securing Coffman’s left
wrist to the armrest of the restraint chair. About six seconds later, while
Coffman’s left wrist is inside the wrist restraint, Battle deploys his taser into
Coffman’s abdomen in drive stun4 mode. A few more seconds pass, and Battle
deploys his taser in a similar manner a second time. Near the end of the second
taser use, Coffman frees his left arm from the wrist restraint and uses it to cover his
abdomen in a protective manner. He quickly returns his left arm to the armrest
when Battle’s fellow officer raises what appears to be a taser of his own. Battle’s
taser caused four burns marks, which turned to scars, across Coffman’s abdomen.
Given the clear video evidence, we conclude that Battle’s use of the taser on
the subdued Coffman was objectively unreasonable. Of course, we are mindful
that officers have “legitimate interests” in “preserv[ing] internal order and
discipline” and “maintain[ing] institutional security,” and that officers also are
3
We note that the camera responsible for capturing the video of the incident was
mounted just above the door Battle used to enter the suicide cell. The view from the camera is
unobstructed and persons entering the suicide cell before the tasing had a clear view of the
frontside of Coffman and his fellow inmate as they sat next to each other in their restraint chairs.
4
This means that the taser did not override Coffman’s central nervous system or disrupt
his muscle control, but it did cause a painful burning sensation. Hoyt v. Cooks, 672 F.3d 972,
975 n.4 (11th Cir. 2012). Typically, tasers are used in drive-stun mode “as a pain compliance
weapon” to convince a person to cooperate. Id.
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frequently called upon to make “split-second judgments” in situations “that are
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Piazza, 923 F.3d at 953 (quoting Kingsley,
___ U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2473). We also recognize that Coffman’s
misbehavior had disrupted operations at the Floyd County Jail. At the same time,
however, the law is clear that a use of force against a pretrial detainee “may be
defensive or preventative—but never punitive—[and] the continuing use of force is
impermissible when a detainee is complying, has been forced to comply, or is
clearly unable to comply.” Id. Battle’s conduct crossed the line of
constitutionality because Coffman had, despite his disruptive behavior, already
“been forced to comply” and was otherwise sufficiently “subdued” that the use of a
taser was clearly disproportionate to the need for that type of force.
Although Battle argues on appeal that Coffman was not securely restrained
because he was able to remove his left arm from the restraint chair, Battle
tightened the strap holding Coffman’s left arm to the restraint chair only seconds
before twice deploying his taser into Coffman’s abdomen, and it is clear from the
video that, at the time of both the first and second applications of Battle’s taser,
Coffman was offering no resistance. Moreover, Coffman’s entire body was
securely fastened to his restraint chair, as was his right shoulder and right arm.
Under such circumstances, which we conclude would have appeared to any
reasonable officer to involve a subdued detainee who had been sufficiently forced
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to comply, the need for the use of force was extraordinarily low. Given this, the
use of a taser—not once but twice in quick succession—crossed the line from a
constitutionally permissible “defensive or preventative” use of force to a
constitutionally impermissible “punitive” use of force against a pretrial detainee
that was “excessive in relation to [its] purpose.” Id. at 954–55 (citations omitted).
This conclusion is buttressed by other considerations identified by the
Supreme Court in Kingsley that “may bear on the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of the force used.” Kinsley, ___ U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2473.
We note that the Kingsley considerations are neither mandatory nor exclusive, but
instead are “potentially relevant to a determination of excessive force.” Id. Thus,
in addition to the fact that the need for force was extraordinarily low because
Coffman’s body was clearly secured to a restraint chair when Battle tased him, we
also reject Battle’s argument that the extent of Coffman’s injuries weighs in
Battle’s favor. In addition to four burn marks (that turned into scars) on his
abdomen, Coffman endured two painful and seconds-long electrical shocks while
sitting in his restraint chair. Although we are aware that a single use of a taser has
been held to be a reasonable and thus not excessive use of force, see Draper v.
Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1278 (11th Cir. 2004) (observing that “being struck with
a taser gun is an unpleasant experience” but concluding that “a single use of the
taser gun causing a one-time shocking . . . was reasonably proportionate to the
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need for force and did not inflict any serious injury” in a case involving an
unrestrained, uncooperative, and belligerent tractor trailer driver involved in a
traffic stop), we easily conclude that under the totality of the circumstances of this
case the pain and injuries Coffman endured were not de minimis in nature. As a
result, those injuries weigh in favor of affirming the district court’s decision.
Battle also argues that the security problem and threat posed by Coffman
were substantial. We disagree. As noted above, Coffman clearly caused problems
for the officers before he was placed in a restraint chair inside the suicide cell.
