Ronald L. Lane, Jr. v. Guaranty Bank , 552 F. App'x 934 ( 2014 )

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-12605
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 6:13-cv-00085-GKS-DAB
RONALD L. LANE, JR.,
individually,
VANESSA R. LANE,
individually,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
GUARANTY BANK,
BANK OF AMERICA,
ANY AND ALL UNKNOWN PARTIES CLAIMING BY, THROUGH, UNDER
AND AGAINST THE HEREIN NAMED INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANT(S) WHO
ARE NOT KNOWN TO BE DEAD OR ALIVE, WHETHER SAID UNKNOWN
PARTIES MAY CLAIM AN INTEREST,
Defendants-Appellees.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(January 15, 2014)
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Before PRYOR, MARTIN, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Ronald Lane, Jr. and Vanessa Lane, proceeding pro se, appeal the dismissal
of their complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and
the denial of their motion for relief from judgment. Having considered the parties’
briefs and the record, we affirm.
I
Because we write for the parties, we assume familiarity with the underlying
facts of the case and recite only what is necessary to resolve this appeal.
The Lanes filed a verified complaint in state court seeking to quiet title to
real property which they alleged they owned in fee simple pursuant to a corporate
warranty deed. The complaint alleged that Guaranty Bank recorded a “purported
mortgage document” in the public records of Seminole County evidencing that it
had loaned the Lanes $115,000. The Lanes repeatedly demanded that Guaranty
Bank prove that it had loaned them the money, but the bank furnished no evidence
of such a loan. Bank of America subsequently recorded an assignment from
Guaranty Bank of the purported loan in the public records of Seminole County.
The Lanes demanded that Bank of America proffer proof of the validity of the
assignment and its interest in their property, but it failed to do so. The Lanes sued
both banks, requesting a declaration that the mortgage and assignment are null and
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void, canceling the mortgage and subsequent assignment, and granting their
request to quiet title to their property against Guaranty Bank 1 and Bank of
America. The Lanes attached to their complaint copies of the mortgage,
assignment, and demand letters allegedly sent to the banks.
Following removal, the district court dismissed the Lanes’ complaint with
prejudice for failure to state a claim to quiet title, and denied their subsequently-
filed motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b). The Lanes now appeal.
II
We review the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. See Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043,
1056-57 (11th Cir. 2007). In so doing, we view the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiffs and accept as true all of the well-pleaded facts. Id. at
1057. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim of relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations omitted) (citing Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A complaint that merely
sets forth “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,”
and mere conclusory statements in support of a threadbare recital of the elements
of a cause of action will not suffice. See id. at 678.
1
The record indicates that Guaranty Bank was never served with process.
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We review the district court's refusal to grant leave to amend a complaint for
abuse of discretion, but review the legal conclusion that amendment would be
futile de novo. Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 802 (11th Cir. 1999).
Although we construe the pleadings of pro se litigants liberally, this
construction “does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party .
. . or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” GJR
Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998)
(citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701,
709 (11th Cir. 2010). To this end, although a pro se plaintiff is entitled to at least
one opportunity to amend where “a more carefully drafted complaint might state a
claim,” Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled in part by
Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002),
leave to amend need not be granted where amendment would be futile. Cockrell v.
Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 2007).
We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment for
abuse of discretion. Willard v. Fairfield Southern Co., 472 F.3d 817, 821 (11th
Cir. 2006). In relevant part, Rule 60(b) allows for relief from “a final judgment,
order, or proceeding” on grounds of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial . . . fraud . . . misrepresentation, or
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misconduct by an opposing party; the judgment[‘s] void[ness] . . . or any other
reason that justifies relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(4), (6).
III
The Lanes argue that (1) the district court erred in dismissing their complaint
with prejudice because they properly stated - or at a minimum should have been
given leave to replead - a quiet title claim; (2) the district court improperly
considered materials beyond the four corners of the complaint at the motion-to-
dismiss stage; and (3) the district court improperly denied their Rule 60(b)
motion.2
The Lanes first contend that the district court erroneously dismissed their
quiet title claim because their allegations stated a claim as pled. A claim for quiet
title in Florida “must not only show title in the plaintiff to the lands in controversy,
but also that a cloud exists, before relief can be given against it.” Stark v. Frayer,
67 So. 2d 237, 239 (Fla. 1953). See also Trs. of Internal Improvement Fund of
Fla. v. Sutton, 206 So. 2d 272, 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968) (“It is well settled that he
who comes into equity to get rid of a cloud upon his own title must show clearly
the validity of his own title and the invalidity of his opponents.”).
2
The Lanes also assert that they were entitled to amend their complaint once as of right
under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.190. This argument fails, however, because the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply in federal court.
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The district court properly dismissed the Lanes' complaint for failure to state
a claim. Accepting the Lanes' allegations as true and construing them in the light
most favorable to the Lanes, the Lanes did not allege sufficient facts to plausibly
show that Bank of America's interest in the property was invalid, and that the
underlying mortgage or assignment was a cloud on their title. The Lanes hinge
their quiet title claim on the failure of Guaranty Bank and Bank of America to
respond to their demands for proof of the validity of the mortgage and assignment.
The banks' failure to respond to the Lanes' unilateral demands, however, is legally
insufficient to create a cloud on their title. The Lanes merely offer their own
unsupported, subjective belief that the failure to respond rendered the mortgage
and assignment invalid. This subjective belief, however, does not rise to the level
of stating a claim that is “plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Because
the banks’ failure to respond did not render the mortgage and assignment invalid or
create a cloud on the Lanes’ title, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that amendment would have been futile. See Cockrell, 510 F.3d at
1310. 3
3
We likewise reject the Lanes’ argument that the district court violated their due process
rights by dismissing their complaint. See Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th
Cir. 2001) ( “Plaintiff cites no authority, nor do we know of any, which supports his contention
that constitutional due process requires that a plaintiff always be afforded a chance to amend his
complaint.”).
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Moreover, to the extent that the district court considered the purported loan
documents and demand letters that the Lanes attached to their complaint in
deciding that dismissal was appropriate, it did not err in doing so. See Tellabs, Inc.
v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (noting that courts
“ordinarily examine . . . documents incorporated into the complaint by reference”
in ruling on motions to dismiss). Nor did the district court abuse its discretion in
denying the Lanes’ motion for rehearing. Although the Lanes cite the language of
Rule 60(b), they do not explain their entitlement to any of the grounds for relief set
forth in the rule. To the extent their brief can be read to take issue with the district
court’s purported imposition of dismissal with prejudice as a sanction against
them, such an argument is misguided. The district court dismissed their complaint
for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), not as a punitive sanction.
IV
The district court’s dismissal of the Lanes’ complaint with prejudice and
denial of the Lanes’ motion for relief from judgment are affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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