Douglas S. Carter v. Diamondback Golf Club, Inc. , 222 F. App'x 929 ( 2007 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
March 30, 2007
Nos. 06-11961 & 06-14817 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 03-00326-CV-T-27-MAP
DOUGLAS S. CARTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DIAMONDBACK GOLF CLUB, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(March 30, 2007)
Before BIRCH, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Douglas S. Carter (“Carter”) filed suit against his former employer,
Diamondback Golf Club, Inc. (“Diamondback”), for religious discrimination under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., as amended
by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (“Title VII”), and the Florida
Civil Rights Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 760.01–760.11. Previously, we vacated the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Diamondback on the grounds that
Carter had “present[ed] circumstantial evidence of a mixed motive on
Diamondback’s part.” Carter v. Diamondback Golf Club, Inc., No. 12422, slip op.
at 2 (11th Cir. Apr. 1, 2005).
On remand, the district court considered Diamondback’s renewed motion for
summary judgment and held that Carter had presented circumstantial evidence
sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact that religion was a motivating
factor in Diamondback’s decision to fire him. The district court also determined
that if Carter were to convince the jury that religion was a motivating factor in his
termination, and Diamondback successfully raised a “same decision” defense,
Carter would be limited to seeking attorney’s fees and costs. The court held,
without considering the particular facts of the case, that Carter could not seek
declaratory or injunctive relief because he did not specifically request declaratory
or injunctive relief in his complaint. The district court chose not to construe
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language in the complaint requesting “such other relief as this Court deems just
and proper” as encompassing a claim for declaratory or injunctive relief.
The case proceeded to trial and a jury returned a “mixed-motive” verdict
establishing that although religion was a motivating factor in Diamondback’s
decision to terminate Carter, Diamondback would have made the same decision
even if Carter’s religion had not been considered. Following its earlier limitation,
the district court did not consider declaratory or injunctive relief, but did determine
that Carter is not entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs because he did not obtain at
least some relief on the merits of his claim, and therefore was not a prevailing
party. Further, the district court did not award attorneys’ fees and costs because it
did not find Diamondback’s discrimination to be particularly egregious, but found
that Carter had engaged in wrongdoing of his own that resulted in his termination.
In these consolidated appeals, Carter argues that (1) the district court erred in
ruling that it need not consider declaratory and injunctive relief, and (2) that the
district court erred in denying his motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.
I.
The district court should not have denied declaratory and injunctive relief
merely because Carter failed to specifically request such relief in his complaint.1
1
We review the district court’s conclusion that Carter was not entitled to declaratory or
injunctive relief de novo, as it was a conclusion of law. Miles v. Naval Aviation Museum Found.,
3
Pursuant to Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court may grant
such relief as is proper notwithstanding the failure of a party to demand such relief
in the pleadings. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 65-66, 99
S. Ct. 383, 387, 58 L. Ed. 2d 292 (1978). Under Rule 54(c) and Title VII, the
district court has broad discretion in fashioning relief to achieve the broad purposes
of the Civil Rights Act and has authority to award appropriate relief dictated by
evidence, “even though it may not have been sought in pleadings.” Fitzgerald v.
Sirloin Stockade, Inc., 624 F.2d 945, 957 (10th Cir. 1980); Rivers v. Washington
County Bd. of Educ., 770 F.2d 1010, 1012 (11th Cir. 1985) (“The district court has
broad, equitable discretion to grant any equitable relief it deems appropriate to
make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment
discrimination.”); See also 10 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay
Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2664 (3d ed. 1998).
The district court’s order names as its sole reason for limiting Carter’s relief
to attorneys’ fees and costs that he did not request declaratory or injunctive relief
Inc., 289 F.3d 715, 720 (11th Cir.2002). Diamondback correctly states that the standard of
review for application of Rule 54 is “whether the district court was clearly erroneous in its
factual findings and whether it abused its traditional discretion to locate a just result in light of
the circumstances peculiar to the case.” Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424-25,
95 S. Ct. 2363, 2375, 45 L. Ed. 2d 280 (1975) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
However, the district court did not appear to consider the facts or circumstances of this case in
limiting Carter’s remedy, but instead came to the legal conclusion that it would not consider
declaratory or injunctive relief because they had not been requested.
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in his complaint. The plain language of Rule 54(c) requires courts to “grant the
relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party
has not demanded such relief in the party’s pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). The
fact that Carter’s complaint had not specifically requested declaratory or injunctive
relief does not foreclose their availability. Rule 54 requires the district court to
grant the relief to which each plaintiff is entitled, even if that relief is not requested
in the complaint.
Notably, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits the relief available in a
mixed-motive case: the district court “may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief
. . . , and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to
the pursuit of” a mixed motive claim. While we acknowledge that it is within the
discretion of the district court under Title VII not to grant declaratory or injunctive
relief, in this case we cannot determine whether the district court reached “a ‘just
result’ in light of the circumstances peculiar to the case,” Albemarle Paper Co.,
422 U.S. at 424, 95 S. Ct. at 2375, because the district court did not appear to
consider the facts of the case in making its determination. Accordingly, we vacate
the district court’s judgment with regard to declaratory and injunctive relief, and
remand for a consideration of available remedies based on the facts and
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circumstances of this case.2
II.
Because the district court’s order denying attorneys’ fees and costs depends
in part on Carter’s failure to obtain declaratory or injunctive relief, Carter’s motion
for attorneys’ fees and costs should be reconsidered on remand as well. As the
district court properly notes, one of the considerations in determining entitlement
to fees is the existence or award of declaratory or injunctive relief. See Canup, 123
F.3d at 1444. Accordingly, although we agree with the district court’s reliance on
our precedent in Canup, 123 F.3d 1440, we vacate and remand the district court’s
order denying attorneys’ fees and costs for reconsideration following its
consideration of declaratory and injunctive relief.
VACATED and REMANDED.
2
In so holding, we make no judgment as to whether declaratory or injunctive relief is
appropriate in this case. “Injunctive relief may not be available in a given case . . ., but it will be
available in some situations.” Canup v. Chapman-Union, Inc., 123 F.3d 1440, 1444 (11th Cir.
1997).
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