[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-15265 DECEMBER 27, 2010
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D. C. Docket No. 09-60083-CR-WJZ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ROBERTO RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(December 27, 2010)
Before EDMONDSON, PRYOR and BARKSDALE,* Circuit Judges.
PRYOR, Circuit Judge:
*
Honorable Rhesa H. Barksdale, United States Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit, sitting
by designation.
The main issue in this appeal is whether the prying by a former bureaucrat is
criminal: that is, whether the defendant violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, which prohibits “intentionally access[ing] a computer without authorization or
exceed[ing] authorized access, and thereby obtain[ing] . . . information from any
department or agency of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B). Roberto
Rodriguez, a former employee of the Social Security Administration, appeals his
conviction for violating the Act on the grounds that he did not exceed his
authorized access to his former employer’s databases and that he did not use the
information to further another crime or to gain financially. The Administration
prohibits accessing information on its databases for nonbusiness reasons, and
Rodriguez at trial admitted that he accessed information for nonbusiness reasons
when he obtained personal identifying information, such as birth dates and home
addresses, of 17 persons he knew or their relatives. Rodriguez also appeals his
sentence of 12 months of imprisonment on the ground that it is unreasonable.
Because the record establishes that Rodriguez exceeded his authorized access and
the Act does not require proof that Rodriguez used the information to further
another crime or to gain financially, we affirm his conviction. We also conclude
that Rodriguez’s sentence is reasonable.
2
I. BACKGROUND
From 1995 to 2009, Roberto Rodriguez worked as a TeleService
representative for the Social Security Administration. Rodriguez’s duties included
answering questions of the general public about social security benefits over the
telephone. As a part of his duties, Rodriguez had access to Administration
databases that contained sensitive personal information, including any person’s
social security number, address, date of birth, father’s name, mother’s maiden
name, amount and type of social security benefit received, and annual income.
The Administration established a policy that prohibits an employee from
obtaining information from its databases without a business reason. The
Administration informed its TeleService employees about its policy through
mandatory training sessions, notices posted in the office, and a banner that
appeared on every computer screen daily. The Administration also required
TeleService employees annually to sign acknowledgment forms after receiving the
policies in writing. The Administration warned employees that they faced criminal
penalties if they violated policies on unauthorized use of databases. From 2006 to
2008, Rodriguez refused to sign the acknowledgment forms. He asked a
supervisor rhetorically, “Why give the government rope to hang me?” To monitor
access and prevent unauthorized use, the Administration issued unique personal
3
identification numbers and passwords to each TeleService employee and reviewed
usage of the databases.
In August 2008, the Administration flagged Rodriguez’s personal
identification number for suspicious activity. Administration records established
that Rodriguez had accessed the personal records of 17 different individuals for
nonbusiness reasons. The Administration informed Rodriguez that it was
conducting a criminal investigation into his use of the databases, but Rodriguez
continued his unauthorized use. None of the 17 victims knew that Rodriguez had
obtained their personal information without authorization until investigators
informed them of his actions.
Most of Rodriguez’s victims testified at trial. Cecilia Collins was married to
Rodriguez from 1985 to 1990. In 2008 and 2009, Rodriguez used the
Administration databases to determine how much Collins was earning. Rodriguez
also accessed the personal information of Collins’s sister for nonbusiness reasons.
Sally Culver lived with Rodriguez from 2001 to 2005. She testified that she
had not spoken with Rodriguez since 2005. Culver testified that on one occasion,
when she complained to Rodriguez about pay disparities at her place of work,
Rodriguez stated that, if Culver gave him the name, birth date, and approximate
age of a coworker, then he could tell her how much that coworker earned. Culver
4
declined Rodriguez’s offer and did not provide him the coworker’s name.
Rodriguez also accessed the personal information of Culver’s father for
nonbusiness reasons. Rodriguez also told Culver that, if he was ever asked about
his unauthorized searches, then he would make up an explanation. In 2008 and
2009, long after Culver and Rodriguez ended their relationship, Rodriguez
accessed Culver’s personal information 62 times.
