Eric Turner v. Broward Sheriff's Office , 542 F. App'x 764 ( 2013 )

Case: 12-14885 Date Filed: 10/04/2013 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 12-14885
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 0:12-cv-61038-RNS
ERIC TURNER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BROWARD SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
HOLLYWOOD POLICE DEPARTMENT,
DETECTIVE CYNTHIA BATES,
OFFICER K. BECKFORD,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(October 4, 2013)
Before DUBINA, WILSON, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Case: 12-14885 Date Filed: 10/04/2013 Page: 2 of 7
Eric Turner (Turner), proceeding pro se, appeals the dismissal of his 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action against Broward County Sheriff’s Office (BCSO),
Hollywood Police Department, Detective Cynthia Bates (Bates), and Officer K.
Beckford (Beckford) (collectively, Defendants), in which he alleges that he was
arrested based upon falsified police reports and affidavits. Upon review of the
record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
I. Background
The magistrate judge determined that Turner’s claims were barred by Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S. Ct. 2364 (1994), and, alternatively, Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S. Ct. 746 (1971). The district court adopted the
magistrate’s recommendation over Turner’s objections, dismissing his complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
On appeal, Turner contends that Defendants falsely arrested and illegally
detained him in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. He argues
that Defendants should be held liable because he was arrested only after Bates
submitted a falsified probable-cause affidavit to the state court.1
1
Additionally, Turner argues for the first time on appeal that has was detained without
being “routinely process[ed]” back into BCSO’s jail, in violation of his due process rights. As
this argument was not raised before the district court, we will not consider it. See Porter v.
Ogden, Newell & Welch, 241 F.3d 1334, 1340 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428
U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2877(1976) (“It is the general rule, of course, that a federal
appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.”)). Similarly, the exhibits that
Turner submits with his appellate brief which are not part of the record on appeal will not be
2
Case: 12-14885 Date Filed: 10/04/2013 Page: 3 of 7
II. Legal Standards
We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state
a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), viewing the allegations in the complaint as true.
Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1159–60 (11th Cir. 2003); Mitchell v. Farcass, 112
F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). We liberally construe pro se briefs. Timson v.
Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008).
Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), a court shall dismiss a case proceeding in forma
pauperis “at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a
claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Dismissal
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as a dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483,
1490 (11th Cir. 1997). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to
dismiss, the entitlement to relief “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007).
considered. See Fed. R. App. P. 10(a); Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509 F.3d 1351, 1357
(11th Cir. 2007).
3
Case: 12-14885 Date Filed: 10/04/2013 Page: 4 of 7
Under Heck v. Humphrey, a plaintiff cannot bring a claim for damages under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor would render a state
conviction or sentence invalid, unless the plaintiff proves that the conviction or
sentence has been invalidated by an entity with the authority to do so. Heck,
512 U.S. at 486-87; 114 S. Ct. at 2372. Accordingly, when a state prisoner brings
a § 1983 claim for damages, “the district court must consider whether a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence.” Id.; see Hughes, 350 F.3d at 1160–61 n.2 (“Thus, the court must look
both to the claims raised under § 1983 and to the specific offenses for which the
§ 1983 claimant was convicted.”). If the claim would necessarily imply the
invalidity of the conviction or sentence and the plaintiff cannot establish that the
conviction or sentence already has been invalidated, then the court must dismiss
the complaint. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. Typically, a § 1983
action necessarily implies the invalidity of a conviction if the action requires
negating an element of the offense of conviction. See id. at 486–87 n.6. However,
Heck is not implicated if there is not a “necessary logical connection between a
successful § 1983 suit and the negation of the underlying conviction.” Dyer v. Lee,
488 F.3d 876, 880 (11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original).
Further, the Heck bar applies only when there is a conviction or sentence
that has not been invalidated. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393, 127 S. Ct. 1091,
4
Case: 12-14885 Date Filed: 10/04/2013 Page: 5 of 7
1098 (2007) (indicating that Heck did not preclude “an anticipated future
conviction”). Moreover, where a plaintiff brought a § 1983 suit alleging arrest
without probable cause, and participated in Florida’s pretrial intervention program,
we held that because plaintiff was not convicted of any offense, Heck preclusion
did not apply. McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1251–52 (11th Cir. 2007).
