John B. Finney v. Bibb County Public Schools , 201 F. App'x 671 ( 2006 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
OCT 3, 2006
No. 06-11437 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 02-00468-CV-DF-5
JOHN B. FINNEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BIBB COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendant-Appellee,
SHARON PATTERSON,
individually and in her official
capacity as school Superintendent for
Bibb County Public Schools, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
_________________________
(October 3, 2006)
Before BLACK, BARKETT and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
John B. Finney appeals various decisions made by the district court during
the course of Finney’s trial on his Title VII retaliation suit against Bibb County
Public Schools.
Finney was hired by Bibb County Public Schools as a custodian in 1993. In
1995, Finney was transferred to the Bibb County Alternative School. During the
1999-2000 school year, Finney filed a sexual harassment complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission against Bibb County Public Schools
involving Alternative School’s principal, Dr. James Hodges. Hodges’ secretary
filed a separate sexual harassment complaint against Hodges, and Finney gave a
deposition and testified during her trial.
During the 2000-2001 school year, Finney was transferred to the Alexander
II elementary school. After one year at Alexander II, the new principal, Rochelle
Simms, testified that Finney engaged in inappropriate and insubordinate behavior.
Simms testified that by the spring of 2002 Finney’s inappropriate and
insubordinate behavior had escalated, and she recommended that Finney no longer
remain Head Custodian and be transferred. Dennis Staten, Director of Custodian
Services, testified that he made the decision to terminate Finney rather than
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transfer him. Finney was terminated in April 2002.
Finney filed a lawsuit against Sharon Patterson, Superintendent, Dennis
Staten, Director of Custodian Services, and Rochelle Simms, Principal, in their
individual and official capacities, and Bibb County Public Schools pursuant to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court
granted. Finney filed an appeal, and this Court reversed summary judgment as to
Finney’s employment retaliation claim against Bibb County Public Schools, and
the case was remanded to the trial court.
A jury trial was held in January 2006 on Finney’s retaliation claim. The jury
returned a verdict in favor of Bibb County Public Schools. The jury found that
Finney had failed to establish a causal connection between his adverse employment
action and his statutorily protected activities. On appeal, Finney argues that (1) the
district court erred in the charge it gave to the jury on the definition of “causally
related” employment retaliation, (2) the district court erred by failing to give
Finney’s requested charge on “causal connection,” (3) the jury verdict was contrary
to the weight of the evidence on the issue of causal connection, (4) the district
court plainly erred by failing to ask the jury in a special interrogatory whether the
Bibb County Public Schools’ non-retaliatory reasons for terminating Finney’s
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employment were pretextual, (5) the district court erred by limiting Finney’s
retaliation claim in its charge to the jury to his EEOC sexual harassment charge,
(6) the district court plainly erred in making a comment in addition to the standard
Allen Charge, and (7) the district court abused its discretion by excluding Finney’s
testimony regarding the details of how he was sexually harassed by Principal
Hodges.
As to Finney’s claim that the district court erred in giving certain jury
instructions, we apply a deferential standard of review to a court’s jury
instructions. Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1543 (11th Cir. 1996).
“‘So long as the instructions accurately reflect the law, the trial judge is given wide
discretion as to the style and wording employed in the instructions.’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Starke, 62 F.3d 1374, 1380 (11th Cir. 1995)). We will only find
reversible error in the refusal to give a jury instruction if “(1) the requested
instruction correctly stated the law, (2) the instruction dealt with an issue properly
before the jury, and (3) the failure to give the instruction resulted in prejudicial
harm to the requesting party.” Jennings v. BIC Corp., 181 F.3d 1250, 1254 (11th
Cir. 1999). We employ the same deferential standard of review to the district
court’s failure to give a special interrogatory. Bogle v. McClure, 332 F.3d 1347,
1357 (11th Cir. 2003).
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As to the Finney’s claim that the jury verdict was contrary to the great
weight of the evidence, our review is limited to whether there was any evidence to
support the jury’s verdict, irrespective of sufficiency, because Finney failed to
move for a judgment as a matter of law in the district court and raises this issue for
the first time on appeal. Hercaire International Inc. v. Argentina, 821 F.2d 559,
562 (11th Cir. 1987).
“We review a district court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for
abuse of discretion, and evidentiary rulings will be overturned only if the moving
party establishes that the ruling resulted in a ‘substantial prejudicial effect.’”
Piamba Cortes v. American Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1305 (11th Cir. 1999).
Upon review of the briefs, the record, and the evidence in this case, we find
no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the district court. Furthermore, we
find that there was evidence to support the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we affirm
on all the issues before us.
AFFIRMED.
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