Theresa Ivey had worked with Rodriguez at a post office, but Ivey had not
spoken to Rodriguez since 1999. Ivey’s daughter testified that she met Rodriguez
in 1993 when she was a child. In 2008, Rodriguez accessed Ivey’s personal
information twice and her daughter’s personal information 22 times.
Diamselis Rodriguez worked at a restaurant that Rodriguez frequently
visited. Rodriguez gave Diamselis a pair of earrings on her birthday. In 2008,
Rodriguez accessed Diamselis’s personal information 20 times.
Dana Fennell, a professor of sociology from Mississippi, testified that she
met Rodriguez at a Unitarian Universalist church study group when she was
visiting her parents in Florida. Fennell interviewed Rodriguez for a study on the
health effects of religion, but she did not consider him to be a friend. After Fennell
returned to her home in Mississippi, she received flowers from Rodriguez on
Valentine’s Day even though she had not given Rodriguez her address. Rodriguez
5
later arrived at Fennell’s doorstep unannounced, and Fennell was surprised and
frightened by his presence. On another occasion, Rodriguez mentioned Fennell’s
father’s birthday to Fennell even though she had never mentioned her father to
Rodriguez. Rodriguez also told Fennell that he had the ability to listen to the
telephone conversations of others. Rodriguez later called Fennell to wish her a
happy “half-birthday” although she did not recall telling Rodriguez her date of
birth. Rodriguez accessed Fennell’s personal information on Administration
databases 65 times, and he accessed the personal information of Fennell’s mother
and father multiple times.
Jessica Fox also met Rodriguez at the church study group. Fox testified that
she received a letter from Rodriguez at her home address and was shocked because
she had not given Rodriguez her address, she ordinarily receives all her mail at a
post office box, and her middle initial was on the envelope although she had not
used it since grade school. Rodriguez accessed Fox’s personal information 45
times.
Rodriguez accessed the personal information of several other women he met
at the church study group. Annemarie Jiovenetta considered Rodriguez to be an
acquaintance, and Rodriguez accessed Jiovenetta’s personal information 23 times.
Joan Ginnell considered Rodriguez to be her friend, and she testified that he
6
seemed romantically interested in her. Rodriguez accessed Ginnell’s personal
information 30 times. Catherine Schuman avoided Rodriguez after it became
apparent that he wanted a romantic relationship with her, and Rodriguez attempted
to access her information 29 times. Rodriguez accessed Marianne Silverstein’s
personal information seven times and Jane Dekovitch’s personal information ten
times. Nitza Dominguez did not testify at trial, but the government presented
evidence that Rodriguez accessed Dominguez’s personal information 34 times for
nonbusiness reasons.
On April 2, 2009, a grand jury indicted Rodriguez with 17 misdemeanor
counts of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The indictment charged
Rodriguez with “intentionally access[ing] a computer without authorization or
exceed[ing] authorized access, and thereby obtain[ing] . . . information from any
department or agency of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(B). Trial
commenced on July 27, 2009.
During his opening statement, Rodriguez’s attorney conceded that
Rodriguez had “access[ed] things that were unauthorized.” Rodriguez also
testified in his defense and admitted accessing the personal information of the
victims. Rodriguez testified that he had accessed the personal information as part
of a whistle-blowing operation to test whether his unauthorized use of the
7
databases would trigger the attention of the Administration because he was
conducting an investigation into improper denials of disability benefits. Rodriguez
admitted that he did not access the victims’ records as a part of his duties as a
TeleService representative. On July 29, 2009, the jury rejected Rodriguez’s
argument about his conduct and returned a guilty verdict on all 17 counts.