In Younger, the Supreme Court held that federal courts should not stay or
enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances. 401
U.S. at 41, 91 S. Ct. at 749. The Younger abstention doctrine is based on the
premise that a pending state prosecution will provide the accused with a sufficient
chance to vindicate his federal constitutional rights. Hughes v. Att’y Gen. of Fla.,
377 F.3d 1258, 1263 n.7 (11th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, Younger abstention is
required when (1) the proceedings constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding,
(2) the proceedings implicate important state interests, and (3) there is an adequate
opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges. Christman v.
Crist, 315 Fed. Appx. 231, 232 (11th Cir. 2009); 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329
F.3d 1255, 1275–82 (11th Cir. 2003).
Under the Younger doctrine, federal courts are required to abstain if the state
criminal prosecution commenced before any proceedings of substance on the
merits have taken place in federal court, or if the federal case is in an “embryonic
stage and no contested matter [has] been decided.” For Your Eyes Alone, Inc. v.
5
Case: 12-14885 Date Filed: 10/04/2013 Page: 6 of 7
City of Columbus, 281 F.3d 1209, 1217 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see Redner v. Citrus Cnty., 919 F.2d 646, 649 (11th Cir. 1990)
(explaining that Younger abstention is appropriate where the state prosecution
commenced after the federal complaint was filed but before any proceedings on the
merits had taken place in federal court). However, Younger abstention is
inappropriate if there is no pending state criminal prosecution of the plaintiff.
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462, 94 S. Ct. 1209, 1217 (1974) (noting that
the principles underlying Younger’s abstention doctrine, including equity, comity,
and federalism, have little force where there is no pending state proceeding). We
review the district court’s decision to abstain based on Younger for abuse of
discretion. For Your Eyes Alone, 281 F.3d at 1216.
III. Discussion
First, we take judicial notice that Turner was sentenced, on August 27, 2013,
to ten years for false imprisonment and five years for “2+ simple battery,” based on
offenses he committed on November 8, 2011.2 Based upon this information, at the
time the district court dismissed Turner’s complaint, the charges which resulted in
these convictions were still pending. It appears that, given Turner’s state criminal
convictions were not final at the time he filed his complaint, his claims would not
2
Turner was sentenced after he filed his appeal brief on June 3, 2013. See Offender Information
Search, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., http://www.dc.state.fl.us/AppCommon (search DC Number
Q03280); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201 (permitting a court, at any stage of a proceeding, to take
judicial notice of a fact that “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.”).
6
Case: 12-14885 Date Filed: 10/04/2013 Page: 7 of 7
be barred by Heck. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393, 127 S. Ct. at 1098 (rejecting an
extension of the Heck bar which would preclude § 1983 claims before the plaintiff
has been convicted); McClish, 483 F.3d at 1250–52. Nevertheless, because we
find that the district court properly abstained from the merits of this case pursuant
to Younger, we need not decide whether this case was barred by Heck.
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding
that Turner’s claims were precluded by Younger. Indeed, Younger abstention was
appropriate because (1) the state criminal proceedings against Turner were
pending; (2) criminal proceedings involve important state interests; and (3) Turner
could have raised his constitutional challenges in the state criminal proceedings.
See Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432, 102 S. Ct. at 2521. The record indicates that
Turner’s state criminal proceedings commenced prior to his filing a complaint or
any proceedings of substance on the merits of this case, and thus Younger
abstention was appropriate. See For Your Eyes Alone, 281 F.3d at 1217.
Accordingly, the Court affirms on this ground.
AFFIRMED.
7