Sherryl Hutch Coker v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) , 559 F. App'x 868 ( 2014 )

Case: 13-11657 Date Filed: 03/17/2014 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
___________________________
No. 13-11657
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D.C. Docket No. 1:10-cv-03102-WSD
SHERRYL HUTCH COKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY (“MARTA”),
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
_____________________________
(March 17, 2014)
Before WILSON, Circuit Judge, MIDDLEBROOKS, * and ALBRITTON,**
District Judges.
* Honorable Donald M. Middlebrooks, United States District Judge for the Southern
District of Florida, sitting by designation.
** Honorable W. Harold Albritton, United States District Judge for the Middle District of
Alabama, sitting by designation.
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PER CURIAM:
Sherryl Hutch Coker sued the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority
(“MARTA”) in 2010 for gender-based employment discrimination in violation of
Title VII. Coker claimed that MARTA discriminated against her by hiring a man for
a newly-created position instead of her. In particular, Coker claimed that her
supervisor, who made the hiring decision, told her that the selected candidate “was a
male Asian, from Seattle, Washington, would bring diversity to the office.” Coker
inferred from this statement that her supervisor had chosen the selected candidate
because he was male.
On March 19, 2013, the district court granted summary judgment on all of
Coker’s claims. Coker appealed the district court’s decision, arguing that the district
court erred in deciding that the supervisor’s statement did not constitute direct
evidence of discrimination and that, even if not direct evidence, the statement did not
combine with other evidence sufficiently to create a genuine issue of material fact on
whether MARTA’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for not
selecting Coker were pretext for discrimination.
This court reviews the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.
Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1341 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). We review all
inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable to the
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nonmovant. White v. Mercury Marine, Div. of Brunswick, Inc., 129 F.3d 1428, 1430
(11th Cir. 1997).
A plaintiff has the burden of proving discrimination in a Title VII case, and he
or she may establish a claim by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence.
Hinson v. Clinch Cnty., Ga. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 827 (11th Cir. 2000).
“Direct evidence is that which shows an employer’s discriminatory intent ‘without
any inference or presumption.’” Id. (quoting Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161
F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998)). The statement must show that the employment
decision at issue was motivated by the protected characteristic, and “‘only the most
blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to discriminate on the
[protected classification]’ are direct evidence of discrimination.” Scott v. Suncoast
Beverage Sales, Ltd., 295 F.3d 1223, 1227–28 (11th Cir. 2002) (alteration in
original) (quoting Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354,
1359 (11th Cir. 1999)). Coker has provided no evidence of the context of the
supervisor’s statement in this case. In particular, the evidence does not show the
statement to have been made in response to a question as to why the other person
was hired instead of Coker, and there is no evidence as to whether the statement
related in any other way to the supervisor’s hiring decision. The court would have to
infer or presume that the statement related to the employment decision at issue in
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this case. Thus, the statement is not direct evidence of discrimination.
Further, as to a circumstantial claim, after a thorough de novo review and
consideration of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the oral arguments of counsel, we
find that Coker has failed to present sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of
material fact as to pretext. We further find that MARTA is entitled to judgment
based on the facts before the court. Thus, the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of MARTA is
AFFIRMED.
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