The presentence investigation report provided a statutory maximum sentence
of one year of imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(A), and a sentencing
guidelines range between zero and six months of imprisonment, U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 2B1.1(a)(2) (2008). Rodriguez did not object to the
sentencing report. The government sought an upward variance from the guidelines
range to 36 months of imprisonment. The government asked the district court to
impose the statutory maximum of 12 months on some of the counts and order that
the sentences run consecutively. The government argued that the guidelines range
did not sufficiently account for the number of victims or the harm they suffered.
The government also argued that an upward variance would better reflect the
seriousness of the offense and promote respect for the law. At the sentencing
hearing, Rodriguez presented more testimony about his discredited whistle-
blowing motivation and expressed regret. Rodriguez requested a probationary
sentence.
8
After considering the statutory factors for sentencing, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
the district court varied upward and sentenced Rodriguez to 12 months of
imprisonment and 12 months of supervised release. The district court agreed with
the government that the guidelines range did not adequately account for the
number of Rodriguez’s victims or the harm they suffered. Rodriguez objected to
the upward variance.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Two standards of review apply in this appeal. We review questions of
statutory interpretation de novo. United States v. Rahim,
431 F.3d 753, 756 (11th
Cir. 2005). We review a sentence, “whether within or without the guidelines . . .
only for reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard.” United States v.
Irey,
612 F.3d 1160, 1186 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).
III. DISCUSSION
Our discussion of this appeal is divided in two parts. We first discuss
whether Rodriguez’s conduct supports a conviction under section 1030(a)(2)(B).
Next, we discuss whether Rodriguez’s sentence is reasonable.
A. Rodriguez Exceeded His Authorized Access Under Section 1030(a)(2)(B) When
He Accessed Personal Records for Nonbusiness Reasons.
Rodriguez argues that he did not violate section 1030(a)(2)(B) because he
accessed only databases that he was authorized to use as a TeleService
9
representative, but his argument ignores both the law and the record. The
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act makes it a crime to “intentionally access[] a
computer without authorization or exceed[] authorized access, and thereby obtain[]
information from any department or agency of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. §
1030(a)(2)(B). The Act defines the phrase “exceeds authorized access” as “to
access a computer with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter
information in the computer that the accesser is not entitled to obtain or alter.”
Id.
§ 1030(e)(6). The policy of the Administration is that use of databases to obtain
personal information is authorized only when done for business reasons.
Rodriguez conceded at trial that his access of the victims’ personal information
was not in furtherance of his duties as a TeleService representative and that “he did
access things that were unauthorized.” In the light of this record, the plain
language of the Act forecloses any argument that Rodriguez did not exceed his
authorized access.
Rodriguez contends that the interpretation of the Act by the Ninth Circuit in
LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka,
581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009), supports his
argument, but Rodriguez’s reliance on Brekka is misplaced. The Ninth Circuit
held that Brekka, an employee of a residential addiction treatment center, had not
violated the Act when he emailed documents that he was authorized to obtain to his
10
personal email account.
Id. at 1129. The treatment center argued that Brekka
obtained the documents he emailed without authorization because he later used
them for his own personal interests.
Id. at 1132. The treatment center had no
policy prohibiting employees from emailing company documents to personal email
accounts, and there was no dispute that Brekka had been authorized to obtain the
documents or to send the emails while he was employed.
Id. at 1129. Brekka is
distinguishable because the Administration told Rodriguez that he was not
authorized to obtain personal information for nonbusiness reasons.
Rodriguez also relies on United States v. John,
597 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 2010),
but his reliance on that decision too is misplaced. The Fifth Circuit held that use of
information may constitute “exceeding authorized access,” if the use is criminal.
Id. at 271. John, an employee of Citigroup, was authorized to use her employer’s
computers and to view and print account information.
Id. John used the
information to incur fraudulent charges.
Id. at 269. The Fifth Circuit observed that
“John was authorized to view and print all of the information that she accessed,”
but concluded that “authorization” as used in the Act, “may encompass limits
placed on the use of information obtained by permitted access to a computer
system and data available on that system” if the use is in furtherance of a crime.
