Nathan Smith vs Gary Hutchins, Sheriff, Edward J. Tarver, United States Attorney , 426 F. App'x 785 ( 2011 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-11440 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar MAY 12, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 1:09-cv-00147-JRH-WLB
NATHAN SMITH,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GARY HUTCHINS,
Sheriff,
EDWARD J. TARVER,
United States Attorney,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
________________________
(May 12, 2011)
Before TJOFLAT, HULL and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Nathan Smith appeals pro se from the district court’s dismissal of his civil
rights action against Gary Hutchins, Sheriff of Jefferson County, and Edward
Tarver, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Georgia, brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999 (1971), for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.1 After review, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In the Southern District of Florida, Smith was indicted for bank robbery in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and possession of a stolen motor vehicle in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2313. On May 7, 2009 Smith was arrested. On May 21,
2009, the district court ordered that he be held in federal custody without bond
pending trial. The district court appointed attorney Matthew Waters to represent
Smith. Waters is an attorney in Wrightsville, Georgia.
On August 27, 2009, Smith sought to proceed pro se and waived his right to
1
Although Smith brought his claims against Tarver and Hutchins pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the district court construed his complaint as an attempt to state a claim under Bivens, as his
complaint alleges deprivations of his constitutional rights while he was being held in federal
custody.
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legal representation. At that time, the district court allowed Smith to proceed pro
se but directed that attorney Waters act as standby counsel and give advice on
procedural matters. On September 2, 2009, pending trial, Smith was transferred to
Jefferson County Law Enforcement Center (“Jefferson County LEC”) in
Louisville, Georgia. On September 23, 2009, a jury trial was held, and Smith was
convicted on both counts. Attorney Waters acted as standby counsel for defendant
Smith during the criminal trial in court. After his conviction, Smith remained at
the Jefferson County LEC.2 We note that Smith has raised no argument that his
waiver of counsel was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
On November 18, 2009, while still at the Jefferson County LEC, Smith filed
this lawsuit against Gary Hutchins, Sheriff of Jefferson County, and Edward J.
Tarver, United States Attorney for the Southern District of Georgia.3 Smith’s
complaint alleged that during his pre-trial detention at Jefferson County LEC, he
had no access to legal materials or a law library, and he was therefore unprepared
to defend himself during his criminal trial. Smith stated that he brought the claim
against Sheriff Hutchins because the Jefferson County LEC had no law library or
2
Smith alleges that he remained at the Jefferson County LEC until approximately April 15, 2010.
3
Smith referred to Tarver as “Attorney General” in his complaint, but Tarver is a United States
Attorney.
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access to legal materials, and against U.S. Attorney Tarver because Tarver failed
to ensure that the Jefferson County LEC provided access to legal materials while
Smith was in federal custody.4 Smith sought, inter alia, a court order that a law
library be established at Jefferson County LEC and $1,000,000 in punitive
damages. Smith sought and was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis
(“IFP”).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and 1915A, the district court dismissed
Smith’s complaint without prejudice after concluding that he failed to state a
viable claim for relief. Specifically, the district court concluded that an individual
who is provided counsel but nevertheless elects to proceed pro se in a criminal
prosecution is not constitutionally entitled to access to a law library or legal
materials during his pre-trial detention.
Smith now appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claim that he was
unconstitutionally deprived the right to access a law library while held at Jefferson
County LEC.
4
Smith also brought a claim for “discrimination against minorities housed” at Jefferson County
LEC, and later sought to amend his complaint to include a claim regarding deficiencies in the
ventilation system at the jail. Smith makes no arguments regarding these claims on appeal and
thus, they are deemed abandoned. See United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th
Cir. 2003) (party abandons an issue if not raised in initial brief).
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II. DISCUSSION
A. Sua Sponte Dismissals
The district court must dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint at any time if
it determines that, inter alia, the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may
be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
provides that a court “shall review, before docketing, if feasible, or, in any event,
as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a
prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity.” Id. § 1915A(a). Upon review, “the court shall identify
cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the
complaint . . . is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted . . . .” Id. § 1915A(b)(1).
We review de novo dismissals for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(b)(1). Leal v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 254 F.3d 1276, 1278-79 (11th Cir.
2001); Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). “[W]e [] apply
[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6) standards in reviewing dismissals
under section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).” Mitchell, 112 F.3d at 1490. We must view all of
the facts alleged in the complaint as true. Id. Finally, “[p]ro se pleadings are held
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to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore,
be liberally construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th
Cir. 1998).
Although Smith’s complaint does not cite any particular constitutional
provision, his brief on appeal cites both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Thus,
we broadly construe his claim and address his right of access to a law library under
both Amendments.
B. Sixth Amendment Right to Waive Counsel
Federal criminal defendants have both statutory and Sixth Amendment
rights to waive counsel and represent themselves when they voluntarily and
intelligently so elect. 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.
