United States v. Richard Carino , 368 F. App'x 929 ( 2010 )


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  •                                                         [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUITU.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    MAR 11, 2010
    No. 08-16887                       JOHN LEY
    Non-Argument Calendar                    CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 06-00234-CR-T-17-MSS
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    versus
    RICHARD CARINO,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Middle District of Florida
    _________________________
    (March 11, 2010)
    Before EDMONDSON, BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Richard Carino appeals his convictions for possessing and receiving visual
    depictions of child pornography, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2252
    (a)(2) and
    (a)(4)(B). He raises one issue on appeal. Carino, who was 48 years old at the time
    of trial, contends that the district court failed to conduct a Rule 403 balancing
    before admitting his sister’s testimony that he sexually molested her when he was
    16 and she was 11.
    We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.
    United States v. Breitweiser, 
    357 F.3d 1249
    , 1254 (11th Cir. 2004). Generally,
    “propensity” evidence is inadmissible. See Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) (“Evidence of other
    crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order
    to show action in conformity therewith.”). An exception exists, however, for
    “child molestation” cases. Fed.R.Evid. 414(a) provides:
    In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an
    offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant’s
    commission of another offense or offenses of child
    molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its
    bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.
    Rule 414(d)(2) provides that an “offense of child molestation” includes possession
    of visual depictions of child pornography, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2252
    (a)(4)(B), and receiving visual depictions of child pornography, in violation
    of 
    18 U.S.C. § 2252
    (a)(2), both of which are offenses within Chapter 110 of Title
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    18. It follows that in prosecutions for possession or receiving child pornography
    evidence that a defendant has engaged in child molestation in the past is admissible
    as evidence that he is more likely to have committed the offense charged. See
    Fed.R.Evid. 414(a).
    Evidence admissible under Rule 414 must also meet the requirements of
    other provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence, including Rule 403. While we
    have not addressed the issue of whether Rule 403 applies to Rule 414, other
    circuits have held that Rule 403 applies to Rule 414. See United States v. Kelly,
    
    510 F.3d 433
     (4th Cir. 2007); United States v. Stout, 
    509 F.3d 796
     (6th Cir. 2007);
    United States v. Hawpetoss, 
    478 F.3d 820
     (7th Cir. 2007); United States v.
    LeCompte, 
    131 F.3d 767
     (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. LeMay, 
    260 F.3d 1018
    (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Castillo, 
    140 F.3d 874
     (10th Cir. 1998). Those
    circuits vary some in their views about the factors to be considered under Rule 403
    before admitting evidence pursuant to Rule 414. See generally Kelly, 
    510 F.3d at
    437 n.3 (discussing differing views of various circuits). But we do not have to
    choose between those views in this case, because Carino challenges only whether
    the district court considered Rule 403 at all.
    Contrary to Carino’s position, the district court did consider Rule 403 and
    did undertake the balancing required by that rule before admitting Carino’s sister’s
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    testimony under Rule 414. Both the government and Carino, on multiple
    occasions, argued about how the court should balance the testimony’s probative
    value with its prejudicial impact. In its trial brief, the government argued that the
    court must “balance [the] probative value against the risk of unfair prejudice and
    any other pertinent Rule 403 factor.” In making that argument, the government
    acknowledged the prejudicial nature of the evidence but contended that it was not
    unfairly prejudicial. Before his sister testified, Carino, citing Kelly, argued that for
    a similar act to be admitted, the act must still pass a “a 403 balancing test.” He
    cited to the court the factors that the Fourth Circuit had considered in Kelly and he
    contended that under this “Rule 403 balancing as to similarity and time alone that
    the allegations of [his sister] are not admissible. . . .” Further, while discussing
    proposed jury instructions, Carino admitted “that the Court had considered the
    factors of 403 in admitting [the testimony] just as it would consider the factors in
    admitting something under 404(b).”
    It is clear to us from the record that in deciding to admit the testimony of
    Carino’s sister, the district court undertook the Rule 403 inquiry and considered
    each parties’ arguments as to the testimony’s probative value and prejudicial
    impact.
    AFFIRMED.
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