Id. at 271–72 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rodriguez erroneously argues
11
that he cannot be convicted under the Act because his use of the information was
not criminal. The problem with Rodriguez’s argument is that his use of
information is irrelevant if he obtained the information without authorization or as
a result of exceeding authorized access. See § 1030(a)(2)(B). Rodriguez exceeded
his authorized access and violated the Act when he obtained personal information
for a nonbusiness reason.
Rodriguez also argues that his conviction cannot stand because he never
used the personal information he accessed without authorization to defraud anyone
or to gain financially, but this argument is foreclosed by the plain language of the
Act. “The starting point for all statutory interpretation is the language of the
statute itself[,]” and “we look to the entire statutory context.” United States v.
DBB, Inc.,
180 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 1999). Sections 1030(c)(2)(B)(i) and
(ii) of the Act provide a punishment of up to five years of imprisonment if “the
offense was committed for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial
gain [or if] the offense was committed in furtherance of any criminal or tortious
act.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(c)(2)(B)(i), (ii). The misdemeanor penalty provision of the
Act under which Rodriguez was convicted does not contain any language
regarding purposes for committing the offense. See
id. § 1030(c)(2)(A).
Rodriguez’s argument would eviscerate the distinction between these misdemeanor
12
and felony provisions. That Rodriguez did not use the information to defraud
anyone or gain financially is irrelevant.
B. Rodriguez’s Sentence is Reasonable.
Rodriguez argues that his sentence of 12 months of imprisonment is
unreasonable both procedurally and substantively. The party challenging a
sentence has the burden of establishing unreasonableness. United States v. Talley,
431 F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). To be upheld on appeal, a sentence must be
both procedurally and substantively reasonable. United States v. Docampo,
573
F.3d 1091, 1100 (11th Cir. 2009). We consider each requirement in turn.
The district court committed no procedural error. A sentence is procedurally
unreasonable if the district court erred by “failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to
consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous
facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an
explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51,
128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). The district court considered the
guidelines range and the section 3553(a) factors and adequately explained
Rodriguez’s sentence.
Rodriguez argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the
13
district court should not have considered that there were multiple victims in its
decision to vary upward because an enhancement under section 2B1.1(b)(2)(A) of
the sentencing guidelines was the “proper mechanism” for considering multiple
victims, but we disagree. This Court has held that a district court can rely on
factors in imposing a variance that it had already considered in imposing an
enhancement, United States v. Amedeo,
487 F.3d 823, 833–34 (11th Cir. 2007),
and there is no requirement that a district court must impose an enhancement
before granting a variance.
Rodriguez’s burden of establishing that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable is heavy. See
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct. at 597. The district
court has wide discretion to decide whether the section 3553(a) factors justify a
variance. See
id. That we “might reasonably have concluded that a different
sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal.”
Id. We will reverse
only “if we are ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court
committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving
at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the
facts of the case.’” United States v. McBride,
511 F.3d 1293, 1297–98 (11th Cir.
2007) (quoting United States v. Williams,
456 F.3d 1353, 1363 (11th Cir. 2006)).
Rodriguez’s sentence is substantively reasonable. Rodriguez argues that the
14
sentence of 12 months of imprisonment is unreasonable because he is 54 years old,
he has no prior criminal history, the offense was nonviolent, and he has already
lost his job as a result of his actions, but the district court considered Rodriguez’s
personal characteristics and reasonably determined that an upward variance of six
months was necessary to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for
the law, and protect the public from future criminal conduct by Rodriguez. The
district court was entitled to find that an upward variance was warranted based on
the number of victims and the extensive nature of Rodriguez’s unauthorized
access. Although Rodriguez did not use the information he obtained to commit
another crime, he used the information in a manner unwelcomed by his victims.
Rodriguez’s sentence of 12 months of imprisonment does not lie outside the range
of reasonable sentences. See
McBride, 511 F.3d at 1298. The district court did not
abuse its discretion.
IV. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
15
