Stanley N. Tavorn v. Charles Shockley , 230 F. App'x 888 ( 2007 )


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  •                                                          [DO NOT PUBLISH]
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FILED
    FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    ________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
    APRIL 26, 2007
    No. 06-13375                 THOMAS K. KAHN
    Non-Argument Calendar                 CLERK
    ________________________
    D. C. Docket No. 03-14322-CV-DMM
    STANLEY N. TAVORN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    versus
    CHARLES SHOCKLEY,
    DAVID FARCUS,
    M. L. ENGLISH,
    R. F. CARTER,
    K. J. GREEN,
    CONNIE SHOOTS,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ________________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Florida
    _________________________
    (April 26, 2007)
    Before TJOFLAT, BLACK and HULL, Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM:
    Florida state prisoner Stanley N. Tavorn appeals the district court’s dismissal
    of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil complaint against prison officials M.L. English and
    Connie Shoots.1 Tavorn contends the district court erred in dismissing his case
    because he did not agree to settle the instant case. According to Tavorn, he and the
    defendants orally discussed settlement of a separate case, but they did not reach a
    final, binding agreement that extended to the instant case.
    Generally, a party who consents to the entry of a judgment lacks standing to
    appeal it. Reynolds v. Roberts, 
    202 F.3d 1303
    , 1312 (11th Cir. 2000). However,
    there are two exceptions to this general rule: “(1) where the party did not actually
    consent or (2) where the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the
    judgment.” White v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 
    776 F.2d 976
    , 977 (11th Cir.
    1985).
    We review the district court’s enforcement of a settlement agreement for an
    abuse of discretion. See Brooks v. Georgia State Bd. of Elections, 
    59 F.3d 1114
    ,
    1119 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he duty of an appellate court is simply to ascertain
    whether or not the trial judge clearly abused his discretion in approving or rejecting
    1
    The district court dismissed the other defendants, Charles Shockley, David Farcus, R.F.
    Carter, and K.J. Green, in an order that is not at issue on appeal.
    2
    a settlement agreement.”); Murchison v. Grand Cypress Hotel Corp., 
    13 F.3d 1483
    , 1485 (11th Cir. 1994) (“We review the district court's decision to enforce a
    settlement agreement without an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion.”).
    Although the district court has the authority to summarily enforce a
    settlement agreement without an evidentiary hearing, “the district court may
    enforce only complete settlement agreements.” 
    Murchison, 13 F.3d at 1486
    .
    “Summary enforcement of an alleged settlement is improper when there is a
    substantial factual dispute as to the terms of the settlement.” 
    Id. The parties
    must
    be allowed an evidentiary hearing when there is a dispute about the material facts
    concerning the existence or terms of a settlement agreement. 
    Id. In Londono
    v.
    City of Gainesville, 
    768 F.2d 1223
    , 1229 (11th Cir. 1985), we vacated a district
    court’s order enforcing a settlement agreement the defendant denied agreeing to,
    and we remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing because, based on the record
    before us, we were unable to discern the terms of the settlement agreement and the
    factual basis for the district court’s conclusion that an enforceable contract was
    formed.
    In this case, the record does not contain the settlement agreement, evidence
    of the oral settlement discussions, or an evidentiary hearing on the settlement
    agreement, and the parties dispute the terms of any such agreement. Therefore, we
    3
    cannot ascertain our own jurisdiction because, without the terms of the settlement
    agreement, we are unable to determine whether Tavorn consented to the dismissal
    order. See 
    White, 776 F.2d at 977
    . Moreover, as in Londono, we cannot review
    the factual basis for the district court’s apparent conclusion an enforceable
    agreement was formed. Therefore, even if we could establish jurisdiction, we
    cannot determine whether the district court’s dismissal of the case was an abuse of
    discretion.
    Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s order dismissing the case, and we
    remand this case to the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine
    the existence and terms of the settlement agreement.
    VACATED AND REMANDED.
    4