But, at the time Battle entered the suicide cell, those problems were substantially
under control. We know from viewing the video evidence that Coffman removed
his left arm and shoulder from the restraints, but there is no indication that Battle
knew anything more than that Coffman was “out of his chair” before he entered the
cell. In any event, upon entering the suicide cell Battle determined that Coffman’s
left wrist restraint needed to be secured and quickly did so. Nor is there any
indication that Coffman was armed, or that he had actually used force against
Battle at any time prior to the tasing incident. And although he had previously
flooded two cells, the suicide cell did not have any toilets. Thus, when compared
to other cases where the threat factor has weighed in favor of the officer, any
remaining security problem and threat posed by Coffman was “exceedingly
minimal.” See Piazza, 923 F.3d at 955 (comparing situation involving man
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carrying a shower curtain and running away from officers to three Eleventh Circuit
cases in which the officer was held to have reasonably perceived a threat, including
one involving a hatchet-wielding suspect, one involving a knife-wielding suspect,
and another involving a car rolling toward the officer). In light of the fact that
Coffman posed an exceedingly minimal ongoing threat or security risk at the time
of the tasing, Battle acted unreasonably in tasing Coffman twice within seconds
after tightening his left wrist restraint. At that moment in time, no reasonable
officer could have concluded that a significant security problem or threat remained
because Coffman was secured to his restraint chair.
In sum, we hold that the district court did not err in concluding, as a matter
of law, that Battle violated Coffman’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from
the use of excessive force when he twice tased Coffman, who was secured to a
restraint chair, only seconds after tightening Coffman’s loose left wrist restraint.
B.
Of course, even though the district court did not err in determining that
Battle violated Coffman’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from excessive
force, Battle may still be able to avoid liability unless Coffman can establish that
Battle is not entitled to qualified immunity. We also agree with the district court
that Battle is not entitled to qualified immunity in this case.
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Qualified immunity shields “government officials performing discretionary
functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.”5 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct.
2727, 2738 (1982). To qualify as clearly established law, “a legal principle must
have a sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent.” District of
Columbia v. Wesby, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018). This means
that the principle is “settled law” and also is one that “every reasonable official
would know.” Id. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 589–90 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted). In the context of excessive force cases like this one, it is important
to define the right at issue with specificity. See City of Escondido v. Emmons, ___
U.S. ___, ___, 139 S. Ct. 500, 2019 WL 113027, at *2–3 (2019) (per curiam)
(citation omitted). Even so, a plaintiff may still overcome the qualified immunity
defense without a factually similar case finding particular conduct unconstitutional
if existing precedent places the unlawfulness of the conduct “beyond debate.”
Wesby, ___ U.S. at ___, 138 S. Ct. at 590. At the end of the day, “the critical
question is whether the law gave the officer ‘fair warning’ that his conduct was
unconstitutional.” Piazza, 923 F.3d at 955.
5
The parties do not dispute that Battle was acting in his discretionary capacity as a
corrections officer when the challenged tasing occurred.
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The law of this Circuit gave Battle fair warning that his conduct was
unconstitutional. As a panel of this Court observed in May 2019, “[i]t was more
than ten years ago now that this Court held, in no uncertain terms, that ‘[w]hen
jailers continue to use substantial force against a prisoner who has clearly stopped
resisting—whether because he has decided to become compliant, he has been
subdued, or he is otherwise incapacitated—that use of force is excessive.’” Id.
(quoting Danley, 540 F.3d at 1309) (second alteration in original); see also id. at
955–56 & n.9 (collecting cases in support of the basic legal principle that officers
may not use gratuitous force against prisoners or detainees who are already
subdued and force used after the need for that force ceases is excessive).
Given the vintage of this settled legal principle, which dates to well before
July 2016 when the events at issue in this case occurred, we easily conclude that
Battle violated clearly established law by tightening Coffman’s left wrist restraint
and then tasing Coffman twice in quick succession while he was secured to a
restraint chair in a suicide cell. Because every reasonable official would know that
the use of such substantial force on a restrained detainee violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, we hold that the district court did not err in rejecting Battle’s
qualified immunity defense.
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C.
Finally, Battle argues that the district court erred by denying Battle official
immunity as to Coffman’s state law battery claim. Because there is no dispute he
was acting in his discretionary capacity when he tased Coffman, Battle is entitled
to official immunity under Georgia law unless Coffman can show that Battle’s acts
were performed with actual malice or intent to cause injury. “Actual malice is a
demanding standard; it requires an officer to act with ‘a deliberate intention to do a
wrongful act.’” Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1266 (11th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Adams v. Hazelwood, 520 S.E.2d 896, 898 (Ga. 1999)). Indeed, a
showing of actual malice or intent to injure requires more than “poor judgment,
rude behavior, and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others.” Selvy v.
Morrison, 665 S.E.2d 401, 405 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008).
Although it is generally true that the Georgia “state courts must consider the
issue of a government employee’s qualified immunity from liability as the
threshold issue in a suit against the officer in his personal capacity,” Cameron v.
