United States v. Henry Hill , 313 F. App'x 195 ( 2008 )

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JUNE 4, 2008
No. 07-14063 THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 06-00342-CR-T-30-TGW
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff–Appellee,
versus
HENRY HILL,
Defendant–Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(June 4, 2008)
Before ANDERSON, BARKETT, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Henry Hill appeals his conviction for conspiracy to make unregistered
firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 26 U.S.C. § 5861(f). The charged
conspiracy involved incidents where an indicted co-conspirator, Jerome Flowers,
threw two different Molotov cocktails at the houses of two of Hill’s neighbors.
First, Hill argues on appeal that sufficient evidence did not support his conviction
because the district court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal was
inconsistent with its grant of the same motion by his co-defendant and alleged co-
conspirator, William Conner, Jr., on the same conspiracy charge. Second, he
contends that he is entitled to a new trial due to the cumulative effect of errors
committed by the district court during the trial. Specifically, he argues that the
errors included a Bruton 1 error, a possible discovery violation, an improper
statement by the court, and improper closing arguments by the prosecutor.
I.
We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the government and accepting all reasonable inferences
in favor of the verdict. United States v. Klopf, 423 F.3d 1228, 1236 (11th Cir.
2005). The jury alone may make credibility determinations. United States v.
Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314, 1325 (11th Cir. 1997). The jury may choose to accept or
reject a witness’s testimony either in whole or in part. See United States v. Habel,
613 F.2d 1321, 1324 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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Based on this record, we conclude that sufficient evidence supported Hill’s
conviction for conspiracy to make unregistered firearms. Flowers’s testimony was
sufficient to prove all the elements of the charged conspiracy, and other evidence at
trial confirmed many of the details given by Flowers regarding the Molotov
cocktail incidents. Moreover, the district court’s grant of judgment of acquittal to
Hill’s co-defendant and alleged co-conspirator Conner does not render the
evidence insufficient to support the jury verdict against Hill. The record does not
demonstrate that the grant of Conner’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the
conspiracy charge was inconsistent with Hill’s conviction. Therefore, the district
court’s denial of Hill’s motion for judgment of acquittal was not erroneous.
II.
Hill next argues that cumulative errors during the trial mandate a reversal of
his conviction. We reject this argument, finding that any errors that may have
occurred were harmless in this case. First, any possible Bruton error at trial was
harmless because other evidence, outside of the statement made by Hill’s non-
testifying co-defendant Conner, indicated Hill’s full participation in the conspiracy.
Second, any possible discovery error regarding the mid-trial disclosure of a
videotape of Hill’s July 25 statement to police also was harmless because it did not
affect Hill’s ability to present a defense, the video’s influence on the jury was
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invited, and no reasonable probability exists that the late disclosure affected the
outcome of the trial. Third, the district court did not plainly err in succinctly
notifying the jury that it granted Conner’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
Finally, none of the prosecutor’s closing arguments constituted plain error because
most of the challenged statements properly urged the jury to draw inferences from
the evidence and correctly stated the law. To the extent that any of the
prosecutor’s statements went beyond the evidence, they did not prejudice Hill’s
substantial rights.
Accordingly, the district court did not commit any reversible errors during
Hill’s trial, and the cumulative effect of any harmless errors did not prejudice
Hill’s substantial rights. Therefore, Hill is not entitled to a new trial and we affirm
his conviction.
AFFIRMED.
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