Ct. 2525 (1975). However, the right to proceed pro se in a criminal trial does not
imply there are additional rights to access legal materials or law libraries. “When
an accused manages his own defense, he relinquishes, as a purely factual matter,
many of the traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel.” Faretta, 422
U.S. at 835, 95 S. Ct. at 2541; see United States v. Smith, 907 F.2d 42, 45 (6th Cir.
1990) (“We find that by knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to counsel,
the appellant also relinquished his access to a law library.”); United States v.
Wilson, 690 F.2d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1982) (“We decline to interpret the right to
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self-representation under the Sixth Amendment to include a right to conduct one’s
own research at government expense.”).
Thus, to the extent that Smith argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were
violated due to the lack of a law library at Jefferson County LEC, his complaint
fails to state a claim. Smith had the option of being represented by counsel but
chose to proceed pro se, during which time his appointed counsel remained on
duty as standby counsel. Given the particular facts of this case, the Sixth
Amendment does not grant Smith a right to access a law library at Jefferson
County LEC in order to prepare his defense.
C. Right of Access to Courts
“It is now clearly established that prisoners have a constitutional right of
access to the courts.” Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006)
(citing Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 97 S. Ct. 1491, 1494 (1977)). In
Bounds v. Smith, the Supreme Court held that “the fundamental constitutional
right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the
preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with
adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.”
430 U.S. at 828, 97 S. Ct. at 1498. Although the majority opinion in Bounds did
not identify the constitutional provision underlying the right of access to the
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courts, this Court has indicated that the constitutional right of access to the courts
is “grounded in the First Amendment, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities
Clause, the Fifth Amendment, and/or the Fourteenth Amendment.” Al-Amin v.
Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1325 n.17 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted).
Importantly, however, Bounds holds that access to law libraries is not
mandatory to provide meaningful access to the courts in the context of filing
habeas petitions or civil actions, where legal counsel is provided as an alternative:
“[W]hile adequate law libraries are one constitutionally acceptable method to
assure meaningful access to the courts, our decision here . . . does not foreclose
alternative means to achieve that goal,” such as the provision of professional legal
assistance to prisoners. 430 U.S. at 830-31, 97 S. Ct. at 1499. “[A] legal access
program need not include any particular element we have discussed . . . .” Id. at
832, 97 S. Ct. at 1500; see also Hooks v. Wainwright, 775 F.2d 1433, 1435 (11th
Cir. 1985) (concluding state need not provide prisoners assistance of counsel in
addition to libraries for purpose of filing collateral suits, stating, “it is noteworthy
that Bounds refers to law libraries or other forms of legal assistance, in the
disjunctive, no fewer than five times.”).
We have held that a criminal defendant who seeks to proceed pro se has no
right to access a law library to aid him in his own defense at trial where he has
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already been provided the option of legal counsel.5 See Edwards v. United States,
795 F.2d 958, 961 & n.1, 3 (11th Cir. 1986) (rejecting habeas petitioner’s claim he
was denied access to a law library during criminal trial where he had elected to
proceed pro se with standby counsel, concluding, “When counsel is offered, the
alternative of a library is not mandatory”) (citing Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828, 97 S.
Ct. at 1498); see also Degrate v. Godwin, 84 F.3d 768, 769 (5th Cir. 1996)
(affirming dismissal of a § 1983 suit by a prisoner after concluding that he “had no
constitutional right to access a law library in preparing the pro se defense of his
criminal trial”); United States ex rel. George v. Lane, 718 F.2d 226, 233 (7th Cir.
1983) (holding that where pre-trial detainee is offered appointed counsel and
instead proceeds pro se, there is no constitutional right mandating that the prisoner
be provided access to a law library); Wilson, 690 F.2d at 1272 (“The offer of
court-appointed counsel to represent Wilson satisfied the Fifth Amendment
5
Because Bounds addressed only the issue of access to the courts in the context of inmates filing
civil actions or habeas petitions for post-conviction relief, some courts have held that Bounds has
no applicability to defendants representing themselves in criminal proceedings. See Smith, 907
F.2d at 44 (“Clearly, then, the only application that Bounds has to pretrial detainees would be in
civil matters because access to an adequate law library would never suffice as a constitutionally
permissible replacement by the government for the right to the assistance of counsel in a criminal
trial absent a voluntary waiver of counsel.”); United States v. Chatman, 584 F.2d 1358, 1360 (4th
Cir. 1978) (“Bounds, of course, has no direct application to defendant. He was accused of crime
and had an absolute right to counsel, which he validly waived; he had no present thought of
pursuing post-conviction relief.”). Regardless of whether Bounds applies to pre-trial detainees,
we conclude in this case Bounds does not require access to a law library where Smith had the
option of assistance of appointed counsel.
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obligation to provide meaningful access to the courts”); United States v. Chatman,
584 F.2d 1358, 1360 (4th Cir. 1978) (rejecting argument that Bounds provides a
defendant who has waived his right to counsel the “right to access to legal matters
to prepare his defense” or obligates the government to provide such access).
Because Smith voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel,
Smith had no constitutional right to access a law library and other legal resources
during his pre-trial detention. Thus, the district court properly dismissed his
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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