Lang, 549 S.E.2d 341, 345 (Ga. 2001), it is also true that where genuine issues of
fact as to an officer’s mental state remain unresolved on a motion for summary
judgment, Georgia courts have held that “[a] factfinder may infer from evidence
that a defendant acted with actual malice,” see Lagroon v. Lawson, 759 S.E.2d
878, 883 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014). We have also recognized that “a jury can infer
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actual malice based on an officer’s conduct.” Black, 811 F.3d at 1266. Even so,
conduct that is unreasonable or recklessly illegal will not support an inference of
actual malice. Id.
We agree with the district court that, under the circumstances of this case
(which include clear video of evidence of the challenged use of force), a jury could
infer from Battle’s conduct that he acted with actual malice when he twice tased
Coffman while he was secured to a restraint chair.6 In reaching this conclusion, we
note that a jury would not be required to so decide; the fact that we have
determined that Battle violated Coffman’s Fourteenth Amendment rights by
subjecting him to an objectively unreasonable and excessive use of force does not
necessarily mean that Battle acted with actual malice or an intent to injure. We
6
Nor are we convinced that the district court necessarily erred by also deciding the state
law battery claim. To the extent that the Georgia courts have a stated preference for
“considering” or “evaluating” the state law official immunity issue before deciding the
underlying claim, see Cameron, 549 S.E.2d at 345, the district court did just that and ultimately
determined that factual issues remained as to Battle’s state of mind. Moreover, given that the
rule stated in Cameron is predicated on creating a “logical, efficient, [and] fair” procedure, we
see little logic or efficiency in remanding the battery issue for consideration by a jury in this
case. This is because we have already concluded that Battle acted in an objectively unreasonable
manner under the Fourteenth Amendment in twice tasing Coffman. Therefore, a fortiori, no
reasonable jury could conclude that Battle did not commit battery under Georgia state law
because “[a] cause of action for . . . battery can be supported by even minimal touching.” Ellison
v. Burger King Corp., 670 S.E.2d 469, 472 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). Importantly, though, this does
not mean that Battle will necessarily be liable for battery. If this case proceeds to trial and the
jury determines that Battle did not act with actual malice or intent to injure, Battle would be
entitled to official immunity and therefore could not be held individually liable for battery.
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leave it to the parties to introduce competent evidence of Battle’s state of mind to a
jury if and when this case proceeds to trial.
D.
We also write briefly to address Battle’s argument that the district court
improperly relied on inadmissible hearsay. To the extent that the district court
considered Officer Hudson’s statements describing Battle’s remarks to Coffman in
the moments after the tasing incident (as those statements were memorialized in
GBI Special Agent Glover’s investigative report),7 Officer Hudson’s statements to
Special Agent Glover were hearsay. And when considering a motion for summary
judgment, “[t]he general rule is that inadmissible hearsay cannot be considered.”
Macuba v. Deboer, 193 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 1999). But, there is an
exception to the general rule: “a district court may consider a hearsay statement in
passing on a motion for summary judgment if the statement could be ‘reduced to
admissible evidence at trial’ or ‘reduced to admissible form.’” Id. at 1323.
This Court has interpreted this to mean that the hearsay evidence “must be
admissible at trial for some purpose,” including because it is not hearsay at all or is
admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. Id. More recently, this Court
concluded that a district court did not err in considering a hearsay statement at the
7
Among other things, Officer Hudson stated that Battle told Coffman “he would be
better off dead” and that “if [Battle] could, he would kill Plaintiff.”
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summary judgment stage where the hearsay declarant could testify to the relevant
facts at trial and had not otherwise offered contradictory statements. Smith v.
LePage, 834 F.3d 1285, 1296 n.6 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Jones v. UPS Ground
Freight, 683 F.3d 1283, 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2012)).
We conclude that the district court did not err in considering Officer
Hudson’s statements describing Battle’s troubling remarks to Coffman after the
tasing incident. Battle has not argued, and we see no indication in the record, that
Officer Hudson is unavailable to testify to these facts at trial. Moreover, Battle has
not argued that the record includes evidence that Officer Hudson made any
contradictory statements with respect to Battle’s remarks that Coffman would be
better off dead or that Battle would kill Coffman if he could. Even assuming the
district court did err by considering Officer Hudson’s statements, however, it
would be harmless with respect to any possible error. This is because, even
without the evidence of Battle’s statements to Coffman after the tasing incident, no
reasonable jury could find that Battle acted reasonably under the Fourteenth
Amendment given Battle’s conduct as shown in the video of the tasing incident
taken from inside the suicide cell. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111; Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. And
as to the state law official immunity issue, none of Battle’s substantial rights were
affected because he will be able to question witnesses at trial about his state of
mind at the time of the tasing incident. See id.
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IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court did not err in
denying Battle’s qualified immunity defense and granting Coffman’s motion for
summary judgment as to his claims that Battle used excessive force in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment when he twice tased Coffman while Coffman was
secured to a restraint chair. Nor do we find any reversible error in the district
court’s conclusion that genuine factual issues remain as to Battle’s mental state for
purposes of state law official immunity. The judgment of the district court is
therefore
AFFIRMED.
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